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ABSTRACT
TextFrame: Cosmopolitanism and Non-Exclusively Anglophone Poetries
by Michael Scharf
Advisor: Ammiel Alcalay
This project proposes a replacement for some institutional-archival mechanisms of non-exclusively
anglophone poetry as it is produced under racial capitalism and archived via its universities and grantbearing nonprofits. The project argues specifically for the self-archiving of non-exclusively anglophone
poetry, and by extension of poetry, in a manner that builds away from US-dominated, nationallyorganized institutions. It argues that cosmopolitanist norm translation, as advocated by various critics,
can function as part of a critique of institutional value creation used in maintaining inequalities
through poetry. The US-based Poetry Foundation is currently the major online archive of contemporary
anglophone poetry; the project comprises a series of related essays that culminate in a rough outline
for a collaboratively designed, coded, and maintained application to replace the Foundation’s website.
Whatever benefit might result, replacing archival mechanisms of racial capitalism while remaining
within its systemic modes of value creation is at best a form of substitution: it is not an actual change
in relations and not a transition to anything. Doing so may, however, allow greater clarity in
understanding how poetry is situated within US-based institutions, beyond the images and values that
poets and critics in the US often help to maintain.

Chapter one, “‘Indianness’ and Omission: 60 Indian Poets,” reads the anthology 60 Indian Poets,
published in 2008 in India and the UK (with US distribution), as argument about the contours of Indian
Poetry in English and about the contours of India’s relations in the world. It relates Rashmi Sadana’s
work on the meanings of English in India to decisions made within the anthology, and look further at
Pollock’s conception of cosmopolitanism and vernacularity, particular as it applies to the Indian NorthEast and the poetry of Kynpham Sing Nongkynrih. The second chapter, “Archival Power:
Individualization, the Racial State, and Institutional Poetry” engages Roderick Ferguson’s concept of
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archival power to explain the 2015 “crisis” within contemporary US poetry driven by practitioners of
conceptual poetry, and an attempted archival act with regard to the Black Lives Matter movement.
The chapter ends with a fragment of Alexis Pauline Gumbs’s recent account of US university life as
experienced by Black artists and scholars. That chapter is followed by “The Poetry Foundation as Site
of Archival Power,” which extends Jodi Melamed’s critique of US university value-creation mechanisms
to Poetry magazine and the Poetry Foundation’s website. It argues that the Poetry Foundation
functions as a de facto arm of the US university system as outlined in the previous chapter, and aids in
capitalist value-creation. “TextFrame: An Open Archive for Poetry,” the fourth chapter, is an attempt
to begin thinking a replacement for current mechanisms of archiving non-exclusively anglophone
poetry. The fifth chapter, “Narayanan’s Language Events as Free-Tier Application,” documents work
imagined for TextFrame, as an application, that has actually already been built: the poet and scholar
Vivek Narayanan adapted Robert Desnos’s Language Events for the classroom using a variety of discrete
free services, and the present author collaborated with Narayanan in creating a stand-alone Web
application.

Chapters six, seven, and eight function as case studies to be used in creating templates for providing
context to specific poems within any built application. Both of the specific moments covered
transmogrify the “anti-psychological.” The sixth chapter, “An Unendurable Age: Ashbery, O’Hara, and
1950s Precursors of ‘Self’ Psychology” thus argues that an anti-psychological ethos is developed in
Ashbery and O’Hara’s poems of that moment. It shows that Frank O’Hara’s “Personism: A Manifesto”
(1959) is almost certainly a parody of Gordon Allport’s theory of Personalism, of related strands of
1950s American psychology, and of the poetry that developed alongside them in the 1930s. It follows
other critics in looking at midcentury conceptions of schizophrenia as a specifically homosexual
disease, and argues for the importance of contemporarily published examples of schizophrenic
discourse, particularly those of Harry Stack Sullivan. It argues that Ashbery’s poem “A Boy” can be read
as directly engaging those ideas, and opposing them. The shorter discussions follow consider the
affinities that Some Trees has with anti- or a-psychological theories of mind that were being developed
at Harvard and MIT at the time that Ashbery and O’Hara were in Cambridge, including generative
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grammar and critiques of philosophical analyticity. The eighth chapter, “Before Conceptualism: Disgust
and Over-determination in White-dominated Experimental Poetry in New York, 1999-2003,” highlights
Dan Farrell and Lytle Shaw’s very different uses of lyric’s peculiar staging of voice to foreground the
multi-furcation of white identities and voice in response to state pressures.

The last two chapters take up two corollaries, or theoretical concerns that fell out trying to think a
cosmopolitanist application. The first, “Why Not Reddit?” examines existing commercial
cosmopolitanist solutions for some of the functionality proposed for the application, and reasons for
rejecting them. In doing so, it discusses Thomas Farrell’s construct of “rhetorical culture” in detail,
and traces a theory of communication and authorship within a community, particularly with regard to
thinking history. The last chapter (and second corollary) is titled “Ethos in Pedagogy as a Limit on Norm
Translation.” It establishes the Aristotelian concept of ethos as a pedagogical limit for norm
translation. The study’s governing interest is not the conflicts or differences between practitioners or
tendencies that are detailed here, but their relative incomprehensibility of those differences outside of
their formative contexts.
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Endpoints for currently deployed “Language Events” application (described in chapter five):
The question / answer language event:
• http://desnos.herokuapp.com/some-random-id/qa/add
• http://desnos.herokuapp.com/some-random-id/qa/combine
• http://desnos.herokuapp.com/some-random-id/qa/show
The if
•
•
•

(or when) / then language event:
http://desnos.herokuapp.com/some-random-id/if-then/add
http://desnos.herokuapp.com/some-random-id/if-then/combine
http://desnos.herokuapp.com/some-random-id/if-then/show

Any string can be substituted for “some-random-id”; it is the means by which a discrete “event” is
created. See chapter five for further instructions.
3

Screen captures of current deployment (and fragments under development)
•
•
•

language_event.mov
parse.mov
xlang.mov

A set of Quicktime movies documenting the work described in chapter five. The first movie documents
the “If-then” language event, but both language events—question/answer and if/then—work exactly
the same way: only the prompts are different. The fragmentary parse! app is basically a sentencediagramming tool, and the xlanguage application is a kind of translation prompt; both are explained
further in chapter five.
4

Code and other deliverables

The contents of three separate Github repositories at the time of deposit, for the Language Events (aka
“desnos”), parse!, and xlanguage (or “cross-language”).
•
•
•

https://github.com/scharfmn/desnos
https://github.com/scharfmn/parse
https://github.com/scharfmn/xlanguage
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List of variables
The following variables are in use in the Language Events app:
EVENTS The main configuration variable for language events. Key-value pair that allows adding of
two-box events. The key is a string; the value is a dictionary containing the names and ordering (a, b)
of the two individual textboxes, and the overall title (or “prompt”) text for the event.
EVENT_TITLE_TEXT A constant for use in choosing the configuration. Forces the developer to use the
variable for a key rather than risking mistyping. Used in the EVENTS key-value pair config to designate
the prompt text.
FLASK_APP An environment variable that should be set before local testing. Allows Flask to run locally
from a chosen location. See the Flask documentation for more information.
FOR_DESNOS_ONLY An environment variable that should be set before deployment. Used to set the
Flask app’s SECRET_KEY.
REDIS_URL An environment variable that should be set before deployment of the Web application.
Provides the deployed Flask app with the address of the Redis key-value store, which is used to store
the texts for the individual language event instances as they are created.
SECRET_KEY A variable required for the Flask app’s security. It is set via the environment variable
FOR_DESNOS_ONLY. A default is also provided for testing.
TEXTBOXES A constant for use in choosing the configuration. Forces the developer to use the variable
for a key rather than risking mistyping. Used in the EVENTS key-value pair config to designate the title
text for each textbox.
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Glossary of functions
The following functions are in use in the Language Events app:
Python/Flask
add_to_cache_on_post Takes input from the user via textbox POST request and stores it in the Redis
key-value store according to the following variable values: the request, which contains the user’s
input, instance_id which is a unique string used to designate a particular instance of a language event,
and an event_id, which is one of the prompt-sets from the EVENTS config.
combine One of the three application endpoints, GET only. It takes retrieves the input as stored and
sends it back to the template for combination and presentation.
retrieve_instance_data Database access function that calls Redis for the correct instance and
language event, and packages the data into valid json. If there is missing input data, sends canned
‘test’ data instead.
show One of the three application endpoints, GET only. It takes retrieves the input as stored and
sends it back to the template for presentation grouped as is.
text_input One of the three application endpoints. It presents the textbox inputs on GET, and stores
the user input in Redis on POST.
Javascript
anonymous [desnos.html] Function for dynamically presenting text in couplets at timed intervals.
anonymous [event-base.html] Cut/paste function from the Bootstrap documentation to validate user
input to the textboxes. Checks for valid input on submit.
copyToClipboard Stores whatever is currently onscreen into the clipboard so that the user might paste
it into a document.
shuffle Randomizing function adapted from stack overflow that combines the input texts in a pseudorandom manner.
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A note on technical specifications
All three applications included here are Python 3-based Flask applications on the backend. On the
frontend, all require the Bootstrap framework (https://getbootstrap.com), the jQuery framework
(https://jquery.com), and the Font Awesome set of fonts (https://fontawesome.com), which are
installed via various content distribution networks that are hardcoded onto the respective hypertext
markup language files. Except where noted, the library requirements are installable by typing $pip
install -r requirements.txt after changing to the repository directory.

The Language Events application is contained within the desnos repository included here. The
application requires a Redis server to be installed and running (https://redis.io), and for the Redis url
to be provided to the application via the environment variable REDIS_URL. The application has a very
small memory footprint; it should not require a machine with a large amount of RAM. The repository
includes a “Procfile” for deployment on the Heroku platform (https://www.heroku.com), as well as a
Dockerfile and Docker-compose.yml for deploying both the application and Redis via Docker container
(https://www.docker.com). The Procfile has been tested and used in the existing deployment on the
Heroku free tier. Redis can be added to Heroku applications via the Heroku admin dashboard; see the
Heroku documentation.

The parse! application requires the spacy.io natural language processing library (https://spacy.io),
which can be difficult to install in some environments as it has a Cython (Python-syntax C) component,
and many Python library dependencies. I have not attempted to include instructions for installing
spacy.io or to include a Docker container or Dockerfile for a properly configured environment; it’s
currently a very large set of files that seems to preclude a strictly free-tier deployment in line with the
project’s goals as outlined in chapter five, including easy and free deployment. The parse! application
itself is fragmentary and still in development. I have included a demonstration of the existing
functionality; the code is included here for reference only.
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The xlanguage (or “cross-language”) application similarly has a large set of dependencies, but its
dependencies are lists of lexemes from various languages: basically a list of vocabulary items. I have
taken them from the ubuntu 12.04 LTS distribution (https://ubuntu.com), where they are used, I
believe, for spell-checking; ubuntu is an open source platform, and I have used the files for research
purposes only. I have reformatted the source text, and the resulting files are installed into memory
automatically by the application on startup as long as the file structure in the repository is maintained.
Note that one set is latin-1 encoding and one is utf-8; Python handles them slightly differently.
xlanguage as an application is in a working but still incomplete state and is still under development;
the code is included here for reference only.

xv

Introduction: Cosmopolitanism, Archival Power, and Poetry
This project proposes a replacement for some institutional-archival mechanisms of non-exclusively
anglophone poetry as it is produced under racial capitalism and archived via its universities and grantbearing nonprofits. The project argues specifically for the self-archiving of non-exclusively anglophone
poetry, and by extension of poetry, in a manner that builds away from US-dominated, nationallyorganized institutions. It argues that cosmopolitanist norm translation, as advocated by various critics,
can function as part of a critique of institutional value creation used in maintaining inequalities
through poetry. The US-based Poetry Foundation is currently the major online archive of contemporary
anglophone poetry; the project comprises a series of related essays that culminate in a rough outline
for a collaboratively designed, coded, and maintained application to replace the Foundation’s website.
Whatever benefit might result, replacing archival mechanisms of racial capitalism while remaining
within its systemic modes of value creation is at best a form of shitty substitution: it is not an actual
change in relations and not a transition to anything. Doing so may, however, allow greater clarity in
understanding how poetry is situated within US-based institutions, beyond the images and values that
poets and critics in the US often help to maintain.

Just as it constrains people’s movements, the nation-state organizes people’s work and arts, actively
working against attempts, via shared language or other transnational commonalities, to abstract away
from it. In this sense, “global” always means “nationally-organized” and “transnational” means
poetries that are distributed and read transnationally (or not), with the nation always remaining an
inviolable containing construct in terms of production and reception. The nation, rather than
“anglophone” or any other language-based abstraction one may imagine, is the top-level affiliation
available to anyone writing non-exclusively anglophone poetry. Poetry is subject to more constraints
than capital. People are too.
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A nation is a kind of super-corporation. Nations organize property rights and relations, including
resources and labor. They do so by defining and enforcing exclusions, using borders, which, along with
systems of citizenship, define who does and does not have “rights” within a nation’s jurisdiction. That
is what the poet Wendy Trevino calls a Cruel Fiction. Nations have militaries for enforcing sets of
relations and interests that operate above, and are superordinate to, false and distorted historical and
genetic narratives related to place and to origin. In their very real fictions of separation, nations make
use of and manipulate what Benedict Anderson calls Imagined Communities, people’s ideas about who
they are and who they are not in relation to others. What underlies them is not “imagined” in a
conventional sense; it is internalized and wired in. Internally, nations have police to protect property
and sets of normative practices drawing on these narratives using racist violence; externally, they
enforce borders using racist violence. Internally, prisons isolate those to whom a nation tacitly does not
grant rights under its system of relations. Through courts, prisons extract free or undercompensated
labor from those they isolate. In the US, those imprisoned are disproportionately Black. Mass
incarceration is a direct form of the “afterlife of slavery” (Hartman). The US, founded on slavery,
continues to depend on Black labor extracted using racist violence.

At the same time, literature continues. Its production and its reception can be separable, with writing
happening sometimes from within relatively different sets of relations to those that come to define a
work’s meanings. Within the US, reception is generally a regulated spectacle. It is regulated within
universities, which work to maintain an imagined political horizon, which is tacitly, and often
explicitly, capitalist. The process of reception by which authors like Arundhati Roy or Toni Morrison
appear within a “world republic of letters” (Casanova) is a process whereby a work, as a commodity, is
made to seem “authorized less from its relation to the market,” and authorized more by its expressive
function, treated as if it “does not have a relation to the market” (Spahr, Du Bois's Telegram 15). That
form of reception reflects “art’s anomalous, incomplete, and paradoxical commodification” whereby it
is “brought into capitalism as something that is independent from capitalism”1 in what Spahr calls a
“complicated half-in, half-out relationship” that “gives literature the autonomy to provoke, to speak
truths to power” (ibid 16).
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The production of the “world republic of letters” is a cosmopolitanist process. Nations generally create
relatively insular literatures with inevitable-feeling logics by conditioning production via expected
reception. Finished works are subject to reception for much longer than they are to production, and
reception can be subject to different constraints than is production. Seeming-not-to-have-a-relation to
the market is a form of reception. In reception much more than production, perspectives get
universalized, or detached, from poetries and literatures (or not) by a process that often gets called
cosmopolitanism, imbricated within racial capitalism.

Racial capitalism is capitalism; capitalism assigns value via race. “The process of racial capitalism
relies upon and reinforces commodification of racial identity, thereby degrading that identity by
reducing it to another thing to be bought and sold” (Leong). It’s a pervasive systemic (aka “structural”)
process that “displaces measures that would lead to meaningful social reform” because of the
impossibility of operating outside its fine-grained set of values and its mechanisms for calculating and
assigning them (ibid).

When used as descriptive adjectives for authors, nations implicitly (or explicitly) signify or beg
rhetorical resolution of (in terms of demanding that ambiguous signification be resolved) race:
“American” resolves to “US” resolves to default “white.” Hyphenations specifying origin-points of
emigration (forced or otherwise) or background make race at once operative and finally “illegible”
(Ferguson). National histories, as they are produced by people working within institutions and archives
and then internalized by people, are at once formative, usually wrong, and essential to poetry as we
know it within racial capitalism. They are literature’s origin stories, assigning values, via race,
illegibly.

Many non-exclusively anglophone poets across the world know one another or one another’s work;
many teach in universities; possibly all communicate electronically, often across multiple borders. At
the same time, nations are the top-level signifier and institution of modern literatures, the thing to
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which every “American” poet refers, and the thing that makes “American” a bad synecdoche for “US.”
When Jack Spicer (who was very invested in his US racism)2 referred to a “practice of outside” (Blaser)
he did not mean that one could actually use poetry to destroy a system of value-creation that is
enforced with state violence. He meant proceeding, as a practice, as if one could operate outside of
systemic value creation, even though poetry is always inside of that system. It turns out the practice
doesn’t work.

To take one recent example: conceptual poetry was actually correct in sensing the redundancy of poets
in writing poetry that maintains and reinforces state-based forms of inequality, but wrong in its
adhesion to the US institutional market as arbiter, which ended up killing it in the US.3 Conceptualism
said that it was simply repeating back to the culture-at-large what it had produced, which also wasn’t
true. Conceptualism “exceeded its self-understanding” (as Hal Foster said of Surrealism) by
reproducing structures of domination in ways that were finally fatal to its reception in the US. Chapter
two looks at the mechanism by which that happened.4

Working life within poetry’s institutions themselves, whereby US universities and nonprofits reproduce
real inequalities, is well-documented and theorized by scholars including Sara Ahmed, Roderick
Ferguson, and Jodi Melamed. My intent is to extend their analyses to the archiving of poetry, adding to
recent work by poets writing as critics including Ken Chen, Alexis Pauline Gumbs, Juliana Spahr
(particularly the extensive work on nationalism in Du Bois’s Telegram), and Heriberto Yépez. The
current archival mechanisms for poetry reproduce real inequalities in ways detailed throughout the
first three chapters. Chapter one, centering on contemporary Indian poetry in English, uses
cosmopolitanism and the norm translation to reveal conventionally illegible forms of value creation.
Chapter two, on the mechanisms of the conceptualism “crisis,” looks at conceptualism’s attempted
preliminary archiving of the Black Lives Matter movement via “archival power” as described and
theorized by Roderick Ferguson. The third chapter builds on Juliana Spahr’s work detailing the origins
and purpose of the Poetry Foundation, and proposes an application to replace it. The chapter outlines
a non-exclusively anglophone poetry archive, called here, generically, TextFrame, that can be built
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and run as a collaborative or distributed project. If building a collaborative archive turns out to be a
bad idea, however, i.e. if it seems like it will make things worse, or that it will get immediately coopted into capitalist value creation like everything else, then it should not be built. Either way
TextFrame, as proposed, will have served its purpose.

Nation-state-created value in poetry is in tension with some global non-exclusively anglophone poetries
that, in some subsets, discursively oppose both the nation and capitalist value creation. The internet,
still nascent, has pieces in similar bordered tension. It is this tension that, following a number of
critics, I will be calling cosmopolitanism. It runs through language as it runs through locale. I am using
the term “cosmopolitan” as a subordinate term to “postcolonial.” Cosmopolitanism has specific
resonances I want to engage, but its use may be an incorrect decision. I am not trying to elide
continuing colonial violence or colonial economic relations in any way by using the term
cosmopolitanism. Movement or discursive appearance within a bordered, policed world under the sign
of a dominant language—always in tension with “vernacular” languages—is cosmopolitanism.

The borderless internet was always chimerical (Goldsmith and Wu); it is curtailed and policed in myriad
ways, including (and not benignly) paywalls. To use the terminology of Sanskrit scholar Sheldon
Pollock, English, as the dominant language of the internet and of nominally (if not wholly) US-centered
capitalism, is a major, and specifically cosmopolitanist, dominant language. Arabic as cosmopolitanist
dominant remains operative over much of the sphere to which it was taken beginning in the 7th century
CE, with local languages, such as Adyghe and Bajelani, functioning as vernaculars. At the time of its
dominance and within its sphere of influence, Latin was a cosmopolitanist dominant, and English,
German, Italian, and Spanish were vernaculars. At the time of its dominance, Sanskrit was a
cosmopolitanist dominant, and Javanese, Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, and Tamil were vernaculars.
Spanish is a cosmopolitanist dominant in Mexico, Central America, much of South America, and
elsewhere.
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In trying to limit its signification to language, however, the term cosmopolitanism becomes
euphemistic. Spanish and French are spoken widely as a legacy of Spanish and French colonialism;
those languages, whose use is enforced by violent systems of oppression and extraction, are still
cosmopolitanist dominants. English was brought to the US as a result of colonialism on the same
genocidal mission. Cosmopolitanism as we know it is a violence-enforced, post-colonial, client-state
cosmopolitanism. Despite this, and despite their histories, the valences of dominant cosmopolitanist
languages are not, now, always negative for their speakers working within colonialism and its
continuing settlements, and can, ironically, be a bulwark against nationalist vernacularity. (This point
is the focus of the first chapter.)

For poets, the major form of cosmopolitanism works through the “rhetorical culture” of global nonexclusively anglophone poetries. In the coinage of philosopher Thomas Farrell, a rhetorical culture is
“an institutional formation in which motives of competing practices are intelligible, audiences
available, expressions reciprocal, norms translatable, and silences noticeable” (1). Global nonexclusively anglophone poetry communities together form a rhetorical culture. Its contours and
practices are still coming into focus. Poets, while often subject to censorship or surveillance, can
communicate, make appearances, and even give readings across borders without having to travel
(though the major form of this last kind of appearance is through circulated videos of events, rather
than two-way live streaming). A premise of this project is that the process of solidifying this parainstitutional culture, fraught as it is, out loud, in the open, should be supported, another belief that
should be subject to critique. Either way, global non-exclusively anglophone poetry, as
cosmopolitanist, has glaring gaps with regard to Farrell’s definition of a rhetorical culture: there are
missing translations of norms that are, in fact, translatable; unnoticed silences that are, in fact,
noticeable; and currently mutually unintelligible competing practices that are, in fact, mutually
intelligible. The gaps remain formidable. I will give one introductory example, that of a particular
poet’s reception.

6

Despite his preeminence within Indian poetry in English, relatively few poets in the US know the work
of Adil Jussawalla, or have a sense of the terms under which his great long poem Missing Person
operates.5 Missing Person, published in 1974, describes the vectors in play as the speaker returns from
years living and working in England to (what was then still officially) Bombay. Like Cahier d’un retour
au pays natal thirty-five years earlier, it is the great ex-ex-pat poem of its era. In trying to telescope
emergent post-colonial Indian society through the title persona, the poem’s speaker finds that his
sensibility—and his English—offend: “You’re your country’s lost property/ with no office to claim you
back./ You’re polluting our sounds. You’re so rude.” He continues channeling voices and registering
atrocities (“childbrides bundled to a knot/ childbirth a bleeding bag”), as echoes of “The Waste Land,”
“Howl” and other precedents add ironies: “You see,/ we’re Das Capital, a dried-up well/ and a big
Mein Kampf. Also.”

Jussawalla’s lack of recognition in the institutional US feels of a different order of magnitude from, to
take a generationally comparable example with relative parity across other terms, the lack of
mainstream recognition of J.H. Prynne, whose work also relies on knowing particular histories and
circumstances to be fully decodable. While Prynne’s work may not be actually read in the US, he shows
up frequently enough on US syllabi, and he was the subject of a New Yorker profile: national profiles
signal the poet’s acknowledged value within the US without anyone having to read the work.
Jussawalla, who is arguably a much more important poet, and who has had a much more compelling
life and career, is also not read widely in the US, but has not been similarly profiled and taught. Prynne
appears; Jussawalla does not. This may look like a matter of failed representationalism, and of racism.
While racism is in play, institutional borders are too, in terms of who can play what role within archival
institutions. And those roles are tied to narratives that are in turn tied to norm translation. For
Prynne’s work in the wake of modernism, lots of paradigms exist in the US, and his context has been
detailed within its criticism. The same is not true for Indian poetry in English and for Jussawalla.
Significant and available norm translation would make competing practices (or perhaps complementary
practices, since produced by differing conditions) intelligible, which would remove one obstacle to
appearing (which is, despite its contradictions, probably a positive). Narratives and relations are
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reciprocal: Prynne holds a post at a university that is on the US-based network of value creation;
Jussawalla does not.

The problem of Indian poetry in English’s reception as a problem of norm translation involves an
ignorance of Indian political and linguistic horizons, to name two formative limits; these remain largely
obscure in the default US beyond the Attenboroughian horizon of Gandhi. There are many reasons for
this, including racism, north-centric-ness, and west-centric-ness in the US—which is not to say that
these things are not also present, in different forms, in India. To put it another way, poets in the
institutional US, through curricula and generally read sets of critics, hold sets of background
assumptions about US literary history, assumptions that, as an aggregate, while “improving” (“doing
better”), are flawed and skewed white by default. Those curricula sometimes include some sort of
model of later 20th century poetry in English from the English UK after Philip Larkin: the conditions
that produced it, a few of the major figures who wrote it, what the reception generally was. The
default for poets in the US is not to hold or be taught something similar for Indian Poetry in English,
which is quite various in itself, at all. Directly related to this is the problem of norm translation.
Failure of norm translation is the failure of criticism and/or criticism’s dissemination to explain the
sources of competing and complementary practices. Released in 2016, Rosinka Chaudhuri’s massive
edited collection A History of Indian Poetry in English is a resource that can help to change that. In the
meantime, and as work continues, it’s a failure that creates unnoticed silences.6

The problem of norm translation is clearly framed by Dorothy J. Wang in Thinking Its Presence: Form,
Race, and Subjectivity in Contemporary Asian American Poetry (2013). There, Wang argues that race is
largely “unspeakable” in contemporary “American” poetry, and that it leads to criticism that fails to
produce “sustained critical analyses that pay serious attention to both the literary and social properties
of Asian American writing” (XXII). Wang here articulates major critical failures within the US in norm
translation: the norms structuring poetry by Asian Americans, Wang argues, are often either being
misarticulated not articulated at all. Wang likens criticism that does norm translation to doing
sociology in order to get at historical and cultural differences.
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The focus of Thinking Its Presence is on American poets of Chinese descent. As Wang clearly states,
such silences are not limited to Asian American poetry as a category. The subject of Bishnupriya
Ghosh’s When Bourne Across: Literary Cosmopolitics in the Contemporary Indian Novel (2004) is
transnational silences in discussions of novelists of South Asian descent. In elaborating on the title of
her critical study, Ghosh cites the “culture-specific notation of the migrant, one who is ‘translated’
when borne across kala pani (black water)” (Ghosh 14). Ghosh’s book argues for specific “capacities of
the literary to translate local struggles” and calls carrying across “a cosmopolitan literary activism
within… political limits” (ibid). Those limits are very real: in articulating the contexts of local
struggles, one may participate in widening the discursive horizon, but one cannot change the structure
of global racial capitalism with books or criticism. Ghosh is very careful not to conflate being borne
across with structural change, or to argue that altering discursive limits does anything to alter
economic or other material realities such as freedom of movement.

The kind of being borne across that Ghosh calls for and exemplifies in Ghosh’s own readings of fiction
are analogous to what Wang accomplishes in the five paradigmatic chapters in Thinking Its Presence
that do close readings. Those readings, of work by Mei-Mei Berssenbrugge, Marilyn Chin, Li-Young Lee,
Pamela Lu, and John Yau, serve as object lessons in how to “pay serious attention to both the literary
and social properties” of texts. In the theoretical chapter on “Aesthetics contra ‘Identity,’” Wang
specifically points up “the minefield that awaits anyone, especially a minority scholar, who dares to
invoke the term ‘identity’ (much less ‘race’ or ‘identity politics’) in a US context” (8). Thinking Its
Presence has done a great deal to change that for poetry in the US within institutional contexts. (I
discuss “identity politics” as a “highly contested” term (Haider) in the next chapter.) At the end of
“Aesthetics contra ‘Identity,’” Wang suggests directions for further work, and looks forward to “the
reframing and reconceptualizing—the genuine rethinking—of American poetry, down to its very
historical and conceptual foundations.” That rethinking should allow, Wang argues, for “new forms of
experimental minority poetry; scholars who have been trained to see no contradiction between ethnic
studies and poetics, prosody and postcolonialism; and new digital technologies and possibilities” (47).
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Other poets and critics have made complementary calls. Ghosh’s book offers a look at how
cosmopolitanism works in fiction in a manner that can be extended to poetry. M. Jacqui Alexander’s
Pedagogies of Crossing, which I discuss below, offers a framework for seeing processes of value
creation that are intentionally rendered illegible. In a series of essays arguing that poetry as we know
it must always be understood within capitalist production and value creation, Jasper Bernes, Joshua
Clover, and Juliana Spahr look at the ways that poetry co-evolved with the nation-state as “a tool for
the administration of [its] affairs.” They find that there is a very literal sense in which “poets really
are the unacknowledged legislators of the world,” from Thomas Wyatt at Henry VIII’s court to Robert
Frost reciting “The Gift Outright” at the Kennedy inauguration. Poets themselves know this, they
argue: they point to “the legendary refusals and decompositions” of poets such as Dickinson and
Oppen, who either did not publish at all or did not publish for prolonged periods. Those refusals
“emerge largely as the consequence of the dawning awareness of [the] legacy” of discursively, if often
unwittingly, legislating state affairs:
Once poetry is defined as an explicit antagonism to this legacy — and to the official, sanctifying
role that the poem might play in bourgeois society — the categories of poet and poem and
poetry are animated by curious contradictions, like so many of the categories in capitalism.
The vocation of the poet becomes self-destruction; the vocation of the poem, self-abolition.
(Bernes, Clover and Spahr, Self-abolition)
As they note in a follow-up piece, “self-abolition” may be less useful as a term than realization: the
realization of a new poetry that will come as by-product of structural change, of something beyond
rethinking and beyond protest (Bernes, Clover and Spahr, Realization). If capitalism is to be abolished,
either in confronting climate collapse or as an attempt at finding just forms of living or both, then its
products, the nation-state (as a corporation whose campus is demarcated with borders) and the poetry
produced within and often for it, must also be abolished.

Facilitating norm translation is about (or should be about) thinking the transition to post-racialist, postnationally-organized, post-capitalist society. This document is a dissertation. I’m writing it as
something responsive, or at least not harmful, to changes that people are actively trying to make. The
proposed application, for example, should be designed to let the local struggles of non-exclusively
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anglophone poetries be borne across clearly and without compromise. At the same time, the
application, If it is ever actually built, must avoid reproducing current modes of settler-colonial
domination, or inadvertently inventing new ones. That requires collaboration, from the very beginning,
in planning and in implementation. If the application were to be centered around individual texts, for
example, care must to be taken to ensure that the ways in which local struggles are made legible do
not harm those struggles. Cosmopolitanist norm translation takes place within actually existing reality,
not just in discursive space, even in Ghosh’s sense of local struggle being borne across, and even when
that struggle takes place within a cosmopolitanist dominant. To illustrate what I mean in saying “within
a cosmopolitanist dominant,” I will turn to the work of a US-based poet.

When the poet Tongo Eisen-Martin is characterized as “a revolutionary poet who uses his craft
to create liberated territory wherever he performs and teaches” (SFSU), it means at least in part
that Eisen-Martin’s work creates a reproducible ethos of liberation: a set of determinate dispositions
and actions given the circumstances under which it was produced, and within the contexts in which it
is received (in the US or otherwise). Eisen-Martin’s work gives voice to particular struggles while having
a vision of justice that can be extended to other circumstances. In order for the work to do this, the
context, the local struggle, must either be lived, or it must be otherwise understood:
another mayor puts his head on a pike
(one down is just one down)
but tell all this to the masses and your teacher
will pipeline you
they told me I was jewelry. They told me this was the jungle (well
maybe not the jungle. More like fifty machine guns planted in the
ground)
it’s raining faces again in California
(what does this say about heaven?
what does this say about the people
you have killed?)
(Eisen-Martin 66)
I could try to explicate this poem fragment to someone coming to it knowing nothing about EisenMartin, or about what Black life in the US entails when growing up as a poet and activist or otherwise,
or little about continuing US colonialist state violence, the same violence on which the US was
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founded. I could try to talk about how US schools enforce the racist values of the society at large,
where Black lives and learning are literally worth less. I could try to talk about the history of smears of
activists and organizers in the US, and about the ongoing executions of Black activists, and about how
attempts at political organization are still met with violence in schools and almost everywhere else in
the US, and about how singular removals of overtly racist actors from within government does not
change the system of racial enforcements in place, particularly with regard to armed police. I could try
to talk about how representational diversity can be used as a form of attempted co-optation, and
about how attempts to reduce one to a token are a further form of attempted control. I could try to
talk about the particularities of the history of California organizing, and about the rain of faces on
fliers that alert people that more extrajudicial murders have taken place, fliers that also that call for
those killed to be collectively mourned, often through action. All of that might help the speaker’s
voice to be borne across outside and inside the US.

At the same time, putting the poem here in this dissertation actually deprives it of context in ways that
negate any context I might add. Putting it here is an “archival” act, a means of draining the liberatory
function from work by framing it within a structure, the university, that, ultimately, works to reinforce
conditions as they are by assigning racialized values and setting institutionally-enforced limits on
continued membership, which act to keep demands discursive. This is part of Roderick Ferguson’s
concept of archival power, which is detailed in chapter two; it is the mechanisms of archival power as
they pertain to poetry that it might be possible for this project, paradoxically, to partially address. To
do so requires being clear about the project’s discursive horizon, what its scope is. To do that requires
looking further at its theoretical bases.

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “[t]he nebulous core shared by all cosmopolitan
views is the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, do (or at least can)
belong to a single community, and that this community should be cultivated.” The less-nebulous core
shared by all anarchist and communist views is also unequivocal on this point, but it has liberal forms.
Theorist Seyla Benhabib recounts that “since the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we have
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entered a new phase in the evolution of global civil society, which is characterized by a transition from
international to cosmopolitan norms of justice.” Those forms, Benhabib continues, “accrue to
individuals as moral and legal persons in a worldwide civil society,” while at the same time “their
peculiarity is that they endow individuals rather than states and their agents with certain rights and
claims.” That form of cosmopolitanism, which seeks to transcend the state via natural rights, is a
branch of “rights-based” ethics. While these claims can be made discursively, however, they cannot be
made on the ground by actual people with any real effect. The US border is one visible example of the
violence of that fact.

Theorist Pheng Cheah writes that “cosmopolitanism and human rights are the two primary ways of
figuring the global as the human” and that as such, they partake of a faulty, individualized discourse of
the human. Cheah argues that the discourses that surround, protect, and legitimize forms of
globalization, particularly the discourses of cosmopolitanism and human rights, fail to take into
account the facts on the ground, meaning the actual ways in which people are not actually the
“bearer[s] of dignity, freedom, sociability, culture, or political life.” “Bearers” is the important term
here: Cheah does not mean that dignity and culture don’t exist, but that they are not intrinsic to
people. The failure to recognize that fact “indelibly compromises, circumscribes, and mars the face of
global human solidarities and belongings staged by new cosmopolitanist and human rights discourses.”
Cheah continues:
[I]f social-scientific solutions to the problems of globalization have always already precomprehended an idea of humanity as the bearer of dignity, freedom, sociability, culture, or
political life, and therefore as an ideal project that needs to be actualized, the task and
challenge... in relation to globalization may be to question this pre-comprehension of the
human and, somewhat perversely, even to give it up.
The poets that I care most about are working, inside and outside of their writing, to give up this precomprehended idea of the human, and relatedly, of humanist cosmopolitanism. In its place is a vision
of a borderless, police-less, prison-less world where the monopoly on sanctioned violence is not in the
hands of the state, and all larger- and smaller-scale decisions about value are not made according to
the profit motive. This is the kind of cosmopolitanism—the communist kind—that is the horizon for a
replacement of current forms of archival power.
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In relatively recent versions of postcolonial studies, as I noted above briefly, cosmopolitanism always
involves physical mobility: people with relative freedom of movement traveling across nations and
locales. “Cosmopolitans” are often figured in such studies as in opposition to those who live within a
single, and often marginalized, set of norms and stay in a single locale, either by constraints on
movement or means, or by choice. As travel becomes relatively easier for those with some means,
working solely within a marginalized culture begins to acquire a purist valence within cosmopolitanist
postcolonial criticism, one that elides class. Ghosh, drawing attention to this error, critiques theorist
Arjun Appadurai’s opposition of “ethnic collectivists who lack the global imagination of the
cosmopolitan, who, by contrast, relishes non-national nomadism and celebrates migrancy, hybridity,
and mobility” (19). In contrast to Appadurai, Ghosh cites the critiques of Revathi Krishnaswamy and
Aihwa Ong, who find such formulations of cosmopolitanism reflect the experience of “transnational
elites” who “fetishize their marginality as migrants, while synchronizing the global flows that underpin
the new world order” (ibid). Ghosh finds that the “endless troping of mobility, hybridity, travel,
nomadism, and flexibility in postcolonial critical theory, despite all claims of resistance to oppressive
political and economic regimes, finally serves to flatten structural antagonisms and make light of
abiding cultural differences” (20). For Ghosh, that form of cosmopolitanism is not a critique of racial
capitalism, and is correspondingly not reflective of any nascent movement to abolish it. And at this
point, 15 years after the publication of Ghosh’s book, it is clear that, even for many artist-elites,
nomadism is no longer a readily available possibility.

Ghosh’s vision of cosmopolitanism works at once to “interrupt” elite self-reproduction while at the
same to reject “fetishistic localism” (ibid). Ghosh uses the terms cosmopolitanism and “cosmopolitics”
to limn “the capacities of the literary to translate local struggles” and to attempt, again, “a
cosmopolitan literary activism within the political limits” (14) of local struggles themselves. “Literary
activism,” Ghosh is clear, is activism in a discursive sense only, and not transformative of structure. In
its dialectic of the global and the local, Ghosh’s cosmopolitanism fits, at some points, with that of
Sanskritist Sheldon Pollock, who writes against “what often seems to be the single desperate choice we
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are offered: between, on the one hand, a national vernacularity dressed in the frayed period costume
of violent revanchism and bent on preserving difference at all costs and, on the other, a clear-cutting,
strip-mining multinational cosmopolitanism that is bent, at all costs, on eliminating it” (593). Pollock
wants to “conceive of the practice of cosmopolitanism as literary communication that travels far,
indeed, without obstruction from any boundaries at all, and, more important, that thinks of itself as
unbounded, unobstructed, unlocated—writing of the great Way, rather than the small Place” (599).
This is a form of the practice of outside, bolstered by “world republic of letters” forms of reception. It
doesn’t work, but it thinks of itself as if it does, and the state encourages that thought by regulating
reception. That encouragement is a big reason to be very careful when doing norm translation: nonnationalist vernacularity can work as a form of open secret. (I look at already-revealed ways that that
historically has been so in the first two chapters.)

Pollock does not want to call individuals “cosmopolitanist.” He wants to “think about cosmopolitanism
and vernacularism as action rather than idea, as something people do rather than something they
declare, as practice rather than proposition (least of all, philosophical proposition)” (593). Pollock
wants cosmopolitanism to be a lens that “enables us to see that some people in the past have been
able to be cosmopolitan or vernacular without directly professing either, perhaps while finding it
impossible rationally to justify either” (ibid). I will go further into Pollock’s cosmopolitanism and
vernacularity in chapter one, but the terms, as I use them here, are meant to reflect the discursive
side of postcolonial relations, of English as a globally dominant language that is in tension with other
globally and transnationally-dominant languages (such as Arabic, French, Hindi, Mandarin, and Spanish)
and with vernaculars (such as Diné Bizaad, Khasi, Oriya, and Xhosa). One goal in thinking
cosmopolitanism and in building away from its capitalist institutions should be to make those tensions
explicit and manifest. (I try to do that in the discussion of Indian Poetry in English in chapter one, and
in the discussion of anti-psychological poetries in the US in chapters six, seven, and eight.)

Ghosh’s phrase—being “borne across”—immediately invokes the Middle Passage, the crossing into the
holocaust of slavery and its colonial afterlives in the US and the Americas. The Middle Passage is
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present in any form of cosmopolitanism that one might want to propose, US-dominated or otherwise.
M. Jacqui Alexander’s essay collection Pedagogies of Crossing: Meditations on Feminism, Sexual
Politics, Memory and the Sacred was published in 2005. In her introduction, Alexander outlines the
collection as “a map of the various ways that practices of dominance are simultaneously knitted into
the interstices of multiple institutions as well as everyday life” (4), resulting in “psychic products that
fossilize deep in the interior, forcing us to genuflect at the altar of alterity and separation” (5).
Alexander continues:
Physical geographic segregation is a potent metaphor for the multiple sites of separation and
opposition generated by the state, but which are also sustained in the very knowledge
frameworks we deploy and in the contradictory practices of living the oppositions we enforce:
the morally consuming citizen versus the morally bankrupt welfare recipient; the patriot versus
the enemy; the loyal citizen versus the disloyal immigrant; “us” versus “them”; the global
versus the local; theory versus practice; tradition versus modernity; the secular versus the
sacred; the embodied versus the disembodied. (5)
What I am doing, or what I think I am doing, is to propose means by which social formations around
poetry, formations that form a larger rhetorical culture, might restrict or redirect certain forms of
discursive service to state reproduction of inequality. Doing so might help the process of “making the
world intelligible to ourselves,” as Alexander describes it:
If hegemony works as spectacle, but more importantly as a set of practices that come to
assume meaning in people’s lives (that is, the ways in which ordinary people do the work of the
state and the work of war), then all spaces carry the potential for corruptibility. (5)
Alexander’s invokes “the power of the disembodied and the stories that those who forcibly undertook
the Middle Passage are still yearning to tell, five centuries later” (6). While the resonances with
Ghosh’s formulation strike me forcibly, those stories are not mine to claim or tell. I also do not want to
build the StoryCorps for presenting them on NPR. What I want is to document some of the “practices of
dominance [that] are… knitted into the interstices” of current poetry institutions, and propose a
possible substitution for some of them. At the same time (again), I am not saying that doing so changes
economic relations among people, or within or between states. It is at best a substitution. The best
thing to do would be to evaluate it and reject it as such. Anything else might be a pressure valve. That
is why this study should be subject to critique.

16

This dissertation is written in ten often relatively short chapters. The first five outline the
cosmopolitanist background of and vision for the proposed application. The next three do a form of
norm translation, via conventional literary-historical criticism. The last two develop corollaries that
seem to fall out of the main argument.

Chapter one, “‘Indianness’ and Omission: 60 Indian Poets,” reads the anthology 60 Indian Poets,
published in 2008 in India and the UK (with US distribution), as argument about the contours of Indian
Poetry in English and about the contours of India. There, I relate Rashmi Sadana’s work on the
meanings of English in India to decisions made within the anthology, and look further at Sheldon
Pollock’s conception of cosmopolitanism and vernacularity, particular as it applies to the Indian NorthEast. I look at the poetry of Kynpham Sing Nongkynrih, which was omitted from the anthology, in doing
so. The anthology seems to have been put together with the explicit aim of making Indian poetry in
English something that operates transnationally. Despite its many strengths, it ends up tracing some
familiar national contours in its explicit critique of “Indianness.”

The second chapter, “Archival Power: Individualization, the Racial State, and Institutional Poetry”
engages Roderick Ferguson’s concept of archival power to analyze the 2015 “crisis” within
contemporary US poetry that centered on what I argue was an attempted archival act with regard to
the Black Lives Matter movement by practitioners of conceptual poetry. The chapter ends with a
fragment of Alexis Pauline Gumbs’s recent account of US university life as experienced by Black artists
and scholars.

That chapter is followed by “The Poetry Foundation as Site of Archival Power,” a short chapter
extending Jodi Melamed’s critique of US university value-creation mechanisms to Poetry magazine and
the Poetry Founation’s website. The chapter goes into some detail about the Foundation’s origins and
current practices (already well-documented by Juliana Spahr in Du Bois’s Telegram), and into the
potential functionality (and funding) of a replacement application. It argues that the Poetry Foundation
functions as a de facto arm of the US university system as outlined in the previous chapter.
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“TextFrame: An Open Archive for Poetry,” the fourth chapter, works to think a poem-and-textcentered application for non-exclusively anglophone poetry’s rhetorical culture, with an emphasis on
providing a medium for norm translation and context-reconstruction. TextFrame, as an idea, is an
attempt to begin replacing current mechanisms of archiving non-exclusively anglophone poetry, most
prominently the Poetry Foundation website. The application should allow poets and readers to archive
knowledge online apart from any particular nation-state or academic institution. It should approach the
Freirean horizon of participatory learning from and through life experience without any necessary
institutional affiliation. This is, for better or worse, an explicitly cosmopolitanist approach to thinking
poetry and archiving, in that it seeks to at once represent local struggles while making them legible
across different contexts, including dominant ones. Cosmopolitanism leads inevitably, within
capitalism, to contradictions, and the application is a shitty substitution for what the Poetry
Foundation is doing in terms of value creation.

A shitty substitution exchanges terms within a capitalist value loop in order to make an incremental
gain, or potentially transitional gain, in avoiding conventional value creation, while failing to change
the structure that is sure to compensate, sooner or later. Rather than structural change, that gain may
act as a pressure valve, or it may help people think the tactics for the abolition of capitalism, or it may
replace one bad set of practices with another bad set of practices. Whatever the temporary gains,
without actual change, they will eventually be co-opted. The global non-exclusively anglophone poetry
community somehow coming together to build a transnational archive would be an amazing thing. It
would also be a substitution, in this case a substitution for the value creation mechanisms of the USbased Poetry Foundation. The substitution that I discuss in the most detail in chapter three has to do
with open access for poetry and for scholarly publications.

The fifth chapter, “Narayanan’s Language Events as Free-Tier Application,” documents work imagined
for TextFrame that has actually already been built. The poet and scholar Vivek Narayanan previously
adapted Robert Desnos’s Language Events for the classroom using a variety of discrete free services. As
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an experiment with free-tier applications (applications that can be hosted and run at a small-scale for
free), Narayanan and I built a simple Flask-based Web application to make his classroom processes
more seamless. It is browser-based, but optimized for mobile and desktop. Narayanan has used it in the
classroom twice as of this writing. An appendix at the end of the project documents pieces of two
other free-tier applications we are working on that are in a fragmentary but runnable state, with
suggestions for further development. I imagine pedagogical tools of this kind to be central to the larger
application, whether it ends up a centralized monolith or a series of related sites and APIs.

Chapters six, seven, and eight undertake norm translation, specifically historicist norm translation of
two different but related moments in white-dominated US poetry. I imagine them as case studies, to
be used in creating templates for providing context to specific poems within any built application. Both
of the specific moments I cover transmogrify the “anti-psychological.” I take anti-psychological to be a
term that defines a movement within modernism, a modernism that continued past WWII (Levenson),
and also a particular strain of US thought that arose against the specifics of newly-developed
psychological constructs (Pfister and Schnog). The two moments and poetries I cover operated within
the white-dominated avant-gardes of their times, and their discursive resistances came from a
relatively dominant position (and dominant city) in the US. That fact is part of what positions them in a
literary history that was directly engaged by conceptualism (conceptual art repurposed as a brand of
poetry), which took its branded form most prominently in New York, where the contradictions of
appropriation finally came home to roost. Conceptual art, like conceptualism, explicitly positioned
itself as anti-psychological in ways I look at in chapter eight. Chapters six, seven, and eight as a whole
look at historical anti-psychological antecedents with varying political valences that were silently
marshaled into conceptualism’s ambiguous, “anhedonic” (as Bernes calls it) textual vision.

The sixth chapter, “An Unendurable Age: Ashbery, O’Hara, and 1950s Precursors of ‘Self’ Psychology”
argues that an anti-psychological ethos is developed in Ashbery and O’Hara’s poems of that moment. It
shows that Frank O’Hara’s “Personism: A Manifesto” (1959) is almost certainly a parody of Gordon
Allport’s theory of Personalism, of related strands of 1950s American psychology, and of the poetry
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that developed alongside them in the 1930s. It rehearses the origin myth of the selection of Some
Trees by W.H. Auden for the Yale Younger Poets Series and looks closely at Auden’s conflicted
introduction. From there, it transitions into looking at midcentury conceptions of schizophrenia as a
specifically homosexual disease and at contemporarily published examples of schizophrenic discourse
(those of Harry Stack Sullivan). It argues that Ashbery’s poem “A Boy” can be read as directly engaging
those ideas, and opposing them. It works to clarify uses of the term “surrealist” as applied to O’Hara
and Ashbery to show why, from the perspective of the psychologistic ethos of surrealism itself, the
term is misapplied. The origins of “self” psychology in the US, along with the attendant ethos of “selfactualization,” have bearing on the US as a racial capitalist state (which shows up later in Ron
Silliman’s writing, for example, as Timothy Kreiner shows).

In the shorter discussions that comprise the seventh chapter (with the long title “‘Baskets, Birds,
Beetles, Spools’: Ashbery, O’Hara, and Three 1950s Views of Meaning and Reference”), I consider the
affinities that Some Trees has with anti- or a-psychological theories of mind that were being developed
at Harvard and MIT at the time that Ashbery and O’Hara were in Cambridge, including generative
grammar and critiques of philosophical analyticity. The chapter also touches briefly on the affinities of
Some Trees with Barthes’s related uses of structuralism, and the implicit racism that is marshaled
within it. I don’t explicitly draw parallels between this work and conceptualism, but the fact that this
work is part of a line that led directly to the conceptual art movement that conceptualism in turn
appropriated is well-known. The poetry covered in the next chapter makes that point explicitly.

The eighth chapter, “Before Conceptualism: Disgust and Over-determination in White-dominated
Experimental Poetry in New York, 1999-2003,” recovers a micro-tradition that was also silently
marshaled into the larger, slightly-later movement of conceptual poetry. It highlights two poets’ uses
of lyric’s peculiar staging of voice to foreground the multi-furcation of white identities and voice in
response to state pressures. Some poems treat the space of the poem as ironically inhabitable; some
treat it as an extension of the boring city and landscapes available to whites as produced by late
capitalism. The parodic institutionalism of Dan Farrell’s work and the ironic peregrinations of Lytle
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Shaw’s Cable Factory 20 are two affects with political valence that were flattened out of
conceptualism. Dan Farrell writes an aestheticized but still uncompromising Marxist poetry from a decentered white perspective. It allowed its subjects (its objects) to be exactly what they are
systemically, while at the same time heightening the perceptual frame around them, and rejecting
false divisions. Lytle Shaw seems to be doing the opposite: intentionally make the frame at once as
baroque and as boring as possible as a different kind of rejection of the same things, also from a selfaware white perspective, one that uses an ironic pleasure in disgust to get at its contradictions. The
ironic pleasure in disgust that Shaw developed (in several directions) was, I think, new in US poetry; it
was quickly taken up, in very different forms, by what would become New York’s Flarf collective
(which did not include Shaw). The success or failure of this work in terms of making political
statements is not something I want to argue about: it is clearly not making direct political statements
of any kind. All I am trying to do is point out the political content that is there, and how it was
flattened out as these works were marshaled into conceptualism’s pre-history. That some of the work
allows that can be ascribed to inherent ambiguities and to assumptions made in the authorial framing
of it, as when Shaw appropriates O’Hara’s poem “At the Old Place.”

I wrote chapters six, seven, and eight first, and this project took a very long time. If I were beginning
today, I would want to write about the emerging poetry in the US that deals directly with racial
capitalism, that names it and its many manifestations as such. I would want to write one historical
section about Rodrigo Toscano and Hung Q. Tu, and about how the gradual, relative centering of
younger writers of color within the turn-of-the-millennium avant-garde was interrupted by conceptual
poetry’s marshaling of whiteness and state power. I would want to write another whole book with a
section each on M Archive by Alexis Pauline Gumbs, EXTRATRANSMISSION by Andrea Abi-Karam,
Garments Against Women by Anne Boyer, Don’t Let Them See Me Like This by Jasmine Gibson,
Austerity by Marion Bell, POEMS (2012-2017) by Oki Sogumi, LO TERCIARIO / THE TERTIARY by Raquel
Salas Rivera, a/s/l by Uyen Hua, and Cruel Fiction by Wendy Trevino. The uniqueness and force of each
of these books shatters any list-frame. At the same time, a study that looked even a few of them would
be a beginning on recent forms of anti-capitalist poetry from writers based in the US. The problem is
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that, the way things stand, it would also be a beginning on archiving the work away from the demands
that the books, and their writers, make.

To that end, I also want to note that I’m publishing this dissertation under a CC BY-SA license, which
means that anyone may take it, change it, and republish it as their own, digitally or otherwise. I do not
want the argument’s gaps to be taken as erasures. I have also certainly gotten other things wrong. I do
not discuss trans writers or writing. I do not deal in detail with gender-based oppression within
capitalism. I do not investigate the ways that ableism functions within the framework as I propose it.
These gaps not only limit my analysis, they likely make parts of it unintentionally harmful. I hope that
can be corrected by critique and by repurposing. Further, the Marxist analysis that I should provide at
many points is minimal at best, which deprives the argument of the kind of explanatory power it really
requires. My hope is that other people will correct and expand the argument to the extent that it is
useful.

The last two chapters take up two corollaries, or theoretical concerns that fell out trying to think a
cosmopolitanist application. The first, “Why Not Reddit?” examines existing commercial
cosmopolitanist solutions for some of the functionality proposed for the application, and reasons for
rejecting them. In doing so, it discusses Thomas Farrell’s rhetorical culture construct in detail, and
traces a theory of communication and authorship within a community, particularly with regard to
thinking history. It aims to get at the how of conceiving a rhetorical situation, and the how of
identification when reading a text, without forsaking the what. Described as a kind of transpiling7
problem, the above can be seen to be distinctly cosmopolitanist one as well, in the sense of privileging
English as a global dominant. It is also, seemingly, the same problem that led Stephen Greenblatt and
other New Historicists working in the wake of Foucault to reconstruct contexts, to get closer not just to
the intended meanings of poems of the past, but to their ideological convergences. In that vein, I find
it productive to link Stanley Fish’s interpretive communities to, on the one hand, Thomas Farrell’s
rhetorical cultures, and, on the other, to shitposting.
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The last chapter (and second corollary) is titled “Ethos in Pedagogy as a Limit on Norm Translation.” It
works to establish the specifically Aristotelian concept of ethos as a pedagogical limit for
reconstructing contexts. In so doing, it engages the neglected “descriptive and explanatory” side of
criticism as laid out by cognitive scientists Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson in their theory of rhetorical
“relevance.” Sperber and Wilson’s ideas about rhetorical mechanics draw on H.P. Grice’s inferential
model of communication, whereby the meanings ascribed to a particular utterance may not be directly
encoded within it, but instead are inferred from the larger context. A principle of relevance within
rhetoric, combined with ethos, makes a usable limit in the pedagogy of norm translation and historicist
criticism, of knowing when one might, momentarily, stop. Having to describe the ethos reflected by a
book or poem is a way to specify, within pedagogy, what kinds of other information one needs to read
it with sufficient care. Open the context too far, and one is back in the realm of irrelevant associations
and stock responses; too little, and one is within plain incomprehension. Restricting the delineation of
context to elements of ethos is one way of letting in reader perspectives while attempting to
reconstruct those of the poem.

This study’s governing interest is not the conflicts or differences between practitioners or tendencies
that are detailed here, but their relative incomprehensibility of those differences outside of their
formative contexts. The first chapter looks at some of the issues engaged by one attempt at
contextualizing Indian poetry in English, and the ways some of the poems may still be illegible outside
their specific contexts. In the US, one also need not look extra-nationally to find instances of missed
cues and unnoticed silences: these happen constantly with our poetic and other social formations,
across multiple, ill-defined lines.
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Chapter 1: ‘Indianness’ and Omission: 60 Indian Poets
English was imposed on Indian states by armed force and its attendant murder, subjugation, and
bureaucratic job-creation. English’s current position in India as the language of national class mobility
and international commerce has eclipsed its older political meanings. As anthropologist Rashmi Sadana
details in the groundbreaking English Heart, Hindi Heartland (2012), English in India currently signifies
in ways that are “premised on more direct access to power… that bypasses more traditional or
engrained social boundaries” in Indian society (22). English’s use is increasingly seen in India as
politically “neutral” (ibid) as a result of that role. The perception of neutrality has implications for the
reception of Indian poetry in English inside and outside of India.

India is linguistically very various: there are more than 1,600 languages spoken in India. Almost all are
regional, their speakers centered in particular locales. As multiple scholars recount, after India gained
independence from Britain in 1947, one of India’s regional languages, Hindi, whose everyday familial
use is centered in the north, was declared, in 1950, by the union government, India’s first official
language: the language in which all union (i.e. national) governmental affairs would be conducted. The
plan was for English, then in use in that capacity, to continue alongside Hindi over a period of 15 years,
with English’s use dissipating and ceasing. Then as now, what linguists still call native speakers8 of
Hindi comprised only about 40 percent of India’s population. There was thus widespread resistance to
the language’s designation as the sole official language of the union, particularly in the southern states
(from Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh to Kerala and Tamil Nadu). When 1965 arrived, resistance to a
Hindi-only union government remained very strong. English was designated a second official language.

In many regions of India, Hindi continues to be a “symbol and arbiter of North Indian cultural
hegemony,” as Sadana describes it (19), and it has not played the role in daily life once imagined for it
across the country. There are 31 languages currently in official use across 29 state and 7 union territory
governments, with widespread media behind them. Speakers of Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Tamil,
and Telugu, for example, together number hundreds of millions. At the same time, regional languages
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themselves can be a source of conflict: in some states where there are multiple competing vernaculars,
English is the sole official state-business language, another sign of its relative perceived neutrality.

Education has largely followed suit, particularly given that there is a “long-standing divide [in India]
between students who come from English-medium backgrounds [in their educations] and those who
come from ‘vernacular’ ones” (5)—with vernacular, in terms of education, including Hindi-medium
schools. English-medium education is certainly class-marked, and allows forms of mobility unavailable
to those who lack it. At the same time, the tens of millions of people across India who speak English
with varying fluencies are much too diverse to be categorized as an aggregate elite. In many states,
school-Hindi is as far as many people get; in many rural areas, Hindi will not be heard at all.

If English in India is a language of economic aspiration and domination, its white valence is marshaled
illegibly into India’s own forms of dominance, themselves linked to caste, and, via myriad points of
contact, to the US, the Commonwealth, and other market-based allies. Like other media in India,
Hindi-language media reflect long-standing racial hierarchies, particularly in popular films and music
videos, where “fairness” is a deciding factor with regard to who gets on television and in what role.
Fairness is a major, complex subject of inquiry (Mishra). “Aryan hegemony” signifies and is used in
value creation, and is even more complexly mapped onto and into caste and other social forms
(Sharma). Whiteness signifies as a related but separate category; the roles that white woman play in
Hindi-language media, for example, fall into very specific categories (Dark). Blackness is also a
separate category in India (Jain-Grégoire); many Hindi-language films and music videos perpetuate
specifically anti-Black stereotypes in a manner that calls out for a targeted campaign to make it stop.
English-language media, including imports of much of what is popular in the US and UK in relatively
real time, are presented with their hierarchies largely intact. All of these extraordinarily complex
phenomena are beyond the scope of what I will try address here. The first half of this chapter will
discuss North-East India in some detail with regard to English, racialization, and poetry in India,
particularly as it pertains to a relatively recently-published anthology of Indian poetry in English, 60
Indian Poets. I will detail Sadana’s argument further before turning to the anthology.
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While there is surface agreement on some of what it means to use English in daily discourse and media
in most places in India, English’s role in Indian literature is more broadly controversial in terms of its
reception within India. In the popular press, as Sadana shows, Indian critics overtly evaluate a writer’s
regional linguistic loyalties, and correlate those regional loyalties to the writer’s degree of
“Indianness.” In that equation, as Sadana extensively documents and unpacks, writers of English come
in for harsh critique by bhasha, or vernacular, writers. Bhasha critiques include those of Hindi writers:
Hindi functions as a vernacular with regard to its position vis-à-vis anglophone literature, and as a
language to which one can feel regional affiliation. “From the perspective of most bhasha literary
communities,” Sadana writes, “to write in English is to reject willingly (and perhaps willfully) part of
one’s Indianness” (137-138). Nowhere is this more true than in Indian poetry in English.

If lyric poetry is the literary form that most explicitly and self-consciously explores the relationship
between the construction of individualized voice and the construction of sentences, then the intimacy
of its scale is part of what sets it apart from the novel, and makes it, arguably and paradoxically, the
major expression of national sensibilities and dynamics. Poetry’s “official, sanctifying role” (Bernes,
Clover, and Spahr) in national projects means that there is a way that it gives actual, individualized
discursive form to its national subjects. As such, poetry is political in a way that is arguably more
immediate than the novel: it is literally about how a nation’s subjects are articulated, and it
articulates them as a kind of model that can be used by the state. As Sadana, Ghosh, and others have
shown, English-language fiction is a major medium for the expression, and the export, of India and
Indianness, even as it is critiqued by vernacular writers for whom “authenticity has to do with the
social and economic privileges of the literary Indian English writer who is assumed to be pandering to a
global rather than to a regional audience and who is considered to be ‘less Indian’ for doing so”
(Sadana 138). Indian poetry in English has likewise largely been denounced, dismissed, or ignored
pretty much across the board in India, partly because the particular cultural demands made on poetry
in India are very different from those on prose.
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To put it schematically and to greatly oversimplify: poetry has a long and also centrally religious
tradition in India and Indian states. Sanskrit epics form a textual foundation of Hinduism. As
preservationist receptions of more recent epic poetry disappeared, replaced first by descendants of
Sanskrit court lyric, contemporary lyric has come to stand for “poetry” in the modern imagination
(Thain). How this might work within Hindu nationalism is far beyond the scope of what I am trying to
do here. Even as of this writing, however, when Indian reviewers in the popular press thus wonder
aloud whether India can ever produce poetry in English that would be of any value, or what the point
of doing so would be, they are making a tacitly political argument about what India is, and should be,
one that contests English’s commercial and cosmopolitanist cachet to a variety of ends. A related
critical move, as Sadana notes, is to challenge the poet’s linguistic competence in English and condemn
alleged mimicry so as to impugn the poet with lingering colonialist sensibilities (in a manner that
everyday use of English no longer produces). Such critiques, Sadana shows, rooted in a politics that
does not see English as a proper medium for Indian literature, deny that Indian poetry in English is
“Indian” at all.

Both Sadana and Ghosh document a variety of aspects of Indian literature in English, with Ghosh
focusing on it as an Indian export. For poetry, anthologies play a particularly crucial role in the internal
reception and in the export of national identity. The currently dominant anthology of Indian poetry in
English, edited by the poet and novelist Jeet Thayil, was published in 2008. It was published in India by
Penguin India as 60 Indian Poets, and in the UK and US as The Bloodaxe Book of Contemporary Indian
Poetry in English. The Bloodaxe edition, published “in association with Fulcrum: an annual of poetry
and aesthetics” based in the US, has 12 more poets, and US distribution. Fulcrum itself published a
somewhat shorter version of the anthology as a section of a prior issue, in 2005. In its various forms, it
soon eclipsed Arvind Krishna Mehrotra’s The Oxford India Anthology of Twelve Modern Indian Poets
(1993) as the standard anthology.

Thayil’s anthology makes a self-conscious riposte for Indian poets writing in English against bhasha
critiques, seeking to showcase a mature tradition, a canon of founding poets, and a take on the (then-
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current) English-language Indian poetry scene. Other anthologies from inside and outside India have
attempted the same thing (most successfully Mehrotra’s), but Thayil’s is the first to place a large
selection of poets from across the diaspora, including poets born and living outside India, within the
standard canon that begins with Nissim Ezekiel, and thereby to contest what Indian poetry in English
might be. Thayil spends a significant amount of time in his introduction rehearsing and shooting down
vernacular critiques of Indian poetry in English: that it is a “failure of national conscience”; that it is
“perpetuating colonialism in a postcolonial era”; that what it does is “essentially a conjurer’s trick”
lacking a native tradition in India, inauthentic. His rebuttals dig deep into the history of English
language poetry in India, going back to the mid-nineteenth century.

Thayil, however, never explicitly identifies the ground shared among the poets included in the
anthology, referring instead to “a community separated by the sea”: basically an elite, physical
movement-based cosmopolitanism. In parsing the demographics, as we are trained to do, one finds the
poets are split roughly between India and the diaspora (including poets born or living in Africa,
Australia, the US, and the UK) and between poets who were then under and over 50. What is consistent
is Indian descent, and the use of English. What is missing from Thayil’s account and rationale, however,
is the cosmopolitanist process by which regional, or vernacular, literatures arise, a process that
clarifies the role of English in Indian poetry as the object of bhasha critique, the constraints on Thayil’s
“community,” and the contours of Thayil’s selections.

For Sanskritist and historian Sheldon Pollock, vernacular literatures represent a response to dominant
literary languages that are, in their moments, perceived as cosmopolitan, and even universalizing. For
Pollock, vernacular literatures are not preexisting literary modes that get eclipsed, as such, by
hegemonic languages, but rather novel forms that arise only as and after those hegemonic languages
achieve their hegemonic status, at least in terms of governmental and trade-based transactions and in
terms of literary transmission. Cosmopolitan dominance and vernacularization, in literature, are part of
the dialectic of trade and of nationalism.
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Within this paradigm, English can be seen (historically, ironically) alongside bhasha literatures as
paradigmatic examples of vernacular response to cosmopolitan dominance. English, as a literature and
as a language of statecraft, was created out of Latin’s shadow as part of a wave of vernacularization
that also created written Spanish, French, and German in the same roles. Sanskrit, less than a thousand
years ago, was the language for official transactions across kingdoms extending from “Afghanistan to
Java and from Sri Lanka to Nepal” (Pollock 23). When Sanskrit was taken up by poets, it enjoyed “the
fact and the perception of universality” (24). Pollock finds the eleventh-century Kashmiri poet Bilhana
boasting that “there is no village or country, no capital city or forest region, no pleasure garden or
school where learned and ignorant, young and old, male and female alike do not read my poems and
shake with pleasure” (23).

Vernacularization is a dialectical process. From this perspective, India’s early regional-language writers
self-consciously positioned themselves against Sanskrit, a perceived universal, in order to define
themselves and their literatures: the process of vernacularization. Urdu, Persian, and Hindustani also
played roles in Indian vernacularizations, as did English, eventually. Bhasha writers now define
themselves against English in a manner that is analogous to their historical formation vis-à-vis Sanskrit;
the linguistic lineages are very different, but the process is the same: vernacular critiques, which
assert acceptable structures of regional authenticity, do so, paradoxically, now, in service to the
union, which draws on them in defining authentic Indianness, partially as a pressure-valve for tension
around market relations with the US and with the rest of the Commonwealth (among other states). If
bhasha writers, as Sadana argues, make use of Ngũgĩ’s decolonization argument, whereby “[w]riters
must return to their mother tongues to reclaim their authentic cultural and political selves” (Sadana
107), that “authentic” act, often undertaken within regionalist movements, is quickly appropriated by
the state, which absorbs their demands, then uses the authenticity claims to distinguish and assert
authority over regions it does not deem similarly authentic. (One of those regions is the Indian NorthEast, to which I will turn momentarily.) A partial function of bhasha critiques is thus, paradoxically,
national, if not always directly aligned with the union: as “authentic” products of authentically Indian
regions within in the union, their perceived authenticity serves to authenticate the union and to help it
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to maintain and make use of selective differences. This relationship is literally instantiated at the very
end of India: standing 133 feet tall at Kanyakumari, looking out over two oceans, is a statue of the
Tamil poet Valluvar.

When looked at from the perspective of the diaspora as conceptualized in the anthology, however,
bhasha charges against English seem not to apply at all. Among the contributors to Thayil’s anthology,
poets such as Prageeta Sharma and Srikanth Reddy, who were born in the US and live and work there,
clearly violate bhasha “authenticity” strictures. Are they thus not “Indian” poets? The late Meena
Alexander was born Syrian Christian in Allahabad, educated in Khartoum and Nottingham, and lived and
taught in New York: is her work traitorous to India, to Kerala, and to Malayalam? Vivek Narayanan was
born in the North Indian city of Ranchi to Tamilian parents, raised in Zambia, went to college and grad
school in the US, taught in South Africa, did a years-long residency at the Sarai institute in New Delhi,
and is currently living in Fairfax County, VA and writing in English: is he a traitor to Tamil, and not
authentically “Indian”?

The complex relationships and tensions between Indians in India, non-resident Indians (NRIs), people
who split their time between continents, and other permutations of diaspora are present as a kind of
background to the selections in Thayil’s anthology, which has its basis in forms of elitecosmopolitanism. Those forms have their own authenticity demands: Arundhathi Subramaniam’s poem
in 60 Indian Poets, “To the Welsh Critic Who Doesn’t Find Me Identifiably Indian” addresses them
directly, as do others in the anthology. In the US and in the Commonwealth, regardless of how poets
may self-identify, racialized ethno-national reception is enforced, and Indianness ends up as something
that must be performed by the writer in order to maintain and justify value. That these tensions are
not made explicit by Thayil in the anthology feels like a purposeful choice, one targeting reductionist
vernacular and diasporic receptions at once. At one level, that, in reception, feels liberating: Thayil’s
cosmopolitanist juxtapositions disallow the kind of closed-circuit readings of Indian poetry in English
prevalent up to that point, whereby it was treated as something cut-off from other anglophone
literatures. In India, vernacular-based critiques of the anglophone Indian poetic diaspora, are, at
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worst, when based in authenticity, a form of “national vernacularity dressed in the frayed period
costume of violent revanchism and bent on preserving difference at all costs” (Pollock 593). Indianness,
as a form of reception in India, is withheld from the diaspora. All of this contributed to the initial
reception of the anthology and its genuine attack on that equation. If poetry’s relation to the nationstate is brought to the fore, however, something Thayil also does not do explicitly, the anthology’s
selections seem much more constrained, and predictable.

While the anthology deliberately attacks the linguistic and geographic authenticity mechanisms that
contribute to maintaining Indianness, Thayil nevertheless tacitly follows the prescribed contours of the
extended Indian state: including multiple poets of Indian descent living and working in the US, UK,
Australia, and Canada is perfectly aligned with trade markets opened up under liberalization in India in
1991. The US and its English, once semi-officially spurned partially on decolonial grounds, have become
market-based allies. Liberalization has resulted, among other things, in greater wage inequality (Kumar
and Mishra), an antagonistic contradiction that the anthology’s version of cosmopolitanism cannot
address.

At the same time as the anthology is expansive in a manner in line with economic liberalization, it does
not include a single poet writing in English from Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Sri Lanka.9 India has fought
multiple wars with Pakistan since partition in 1947, including the one that resulted in Bangladesh’s
independence from Pakistan in 1971. Despite historical and remaining cross-national familial ties to
India, it is not possible for Thayil to call Pakistani or Bangladeshi or Sri Lankan poets “Indian”: the
strength of the nationalism in India and in the three neighboring countries makes that impossible. The
nation as top-level referent overrides cosmopolitanism where nationalism overrides potential markets.

The omissions go further, however: of the 60 poets, only a single one from India’s minority North-East
is represented: Mamang Dai from Arunachal Pradesh. The North-East is geographically set apart from
the rest of India, and is perceptually in its own category. In addition to being largely cut-off from the
Indian plain by Bangladesh, India’s North-East is categorized as ethnically distinct from mainland India.
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North-East populations have many similarities, including linguistic, with Southeast Asian populations.
The Khasi language for example, with speakers based in the Indian state of Meghalaya, is a Mon-Khmer
language, related to Vietnamese, of which there are several dialects. People from the North-East are
subject to racism, often involving violence, on the Indian plain, where they are not seen as
conventionally Indian, but as hill-state “tribals” without a blood relation to the mainland. They are
also not conventionally seen as directly part of the Adivasi movement, a Sanskritized coinage from the
1930s usually referring to indigenous, “non-Aryanized” people from the Indian plain.

The Indian constitution explicitly lists 645 indigenous groups across both the mainland India plain and
the Himalayan North-East. Members of the groups are granted certain tax breaks and affirmative action
reservations, as part of the “OBC” (or “Other Backward Classes,” which also include lower-caste
Hindus). The North-Eastern state of Meghalaya, for example, was carved out of the state of Assam in
1970 at the instigation of the Khasi, the Pnar (who are also Khasi, but were divided from them by the
British via linguistic and other differences, including the term “Jaiñtia”) and the Garo: local ethnic and
linguistic majorities known officially through the Indian union as “Scheduled Tribes.” In common use,
the term often collapses into “tribal” or “tribals” (which, again, avoids the Sanskritizing of the term
Adivasi). Regional languages in the North-East are also not “bhasha”; they lack a relationship to
Sanskrit that those who use the term to describe their language seemingly require. While “the
languages” of bhasha critiques are regional, bhasha critiques do not and cannot emanate from the
North-East because the North-East itself is not seen as authentically Indian.

In his introduction and in his choices of poets, Thayil tacitly bypasses work with minority identity
claims within India, from the North-East and elsewhere, even as that work, in English, offers a
powerful means of refuting bhasha definitions of authentic Indianness. Apart from the anthology’s clear
elite-cosmopolitanist composition, I can (only) speculate as to why “identity work,” as it gets called in
the US, was not included. Before I do, I need to define that term.
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Theorist Asad Haider has recently historicized the “highly contested” terms identity and identity
politics in his book Mistaken Identity: Race and Class in the Age of Trump (2018). The term, Haider
finds, has been subject to various uses since it was introduced by the US Black lesbian militant group
Combahee River Collective. Following Malcolm X and Huey Newton, Haider defines identity politics as
“the neutralization of movements against racial oppression. It is the ideology that emerged to
appropriate [the] emancipatory legacy [of Black social movements] in service of the advancement of
political and economic elites” (12), partially through archival acts. That is how identity politics, as a
mode of reception, has traditionally worked within the US university (to which Thayil has had
significant exposure). I will return to this meaning of “identity politics” in the next chapter.

Rather than “appropriate its emancipatory legacy,” however, Thayil likely wants to avoid work in
modes that, in reception, in India, is associated with majoritarian religious and ethnic communalism,
including Hindu nationalism. He thus similarly avoids minoritarian claims that also seem, in some forms
of reception, to have an essentialist identitarian logic. The result is that Thayil avoids work grounded
in struggles outside the norms of elite-cosmopolitanism. He does include, for example, work that has
been received as sex-positive and feminist and that, at the time, pushed limits in India. And he
includes work such as Subramaniam’s that contests diasporic definitions of authenticity. I’m not saying
that doing so is not interesting or important. What I’m saying is that it is in line with elite-based
cosmopolitanism, and that it resulted in the above omission.

In other layers of its multifurcated meanings, identity politics, in poetry, as a thing produced by forms
of reception, is read, wrongly, as rejecting seemingly productive poetic ambiguities in favor of
essentialist claims of heritage and of rights. That is the more commonly-understood meaning of
“identity politics,” a meaning that Dorothy J. Wang unpacks in the “Aesthetics contra ‘Identity’”
chapter of Thinking Its Presence:
In the US academy and society at large, the words “identity,” “identitarian,” and “identity
politics” are often automatically conflated. Used synonymously, all three function as a
reductive shorthand to refer to an essentializing and unthinking “identity politics”—almost
always regarded, explicitly or not, as the provenance of minorities with grievances. “Identity
politics” is a straw-man term. … [It] index[es] something understood by readers as troubling
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but whose precise contours are amorphous and indistinct—and, I would argue, ultimately
incoherent and indefensible. (12-13)
Wang finds the most prevalent meaning of “identity politics” within poetic reception in the US reduces
down to “the antithesis of (opposite to and opposing) literary value and critical rigor” (12). One also
senses that form of reception in Thayil’s selections and omissions throughout, given the prevalence of
work in Indian poetry in English with engagements that are conventionally received within this last
sense of identity politics. Yet that work’s exclusion is a tacit acceptance of this harmful form of
reception, one that deprives the anthology of an important insight that undercuts the anti-English
bhasha critics: English can be a mode of expression of local struggle, one that acts differently in
different contexts, within India. I’ll discuss that point with regard to a Khasi poet from the state of
Meghalaya, Kynpham Sing Nongkynrih. His exclusion from the anthology is a surprise bordering on
shocking, given his accomplishments even at the time of its publication. I need to situate Nongkynrih’s
work within the context North-Eastern Indian state of Meghalaya and its capital, Shillong, in order to
clarify this point.

The East Khasi Hills region of Meghalaya, where Shillong is located, is bordered to the north by the
Indian state of Assam, to the east by Meghalaya’s Jaintia Hills coal belt (and beyond that, by the NorthEastern states of Nagaland and Manipur), to the west by the West Khasi Hills (and their contested
uranium deposits) and to the south, via a border that stretches 443 kilometers, by Bangladesh. There
are maybe a million people who speak Khasi, Pnar, War, and other related dialects in Meghalaya, with
maybe 25 percent in Shillong. Shillong itself is a steeply hilly city, broken into blocky localities by cliffs
and ravines, crisscrossed by twisty lanes and above-ground water pipes, cut by 14 or so always-jammed
main roads, and ringed by mountains, including Shillong Peak. Most houses are built with concrete. The
bourgeois quarters have plenty of McMansions; older districts have a distinctive hybrid colonial neoTibeto-Kashmiri-Brit-looking architecture. Paddy (rice) is still grown within the city limits, if just in a
single remaining valley field.
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The North-East of India is, in Meghalaya, and in Mizoram and Nagaland, largely a Christian-majority
area. (Nongkynrih himself is not a Christian; he practices Ka Niam Khasi.) When Welsh missionaries
arrived in the area in 1840, most people in the Khasi hills lived on a very limited diet of millet and
sweet potatoes (and wild rice in the less altitudinous regions), as some still do. There was no Khasi
written script; it was likely lost in an originary migration, as one Khasi myth laments. (I will not try to
deal here with originary migration and indigeneity; first inhabitants always come from somewhere.)
The mission was successful; schools were opened; agricultural practices altered; building practices
enforced in Shillong and in Sohra (aka Cherrapunji, from the Bengali; “punji” means “capital,” which
Sohra was). By the early 20th century, along with an arguably relatively more benign version of British
rule (a point which is contested), Christianity was well-established, to the point where US evangelical
programming is now piped in via the local cable operator because there is a demand for it. The
intensity of the Christianity in Meghalaya, which drives some international tourism to the area, is welldocumented, along with attendant ideologies. On any given Sunday, one might hear that old John
Ashcroft favorite, “On Eagles’ Wings,” sung in a Shillong Presbyterian Church by 12 adolescents clad in
goldenrod sateen.

Travel up and down the hilly roads is difficult, but regardless, until fairly recently, it is unlikely that an
outsider would have been admitted by officials to the neighboring states of Nagaland or Manipur if
arriving by road or by air: the groups that originally agitated for the states’ independence from Assam
continue to exist in various separatist permutations; isolation is part of the containment strategy. Such
groups are often called “secessionist” in the press, as opposed to the (also-“tribal”) “Maoists” or
“Naxalities” of mainland India who have land issues with the Union. Communism’s long history in India
is something I don’t yet know enough about to comment on meaningfully. Its use in and by these groups
has a different valence from the non-minority-based state communist parties that have run Kerala,
Tripura, and West Bengal states on and off over the decades. The fact that the North-East continues to
be “sensitive” in this way, however, adds to its cut-offness from the rest of India. Geographically, the
main impediment is the “chicken neck”: the thin northerly bit of land that, if traveling by road, one
must cross through to get to from the Indian plain to the North-East by road while avoiding Bangladesh.
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Meghalaya is a tribal majority state, with non-tribals virtually not found in interior rural areas. At the
same time, many villages bordering Assam and Bangladesh have been completely overrun by non-tribal
populations, and many people from the Indian plain have settled in Shillong: mostly from West Bengal
and Bihar, as well as other groups from the non-North-Eastern Himalayas, including Nepal and Sikkim,
and many from neighboring North-East states, particularly where there are ongoing conflicts. The army
and air force have substantial presences in the city, with the entire air command for the North-East
situated in Shillong; with them come men (and it is mostly men) from all over India. The issue of
migrant Bangladeshi workers is enormously complex in Shillong, and not limited to Meghalaya itself;
the weakness of Bangladesh's currency is a big draw across the (militarized, but largely forested)
border. In Shillong, unemployment is high, and Bangladeshi laborers will often work for much less than
the going rate for Khasi laborers. The unease of the local populace in the Khasi Jaintia Hills is not
restricted to the Bangladeshi migrants, but is in general directed to the non-tribals who come to the
hills even from the plains of mainland India. The resulting conflicts mostly simmer, but bandhs called
by Khasi groups are employed several times a year: word goes out that people must stay off the roads
for a day or days, or face stones, fires, attacks. Some the bandhs have to do with getting the local
government, generally passive and largely bereft of transparency, to function. Others have to do with
Bangladeshi migrants, or with ethno-racial conflicts that turn on land claims within Shillong.

Most of the time, Shillong’s elite and non-elite cosmopolitanist composition, maintained since British
times, has a kind of tense stability. Perhaps half the jobs in Shillong have a link to the state
government, but there is not a lot of non-work-related cross-socializing. Churches are the centers of
Khasi social life in Shillong. Another big issue is food: Christian and non-Christian Khasi cuisine features
both beef and pork. While many events are often designed around navigating that, and the relative
neutrality of chicken abounds, many potential childhood friendships are prevented by the tacit fears
related to visiting houses and eating together, and the same is true in many public spaces. Relatedly,
the Christianity in Shillong is generally not a particularly inclusive form; one sermon at an Englishlanguage Presbyterian church I attended featured a 45-minute anti-Semitic rant from a guest-lecturing
parishioner, during and after which no one blinked. The bigger issue, however, is control of the city’s
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land. There are districts of Shillong itself where, like the rest of the state, people from the Indian
plain, Nepal, Bangladesh (places from which outside workers might arrive) cannot enter on foot
completely freely (as opposed to driving though), let alone live. The same is true of non-tribal
dominated localities as well. When people from the North-East go to live in Delhi or other cities on the
Indian plain, they face far higher incidences of violence and murder—particularly women from the
North-East. And while non-tribals generally cannot own land in Shillong (one major exception is
formerly British-controlled districts), many arrangements are struck, adding to tensions. Apart from
Shillong and a few other municipalities (including Sohra and Jowai), Meghalaya is otherwise almost
wholly rural, and its literacy rate, tied to a faulty public school system, sits just slightly above the
union average. At the same time, Shillong also has the highest concentration of colleges in the NorthEast. Several had already been founded when Shillong was the capital of Assam (as it was until 1973),
and, before that, the summer capital of what was the British Bengal Province. The colleges draw the
children of the North-East's aspiring middle class, and their money, into Shillong’s mix. Coal money
from the Jaintia hills unfailingly ends up there. The streets are full of recent-model SUVs where Maruti
800s once dominated.

To represent Meghalaya, Thayil includes the work of poet Anjum Hasan, who was born in Shillong after
her north Indian Muslim family settled there to teach. Hasan now lives in Karnataka and edits the
journal Caravan. To leave Hasan as the sole representative from Shillong, which is basically the poetic
equivalent of the Bombay of the North-East, is to make an elite-cosmopolitan case for multicultural
Shillong (Shillong itself has figured in Hasan’s work), but it also erases Shillong’s poetries from nonexclusively anglophone Khasi and Garo poets, as well as poets like Robin Ngangom, who is from
Manipur, and whose work concerns ongoing conflicts there, who has lived and taught in Shillong for
decades. The problem is not the high rate of Christianity in the North-East: Kerala has a large Christian
population too; Thayil’s family is from Kerala; he includes a significant percentage of Christian poets.
The problem is the perceived link of work by non-exclusively anglophone tribal poets from the NorthEast to “identity” work and to secessionist movements. The omission is in line with the unstated policy
of post-Independence India, which has worked to erase the tribal North-East via land encroachment by
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the military, and by packing appointed government positions from without. Thayil received training in
the US as a young poet at a time when poets received as “identity” poets were met with the kind of
reception that Wang details, and that is still prevalent in many US institutions. It is not surprising that
60 Indian Poets has omissions of this kind.

The English-language anthology Dancing Earth: An Anthology of Poetry from North-East India came out
around the same time as 60 Indian Poets. Edited by Kynpham Sing Nongkynrih and Robin S. Ngangom of
Shillong’s nationally-funded North-Eastern Hill University, much of Dancing Earth makes strong identity
claims or investigations that are permutations of the Indianness equation: questions of what is “Indian”
while being “Khasi” or “Manipuri” run up against their representations in English to startling effect.
Nongkynrih’s own “Blasphemous Lines for Mother” describes the poet’s childhood in then-rural
Cherrapunji (in Khasi, Sohra) and draws on Khasi idioms that sound shocking in English:
My mother is retired, toothless, diabetic and bedeviled
by headaches and a blinding cataract. In short,
she is a cantankerous old woman.
I remember the time when she was a cantankerous
young woman. When she took an afternoon nap,
she was tigerish: “You sons of a vagina!” she
would snarl, “you won’t even let me rest for a moment,
sons of a fiend! Come here sons of a beast! If I
get you I’ll lame you! I’ll maim you! . . . Sons
of a louse! You feed on the flesh that breeds you!
Make a noise again when I sleep and I’ll thrash you
till you howl like a dog! You irresponsible nitwits!
how will I play the numbers if I don’t get a good
dream? How will I feed you, sons of a lowbred?”
The poem’s shocking crux brings Khasi idioms into English in an offhand manner that’s at once as
intimate as it is eerily defamiliarizing. Both languages seem to shatter for an instant and fall to the
ground at the poet’s feet as he voices inheritances at once with unflinching humor and perspective.
The mother’s epithets and her allusion to a particular Khasi betting practice, are
rendered with a literal starkness that departs from standard English. Departures from standard English,
explored ironically in India by poets such as Nissim Ezekiel, are turned, though reception, into identity
markers, but not (or not necessarily) of the kind assigned in the US. It is a transformation that, to be
successful, requires English’s relative neutrality: among small populations speaking unrelated, mutually
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unintelligible languages far from the “Hindi belt,” English is a means of mutual recognition, of being
North-East and of being Indian. Nongkynrih’s poem is unthinkable in Hindi: that language still retains its
connections to bhasha identity claims and all that comes with them. English’s meanings in India’s
North-East thus differ from those in (largely Hindi-speaking) Delhi, or even those in Bengaluru, which
has a large population speaking primarily English.

I will go a little further into Nongkynrih’s work, at the very least to try to clarify this point. (A fuller,
accessible account of his work can be found in that of Bhattacharjee and Guha.) In the prose Around
the Hearth, a book that can be found in most English-speaking houses in Shillong (and, also, with some
frequency, across India, in Wales, and in the US), Nongkynrih retells Khasi myths in beautifully-paced
prose that brings Khasi origins, ethos, and mythology to life. He has written a groundbreaking study of
foundational Khasi poet U So-So Tham, co-edited the major English-language anthology of poetry from
India’s North East, and provided the text for numerous children’s books. Nongkynrih’s collection for
HarperCollinsIndia, The Yearning of Seeds, collects much of his English-language verse up to the point
of its publication (2011). As of this writing, a massive work of prose fiction, Funeral Nights, centered
on the social side of Khasi funerals and loosely inspired by the Decameron, is set to appear from the
Amazon imprint Westland in India. Two poems in The Yearning of Seeds formed my impressions of
Nongkynrih’s poetry, and help underscore the achievement of his most recent book of poems, Time’s
Barter. The first is “Blasphemous Lines for Mother.” The other poem, “Bangladesh Impressions,”
conveys the promise and excitement of first crossing a border fortified in the imagination over a
lifetime. In juxtaposing the poet’s impressions with his guide’s as he travels for a festival-based
reading, Nongkynrih brings charged expectations into a wry, moving homeostasis:
Dhaka University: a huge colorful pandal,
giant loudspeakers, musicians, folk-singers
and a thousand-strong crowd, humming.
Have we come to a carnival?
But Murasingh said, everyone is a poet.
Bangladesh produces poets like paddy.
A park of trees, birds and lovebirds.
Wall magazines, photos of past festivals,
dead poets, living poets, news stories,
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comments and reviews. Murasingh revealed,
next year our photos will also flower here.
It is this laconic, not quite cynical, resigned yet nevertheless still searching sensibility that Nongkynrih
fully realizes in Time’s Barter, a book of Haiku and Senryu. Given his ability to convey multiple
competing impressions within a few lines, Nongkynrih’s turn to Haiku and Senryu in the collection
makes sense. The time of the book passes in and around Shillong, where Nongkynrih lives and teaches
(at NEHU, the North-Eastern Hill University), and often lingers on commutes to and from work and its
environs. The book begins with multiple images of plums and cherries, a meditation on the nature of
promise, mixed in a manner similar to “Bangladesh Impressions”:
juicy-looking plums,
watery taste—shouldn’t have been plucked
on a rainy day.
Fructification, with its possibility of neglect and of rot, has long been associated with poetry;
Nongkynrih extends the metaphor with a vividness, and an only-partial acceptance, that underlies the
collection as a whole:
late-blooming cherries
by the highway—how else can I
describe my haiku?
The poet of Time’s Barter is self-consciously ageing (“rainwater gurgling/ gaily in the gutter—/ how
can I run so low?”), yet is still in contact with youth—both his own, and that of others he meets. He
seems to be moving in first or second gear most of the time (Shillong’s traffic is notorious) and the
familiarity of the scene affords deep glimpses into its character. In one poem, soldiers in green, with
their consumption of land, are unfavorably compared to a particular kind of crawling insect. In
another, a rooster appears on top of a cathedral, and its symbolic incongruity (as a symbol of Ka Niam
Khasi) is quickly and humorously explained. Right at the book’s center is an unforgettable description
of Shillong on a winter evening that I will leave to readers to discover. Its perfection is dazzling.

As the people, places, and things pass by in Time’s Barter, the truths accrete sardonically. One often
sees, in Shillong, hills lost to development and sand-mining (sand and stone is often shipped
clandestinely to Bangladesh):
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progress—
the hill will flatten
because of you.
The lack of citizen control in Shillong over development or the land itself is reflected in a foreboding
kind of wonder:
that blue light behind
dark clouds, whose world, luminous
above this night gloom?
Shillong is also rife with political utopias which sometimes fuel agitation that wins incremental, cyclic
gains, and sometimes ends up just talk:
classless society—
professor and mechanics
whiskey and grilled pork.
One leaves the book with the sense that its time and tradeoffs are eternal.

Pressed by both the diaspora and the regional Englishes, Indianness, in India, as a nationalist
construction built partially from vernacularity, is a problem more fraught than bhasha criticism
captures. At the same time, the cosmopolitanism and the ideas about India’s contours within India that
led Thayil to mostly leave the tribal North-East out altogether remains as controlling as ever. It is,
nevertheless, worth getting a sense of the 60 Indian poets that Thayil does include. I will begin, as
Thayil does, with Nissim Ezekiel. The work of Mumbai poet Ezekiel (1924-2004) is the generally agreedupon starting point for modern Indian poetry in English. As Thayil writes in his introduction, “[u]ntil
Ezekiel, Indian poetry in English was a nineteenth-century product that had survived well into the
twentieth,” full of archaism, under-motivated rhymes, and fantastical themes. When he began
publishing poems in the early 1950s, Ezekiel aimed to displace “the amateurism and windy, shapeless,
overblown spiritualist epics prevalent when he began to write,” as critic Bruce King puts it in an essay
that Thayil includes.

Thayil begins with Ezekiel, placing his poem “Night of the Scorpion” second in the book. The poem is
often taught and anthologized in India, but, as with certain Robert Frost poems, its actual content
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often gets lost in the process. It’s a monologue as deviously simple as Frost’s are insidious. “Night of
the Scorpion” records an adult’s recollection of a childhood incident, the night the speaker’s mother
lays in agony after being bitten, “flash/ of diabolic tail in the dark room.” In the hours that follow:
The peasants came like swarms of flies
and buzzed the Name of God a hundred times
to paralyze the Evil One.
With candles and with lanterns
throwing giant scorpion shadows
on the sun-baked walls
they searched for him: he was not found.
They clicked their tongues.
With every movement the scorpion made
his poison moved in mother’s blood, they said.
May he sit still, they said.
May the sins of your previous birth
be burned away tonight, they said….
May the poison purify your flesh
of desire, and your spirit of ambition,
they said, and they sat around
on the floor with my mother at the centre,
the peace of understanding on each face.
The speaker goes on to contrast the thinly veiled schadenfreude of the “peasants” with the responses
of his father, a “rationalist, skeptic” (who nonetheless deploys various bogus home remedies over the
course of the night), and with rites performed by a “holy man” (who gets two perfunctory lines). After
the mother has been “twisted through and through/ groaning on a mat,” bearing both the scorpion’s
poison and what Marx called “the idiocy of rural life,” Ezekiel finishes off with an exquisite anti-climax
(that I will not spoil if you have not read the poem).

Bruce King, in the still-standard monograph Modern Indian Poetry in English, argues that Ezekiel, part
of the now-vanished Marathi-speaking Bene Israel Jewish community of Bombay, “represents the
opposite of the Hindiizing, peasant-idealizing, Soviet-sympathizing nationalist cultural assertion of the
government and many intellectuals” (18) in post-Independence India. “Night of the Scorpion” is a
textbook parody of the rural glorification verse prevalent in India’s 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s – one from
which the ironies are often stripped when it is read in real textbooks. In another monologue Thayil
includes, “The Patriot,” Ezekiel works in withering dialect to similar effect:
I am standing for peace and non-violence.
Why world is fighting fighting,
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Why all people of world
Are not following Mahatma Gandhi,
I am simply not understanding.
The poem continues, merciless with the speaker’s pompously rehearsed received opinions, and his lack
of actual power. His “standing” in the world is deeply circumscribed, a position from which persistent
violence is explained away with mis-repeated stock phrases—“Friends, Romans, Countrymen, I am
saying (to myself)/ Lend me the ears” —or by reference to the “funny habits” of other groups. That
sort of standing is something that hadn’t been articulated in poetry when Ezekiel started to write,
though it may have had its ultimate expression in G.V. Desani’s magisterial picaresque All About H.
Hatterr, which appeared in England in 1948, right as Ezekiel arrived there for a near four-year stay.10
The poet Daljit Nagra, born in 1966 in West London and also included by Thayil, works with dialect
parody to get at the aspirational diaspora: the title of Nagra’s first book is Look We Have Coming to
Dover!. Though he remains largely unknown in the US, Ezekiel played a crucial, contentious role in
building a literature from within the Bombay scene he helped found, amid notorious personal scandal
and abusive behavior (and eventual dementia). Other Ezekiel poems center on conflicts within and
surrounding sex, and on a rapidly metropolizing, Mumbaiizing Bombay. All of this is evident in poet
Amit Chaudhuri’s “Nissim Ezekiel,” which Thayil includes:
This man, in a room full of papers
in the Theosophy building,
still young at fifty-five,
the centre of his small universe,
told me, for fifteen minutes,
that my poems were ‘derived’.
I was seventeen.
I listened only to the precision
of his Bombay accent, juxtaposed
in my mind with the syllables of his name.
In some ways, he did not disappoint.
The standard line of descent for modern Indian poetry in English11 generally records two or maybe
three foundational poets from within the generation just slightly younger than Ezekiel: Dom Moraes
(1938-2004), A.K. Ramanujan (1929-1993), and Arun Kolatkar (1932-2004). (Rabindranath Tagore, for
his part, probably doesn’t count as a predecessor in this sense: Gitanjali was written in Bengali and
translated by Tagore into English.) Thayil’s anthology preserves the standard lineage, but chops it up
with inheritors, productive juxtapositions and coterie cohorts: Ezekiel, at the book’s beginning, is
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followed by US-born and based poets Aimee Nezhukumatathil and Srikanth Reddy, who seem to have
been placed there to take the book as geographically and generationally far from Ezekiel’s
claustrophobic Bombay as possible: both poets were born in Chicago in the early 1970s. The anthology
closes with Kolatkar, a Bombay poet who wrote in Marathi and in English; he is preceded by the poet
Arvind Krishna Mehrotra, who ingeniously reads Kolatkar in “What Is an Indian Poem?,” an essay Thayil
also includes. At the center of the book are Dom Moraes, who had early success in the UK before also
returning to Bombay, and A.K. Ramanujan, who left India for the U.S. at 31 for an academic career as a
linguist and multi-lingual scholar at the University of Chicago.

Of Ezekiel’s immediate inheritors and younger contemporaries, Moraes remains the best known in
India, and, to a lesser extent, in the UK; in the US he remains largely unknown. His first book won the
Hawthornden Prize in 1957 while he was a student at Oxford, and he went on to lead an eventful
London literary life for a decade or so. Work in journalism took him to New York, Israel, and
elsewhere, before Indira Gandhi’s government forced his return to Bombay. He wrote a ton of prose,
including an autobiography published in 1968 that I haven’t looked at; a full biography in political
context would be fascinating indeed. Moraes’s verse is heavily anthologized in India, particularly his
Audenesque early work:
Things happen here without my full consent.
And I accept them all. What is my choice?
I have few muscles; I must trust my voice.
Moraes has not, however, had much continuing impact outside of India. Moraes worked in modes that
are mostly out of fashion in the US, at least in academic circles. Thayil includes a number of Moraes’s
very last 12 sonnets, written as Moraes knew he was dying, and singled out by King. It is as someone
who responds (in a kind of hateful way) the flawed Robert Lowell of Notebook, The Dolphin, and For
Lizzy and Harriet that I approach late Moraes, whose anguished self-examinations, including a
childhood dominated by an abusive, mentally-ill mother, have a paradoxical rococo lightness and a
vatic distance-in-intimacy that recalls Lowell. Here is the opening sonnet from the sequence:
From a heavenly asylum, shriveled Mummy,
glare down like a gargoyle at your only son,
who now has white hair and can hardly walk.
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I am he who was not I. It’s hot in this season
and the acrid reek of my body disturbs me
in a city where people die on pavements.
That I’m terminally ill hasn’t been much help.
There is no reason left for anything to exist.
Goodbye now. Don’t try and meddle with this.
Why does your bloated corpse cry out to me
that I took from the hospital, three days dead?
I’d have come before, if the doctors had said.
I couldn’t kiss you goodbye, you stank so much.
Or bear to touch you. Anyway, bye-bye, Mumsie.
I can hear lines like “There is no reason left for anything to exist” as comic, as an ironic comment on
narcissism, but I can also hear them as an absolute despair. “Don’t try and meddle with this” refers as
much to the actual poems (i.e. “don’t try to change these poems after my death”—very much an
editorial possibility in India at the time) as to the poet’s own resignation. The three days it takes to
find and claim his mother reads less like oedipal payback than disgust, and fear for the state of
discovery, at what the poet’s own fate, smell already begun, will soon be. It will be interesting to see
what becomes of these poems as critical tastes swing back; Moraes could easily be taught as one of the
stronger poets working in the wake of Lowell, Auden and Larkin (if one wants to preserve that line).
And there is no question that Moraes continues to influence Indian poetry in English, a point that Thayil
underscores by placing his own work immediately following Moraes’s sonnets in the anthology.

In the U.S., Ramanujan is a much more familiar poet. Born in the South Indian city of Mysore,
Ramanujan spent his career at the University of Chicago, where he held a joint appointment in the
departments of Linguistics and of South Asian Languages and Civilizations. He was a Sanskritist, a
multilingual translator, and a member of the school’s notorious Committee on Social Thought. He
wrote poems in English and in Kannada. In the US, Ramanujan is beginning to be read as one of the first
poets of the Indian diaspora, addressing “my confusions, my absent presence,/ faraway rivers amok in
my continents.” He published three books of verse in English during his lifetime; Thayil has taken
poems exclusively from The Black Hen, published two years after Ramanujan’s death. Here is the title
poem:
It must come as leaves
to a tree
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or not at all
yet it comes sometimes
as the black hen
with the red round eye
on the embroidery
stitch by stitch
dropped and found again
and when it’s all there
the black hen stares
with its round red eye
and you’re afraid.
Two of Ramanujan’s contemporaries, G.S. Sharat Chandra (1935-2000) and Srinivas Rayaprol (19251998), are often left out of accounts of Indian poetry in English, but their inclusion in the anthology
should help solidify their places in the founding canon, as will the publication of Rayaprol’s near
lifelong correspondence with William Carlos Williams, in preparation at the time of this writing. Sharat
Chandra and Rayaprol’s work is part of the anthology’s tacit running theme of an emerging diasporic
imagination: Chandra, also originally from Mysore, emigrated to the U.S. and became an English
professor at the University of Missouri, Kansas City; Rayaprol, from Secunderabad, another city in South
India, trained as an engineer in the U.S. and later returned to India and edited the transcontinental
journal East/West. Here is Chandra’s “Reasons for Staying”:
I am talking to the kitchen table
full of roses.
The language is my own,
I tell them
I own them.
There are roses because I say so,
the vase is mine,
so is the kitchen.
I like them red,
I pay for the water.
The chairs immediately respond,
the table,
the knives and plates,
the salt shaker,
join in.
Arun Kolatkar, who closes the book, published three books of poems in English (only Jejuri is available
in the US as a separate volume); a posthumous volume of uncollected work and translations, The
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Boatride & Other Poems, has appeared in India; almost all of his English-language work appears in a
Bloodaxe Collected available in the US. In Marathi, Kolatkar is considered a major 20th century poet,
having published more than 15 collections, including the nearly 400 page Bhijki Vahi, or Tear-stained
Notebook. As Mehrotra describes it, Bhijki Vahi’s 25 poems are fugues on “[the] sorrowing woman –
from Isis, Cassandra and the Virgin Mary to Nadezhda Mandelstam, Susan Sontag, and [Kolatkar’s] own
sister, Rajani.” Though he could have chosen a full elite cosmopolitanism, Kolatkar, while working as a
highly-paid illustrator, chose to remain in Bombay, working in Marathi and in English. His career recalls
Pollock’s formulation: “some people in the past have been able to be cosmopolitan or vernacular
without directly professing either, perhaps while finding it impossible rationally to justify either”
(593). For anyone who has read Kolatkar’s work in English, also canonical in India, the Rabelaisian
fusion of high and low, mythic and modern, serious and playful that Mehrotra’s description promises
seems very familiar. Kolatkar’s back-and-forth between Marathi and English is the subject of Anjali
Nerlekar’s excellent Bombay Modern: Arun Kolatkar and Bilingual Literary Culture. Laetitia Zecchini’s
Arun Kolatkar and Literary Modernism in India works directly from that perspective as well. I defer to
these two studies of this great poet, and particularly to Nerlekar’s particular conception of the
sathottari period (1955-1980) in Bombay, but I will say a little bit more here.

Maharashtra, the state in India where Mumbai is located, was created in 1956, four years after Nissim
Ezekiel’s first book, A Time to Change was published in 1952. Kolatkar, born in 1932, published his first
book in English in 1976, but was by then a well-known poet writing in Marathi. That collection, Jejuri,
is a serial panorama of a sacred Hindu site in Maharashtra, incorporating numerous ironies that play the
site’s actual physical state off its accepted spiritual significance. Kolatkar’s second book written in
English, Kala Ghoda Poems, was published in 2004, a year after his death. Sarpa Satra, a third English
book and a retelling, in very modern terms, of a tiny piece of the Mahabharata, was published that
same year. Kolatkar was born in rural Kolhapur, but his work and reputation are inseparable from
Bombay in general, and Kala Ghoda in particular. Kala Ghoda is a Mumbai district that was once sleepy,
shabby, and radiating past history, and is now completely gentrified while retaining glimmers of its
aura. “Pi-dog,” a longish serial poem included by Thayil nearly in its entirety, opens on a Kala Ghoda
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traffic island. From there, the poem effortlessly combines myriad inheritances and tweaks multiple
sensibilities in channeling the title canine, who lingers with crossed paws in the middle of the island—
the city writ small. (Bombay was originally seven discrete islands.) I don’t want to spoil all the small
shocks of reading the poem for the first time by saying anything more about it here, but “Pi-dog”
makes the city’s endless pain and self-renewal come to life; it belongs in anyone’s personal Anglophone
anthology, particularly as laid out in the Pras Prakashan edition. The poem ends when the morning hour
advances, and it becomes time to “surrender the city/ to its so-called masters.” The poem resists any
attempts to reduce its specificities to perspectives that accrue to any one individual.

The poem is also a kind of open secret. Anne-Lise François, following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, calls an
open secret a “gesture of self-canceling revelation [that] permits a release from the ethical imperative
to act upon knowledge” in environments of threat. For François, an open secret is “an essentially
preventative or conservative mode of communication that reveals to insiders what it simultaneously
hides from outsiders, or, more specifically, protects them from what it is in their power to ignore.”
Poetry, in that sense, can be an open secret, “a way of imparting knowledge such that it cannot be
claimed and acted on.”12 Poets use poetry in this way. Kolatkar’s writing in English may have been a
kind of open secret, with regard to forms of Maharashtrian and Hindu nationalism. It is a kind of
communication that is under explicit threat. “The Evolution of Covert Signaling” is a paper that defines
its subject as “the transmission of information that is accurately received by its intended audience but
obscured when perceived by others. Such signals may allow coordination and enhanced cooperation”
(Smaldino, Flamson and McElreath). The authors present a possible way of computationally modeling
(and thus working to counteract) that threat, introducing “a novel mathematical model to asses when a
convert signaling strategy will evolve, as well as how receiver attitudes coevolve with covert signals”
(ibid).

Poets cannot help producing poetry in environments of threat. To give one example, Shrikant Verma’s
Magadh, which Vivek Narayanan characterizes, in introducing Rahul Soni’s translation, as “one of the
most highly regarded books of Hindi poetry from the 1980s” and “among the best books of poetry” that
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he himself has read, can be read as an open secret. Narayanan says Verma’s “ambiguous invocations of
half-mythical South Asian cities bring Borges and Cavafy automatically to mind, but there is also a
canny and even bitter political outrage... that sets him apart,” that also makes me think of
Mandelstam, and of Robert Duncan’s Passages. “Bizarrely,” Narayanan writes, “Verma was a senior
Congress Party functionary under Indira Gandhi in the late 70s and early 80s—it’s hard, for me at least,
to resist reading Magadh as his way of speaking about some aspects of that close-up experience in the
only way he could” (Narayanan, AI4). Here is Verma’s “Corpses in Kashi” as translated from Hindi by
Rahul Soni:
Corpses in Kashi
Have you seen Kashi?
Where corpses come and go
by the same road
And what of corpses?
Corpses will come
Corpses will go
Ask then, whose corpse is this?
Is it Rohitashva? No, no
all corpses cannot be Rohitashva
His corpse, you will recognize
from a distance
and if not from a distance
then from up close
and if not from up close
then it cannot be Rohitashva
And even if it is,
what difference
does it make?
Friends, you have seen Kashi
where corpses come and go
by the same road
and this is all you did –
made way and asked,
Whose corpse is this?
Whoever it was
whoever it was not
what difference did it make?
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Kolatkar’s generation in Mumbai includes Dilip Chitre (1938-2009) who also has complete oeuvres in
Marathi and in English. In the latter language, Chitre is equal parts phenomenologist and noirish beat.
Keki Daruwalla, born a year earlier, is somewhat notorious for his service to the Indian intelligence
agency (he’s a former chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee); his work pursues rhyming forms
and Hellenic preoccupations through to pessimistic takes on big questions. Kamala Das (1934-2009), is
famous in India for a tell-all autobiography (which she all but disavowed) and for frank poems on
marriage and infidelity, all of which shocked readers in India on a scale that exceeded Anne Sexton’s
impact in the US, for example. That Das’s work had similar impact while not being nearly as graphic as
Sexton’s points up a major way that it requires being carried across. Indian mores at the mid-20th
century were such that even Das’s most “revelatory” poems can seem restrained in more permissive
contexts. Poems like “The Maggots,” though, are crushingly Ledaen:
At sunset on the riverbank, Krishna
loved her for the last time and left.
That night in her husband’s arms, Radha felt
so dead that he asked, what is wrong,
do you mind my kisses love, and she said
no, not at all, but thought, what is
it to the corpse if the maggots nip?
The generation born around the time of Indian Independence includes K. Satchidanandan, whose
recitations of his poems in Malayalam are astonishing (he’s known in Kerala as “the Neruda of
Kottayam”), but whose poems in the anthology don’t hit similar sonic highs. Sadana’s exploration of his
work and career is an excellent place to start with it. Arvind Krishna Mehrotra, the great critic of his
generation (he has stood for election as Oxford’s Professor of Poetry), has poems in the anthology that
tread ironically on Iron John territory, but the full scope of his career is only beginning to come into
focus: the Fall 2019 release in the US of his collected poems should be a major event. Eunice de
Souza’s sharp, unsparing book, Fix, published in 1979, deserves a full critical republication and
reevaluation, along with many more readers. De Souza’s poems, driven by her unmistakable voice,
don’t sit well excerpted within the anthology, but Fix’s vivid, caustic clarity opens out into the world
in a way that reminds me first of Alice Notley’s writing from the same decade. A revised edition of De
Souza’s collected poems, A Necklace of Skulls, was published in 2019.
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Gopal Honnalgere (1942-2003) is, with Sharat Chandra and Rayaprol, among Thayil’s most intriguing
finds. I can’t stop re-reading Honnalgere’s “The City,” a longish poem of married love that’s unlike any
other. Its effects depend on nursery-rhyme-like repetitions that get very close to lovers’ play, and its
intense, real-time tableaux can suddenly pull back into commentary: hard, yet full longing. Parts make
me think of Joseph Ceravolo’s poems, and of Bernadette Mayer’s great Midwinter Day. One hopes that
Thayil’s superb detective work will spur the republication and reconsideration of Honnalgere’s six longvanished Indian small press titles. The work of Lawrence Bantleman (1942-1995), only slightly less
obscure, and also included by Thayil, deserves similar reevaluation. The generation born in the 1950s
includes Vikram Seth, more famous in the U.S. for his memoir Two Lives and for the novels A Suitable
Boy and An Equal Music than for his agile formalist verse; and Vijay Seshadri and Agha Shahid Ali, both
of whom are well-known (and very different) Indian-American poets. Meena Alexander’s elegy to Allen
Ginsberg asks this “Engine of flesh, hot sunflower of Mathura” to “teach us to glide into life,/ teach us
when not to flee.” A discovery for some US readers will be Manohar Shetty, whose lyricism in his poems
of the 1980s at once recalls that of Theodore Roethke, and, at moments, AI. Here is Shetty’s “The
Hyenas”:
My asthmatic child coughs – her throat
Is emery paper. Her tiny
Hands are wet
Petals in my hand. Hyenas cackle
From the Governor’s banquet grounds.
Eyes glint as a fencer’s
Mask, I stare them down. I whisper,
They’ve gone, dearest child, sleep;
They laugh with the Governor’s gang
Of kingmakers, fatcats, gold-toting ogres.
She sleeps, her temples damp.
To the carrion call the drooling
Packs converge: amidst red
Laughter, claws tear
At gizzard, sweating pigling,
Roe, soft brain, and lamb.
From there in the anthology, things are as scattered, various and unsettled as they were elsewhere in
the mid-2000s in poetry for the generations born in the 1960s and 1970s. Mukta Sambrani emigrated to
the US from India as an adult; her entries in the anthology are forceful personae-based lyrics and
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invocations: “Anne Carson lives in Canada, in Greece, in Rome, and in China/ Mothers of gods
everywhere suffer prolonged pregnancy and unnatural labour.” Sambrani’s Broomrider’s book of the
dead was published in 2015 by Paperwall.in. Mani Rao, who was born in Mumbai and splits her time
between the US and India, writes, in the poems included in the anthology, directly and abstractly
about sex and desire in a manner at once distinctive and full of echoes; the three books of Rao’s I have
been able to locate were published by Hong Kong’s Chameleon Press. Anjum Hasan, based in Karnataka
and editor of the literature journal Caravan, recalls “agonized deputations to the sitting room” that
preserve a Shillong childhood’s stasis. Mumbai-based poet Sampurna Chattarji, writing of an unnamed
elsewhere, finds “She understands nothing of this place,/ and so it moves her”; Chattarji’s work over
14 books and her curating at IQ, among many other projects, are formative. An art critic and curator,
Ranjit Hoskote is a critic and intellectual mentor of the Bombay visual art and poetry scenes, and
remains their most accomplished poet: “graphite smudges to mark/ where cloud-hidden peaks will
rise.” A book detailing the work of Hasan, Chattarji, and Hoskote, within poetry and arts journalism
and the ways they relate institutionally in India (and disparately don’t) would be very useful.

The younger poets based in the UK seem, in the anthology, less touched by modernism and its
aftereffects. The younger poets based in the US are more broadly represented in the anthology
Indivisible: An Anthology of South Asian American Poetry. My favorite selections from among the
younger writers in the anthology are from poets living in Missoula and Fairfax County, respectively:
Prageeta Sharma’s beautiful and unclassifiable love poems, and Vivek Narayanan’s bildungsdictungs,
profuse with the confusions of early adulthood:
Thus with the darkly dreaming town colluding
I iced my post-adolescent angst in a heartbeat.
As with most of the living poets in anthology, Sharma and Narayanan’s work has evolved a great deal in
the intervening years.

Despite the critiques of writers who leave or are born outside of India, returns are just as complicated.
Thayil includes Adil Jussawalla’s Missing Person in its entirety. Thayil’s own “Malayalam’s Ghazal”
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conveys a poet’s fear of imperfect vernacular mastery. Arundhathi Subramaniam’s “To the Welsh Critic
Who Doesn’t Find Me Identifiably Indian” takes on the West’s demands for ethnic authenticity with a
rhetoric that’s “about as rustic/ as a mouth-freshened global village.” Kazim Ali’s “Two Halves” takes
the Indianness equation’s concrete givens (language, location) and makes them oblique:
two halves circle each other
each aching for the other’s arms
they’re rent in their itching
to hit the ground at the speed of sound
the half of you is tone deaf
but the other half still sings
one half forgot the other’s face
his ‘collision or collusion with history’
the two lock now one to the other
sink blazingly below the clouds
In his introduction, Thayil says that he hopes the anthology serves as an “introduction to undeservedly
little-known literature.” He love for that literature is palpable, and is part of what makes the book
much more than a survey. But just as Donald Allen’s The New American Poetry 1945-1960 cannot be
accepted as a model of its moment, the same is true of Thayil’s anthology: its first ten years have
already revealed unrecoverable limitations. At the same time, I have lost months to it.
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Chapter 2: Archival Power: Individualization, the Racial State,
and Institutional Poetry
This chapter focuses on an attempt, using poetry, to co-opt and contain an ongoing social movement,
Black Lives Matter—#BlackLivesMatter—in 2015. It argues that a poetry performance by Kenneth
Goldsmith at Brown University on March 13 of that year, entitled “The Body of Michael Brown,” was an
attempted use of archival power. Archival power is a strategy for containing social movements by
keeping their demands discursive and relatively confined to the US university system (Ferguson).
Goldsmith’s performance has already been situated within the context of Black Lives Matter by a
number of critics; I am seeking here to understand it specifically as an instance of archival power.
Before giving an account of the Black Lives Matter movement, of archival power, or of Goldsmith’s
performance, I need to give a brief, particular account of the current US university system, one set of
institutions through which archival power works.

US universities contain ideas that threaten US society’s existing organization; at the same time, US
universities work to maintain existing US class hierarchies and political horizons. That contradiction is
not a design flaw. As a semi-closed system (admission, tuition, library paywalls, credentials), the US
university at once produces and lets off pressure in accordance with contradictions in the larger
economy; as its governance evolves and reacts to conditions, it produces more pressure than it lets off.
The main form of pressure that the US university currently creates is enormous personal debt. At the
same time, the university prepares an increasingly less-employable middle-class workforce, the
country’s bureaucratic and surveillance back office, resulting in diminishing mobility (Bailey). Marxist
critiques of capitalism are taught at US universities, and committed Marxist scholars radicalize
students, but the main political horizon that the university actually promulgates is tied directly into
the racial capitalist state, which needs the university’s ultimate surpluses. And Marxist and other
scholars who do speak out and radicalize students face attacks inside and outside the university, a
phenomenon with a long history.
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Scholars Piya Chatterjee and Sunaina Maira’s collection The Imperial University: Academic Repression
and Scholarly Dissent (2014) responds to recent forms of the phenomenon, “a calamitously repressive
series of well-coordinated attacks against scholars who have dared to challenge the national consensus
on U.S. wars and overseas occupations” in the years following 9/11. Those challenges, in the form of
demand-based occupation and protest, often take place on university campuses themselves; in
response, “administrative policing flexes its muscles along with the batons, chemical weapons, and riot
gear of police and SWAT teams” (Chatterjee and Maira 5). Instances of even speech-based solidarity or
can lead to opaque denials of promotion or resources, or outright ostracism and smears, as with Steven
Salaita (Pettit), with the goal of “containment and censorship of political critique” (Chatterjee and
Maira 5). That containment and censorship is “enacted through the collusion of the university, partisan
off-campus groups and networks, and the state” (ibid).

A recent incident as of this writing involved the arrest and forcible removal of Johns Hopkins University
students and others who took over a university administration building to protest the university’s plan
to employ an armed private campus police force, and to protest the university’s contracts to provide
medical and leadership training to US border enforcement. Following a month-long occupation that
attempted to get the university to abandon its plans for armed private police and to terminate its
government contracts, two undergraduates, two graduate students, and three community members
were arrested, and the building was cleared. The demands were not met (Campbell and Richman).

The US was founded on the twin tracks of slavery and genocide, obscured via elevated rhetoric invoking
autonomy and freedom, relatively available to a protected class that is by default white, the definition
of which expands as necessary. The contemporary US consumes 25% of the world’s resources to support
4.4% of its population, while housing 25% of the world’s known incarcerated people, a disproportionate
number of whom are Black (Reed), (Lee). Some US poetries acknowledge the US’s founding settlercolonial white nationalism. The textual record of acknowledgement stretches from the demands of The
Resolutions of the Germantown Mennonites; February 18th 1688 and James M. Whitfield’s “How Long?”
and before, to Audre Lorde’s “Power,” Jayne Cortez’s “Rape,” John Keene’s Counternarratives, and
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after. These works are not easily grouped together; at the same time, they all seek to disclose the US’s
continuing settler-colonial practices and US slavery’s afterlife (Hartman). While the US’s relatively
permissive speech laws have allowed strains of poetry to act as an open secret in the US, fully-realized
reactionary strands of “quietism” (Silliman) run just as deep through US poetry and thought, presenting
a default white world shot-through with demand-weariness, rue, avoidance, melancholy, apathy, quasiameliorative hand-waving, and acidic satire that betrays lingering investment (here I’m thinking of
Frederick Seidel, but there are lots of examples). Whatever one wants to call them, quietest
tendencies want to represent default-white being-in-the-world in order to solace, consume, or
transcend it. Some poems demonstrate competing false responses; some show some ways of trying to
enjoy oneself, even if they don’t work or are temporary; some indulge in “ecstatic capitulation”
(Borzutzky). In the years following WWII, the production and reception of poetry in the US increasingly
came under the auspices of the US university (Rasula), via a proliferation of writing programs (McGurl),
that are de facto white supremacist (Díaz).

The split among poetic strands under US capitalism mirrors the pistonized pressure-valve construction
of the US university; that contradiction is US poetry institutions under racial capitalism, which has
produced racialized modes specific to poetry. For example, poets from The Black Arts Movement
entered and remained within the academy at varying points in their careers, as did poets from whitedominated poetries that present themselves as oppositional, including Language poetry. For those
coming in from the Black Arts Movement and other movements, however eventual reception within the
university happened almost completely under the sign of “identity politics” (Ho). That term, as noted
earlier, is “highly contested” (Haider); its most clarifying incarnation has been as, as Haider defines it,
“the neutralization of social movements… the ideology that emerged to appropriate their
emancipatory legacy in service of the advancement of political and economic elites” (12). Roderick
Ferguson’s 2012 book The Reorder of Things: The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference
details the mechanics of that neutralization within the US university, and calls the major force behind
its containments in the US university “archival power.” Through archival power, the processes of
identity politics produce “identity poetry” as form of reception in Haider’s sense, regulated from
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within US universities, in ways that have worked to make race “illegible” within US poetry and
literature (Ferguson 43). This reordering continues within writing programs. Its activity was exposed to
particular and painful scrutiny during an institutional “crisis” (Yépez) within US poetry in institutions in
in 2015, when identity-based reception strategies came into conflict with an attempt to co-opt and
contain Black Lives Matter.

It is not for me to claim or tell the ongoing story of the Black Lives Matter movement. I am going to
synopsize a part of the chronological account of its development by the scholar Keeanga-Yamahtta
Taylor. I am doing so to try to clarify what another straight, white, Jewish, male, cis poet from Long
Island did with regard to it.13

“On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown Jr., an 18-year-old African American man, was fatally shot by 28year-old white Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson in the city of Ferguson, Missouri, a suburb of St.
Louis.” That is how the current Wikipedia entry that comes up in searching for “mike brown murder”
begins (Brown). The Black Lives Matter movement arose in the immediate aftermath of Brown’s death.
Its origins and early phase have been documented in the 2016 book From #BlackLivesMatter to Black
Liberation by Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor:14
Every movement needs a catalyst, an event that captures people’s experiences and draws them
out from their isolation into a collective force with the power to transform social conditions.
Few could have predicted that white police officer Darren Wilson shooting Mike Brown would
ignite a rebellion in a small, largely unknown Missouri suburb called Ferguson. For reasons that
may never be clear, Brown’s death was also a breaking point for the African Americans of
Ferguson—but also for hundreds of thousands of Black people across the United States. Perhaps
it was the inhumanity of the police leaving Brown’s body to fester in the hot summer sun for
four and a half hours after killing him, keeping his parents away at gunpoint with dogs. “We
was treated like we wasn’t parents, you know?” “That’s what I didn’t understand. They sicced
dogs on us. They wouldn’t let us identify his body. They pulled guns on us.” Maybe it was the
military hardware police brandished when protests to Brown’s death arose. With tanks and
machine guns and a never-ending supply of tear gas, rubber bullets, and swinging batons, the
Ferguson police department declared war on Black residents and anyone who stood in solidarity
with them. (153-154)
Taylor’s account of the four and a half hours that Brown’s body was left in the street argues that
Michael Brown’s body itself was a primary site of contention for the movement. That view is widely
shared (Coates). Taylor quotes Charles Pierce, whose own account, she notes, “captured what many
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felt”: “Dictators leave bodies in the street. Petty local satraps leave bodies in the street. Warlords
leave bodies in the street… as object lessons”—object lessons making clear who is in power (154). The
#BlackLivesMatter movement, organized largely through social media, gained force locally in Ferguson
in the aftermath of Brown’s death; called by movement membership, a larger resistance began to
converge there. The movement linked Brown’s death to the death, three weeks prior (on July 17,
2014), in Staten Island, New York, of Eric Garner. Garner was choked to death by police officer Daniel
Pantaleo during an attempt to arrest Garner. Awareness of the disproportionate number of Black
people in the US who are killed by police, ongoingly, began to spread, and the deaths began to be more
widely regarded as the extrajudicial executions that they are. Over 300 people were arrested over the
course of nightly riots in August 2014 in Ferguson.

The stakes became further defined as time passed: in the ensuing months, “Black protestors went on to
unmask the kleptocracy at the heart of municipal operations in Ferguson, revealing that the Ferguson
police department, directed by the mayor and city council, were targeting the Black population as a
major source of revenue for the town” though punitive “fines, fees, citations, tickets, and arrests” for
which officials had revenue-generating targets (Taylor 155). The result: “By December 2014, the
department had 16,000 outstanding arrest warrants, mostly for minor offenses. Ninety-five percent of
traffic stops were directed at Black drivers” (ibid). For many, it became clear that these tactics could
not possibly be limited to Ferguson.15 Then, as Taylor recounts, on November 24, 2014, “a grand jury in
Ferguson decided not to indict Darren Wilson for the murder of Mike Brown” (168). Two days before
the announcement, Taylor notes, 12-year-old Tamir Rice had been killed by police Cleveland (the boy
had been holding a toy gun); a week before that, Tanisha Anderson had been killed (also in Cleveland)
as part of an attempted arrest. On December 3, 2014, nine days after the Wilson decision, “a Staten
Island grand jury returned a decision not to indict Daniel Pantaleo, the officer who choked Eric Garner
to death” (169). Riots, protests, and walkouts erupted at points nationwide and around the world, and
continued into the ensuing months: “Researchers at the Rudin Center for Transportation at New York
University… counted more than 1,400 protests in nearly 300 U.S. and international cities related to the
Black Lives Matter movement from November 2014 through May 2015. Half or more of the protests in
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that time in Saint Louis, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Oakland, Calif., wound up shutting down
transportation infrastructure” (Badger). As Taylor recounts, on December 8, 2014, five days after the
decision on Daniel Pantaleo, LeBron James and other basketball players wore a t-shirt emblazoned with
Eric Garner’s entreaty to police, “I Can’t Breathe,” which had been widely circulated; other celebrities
followed suit. The gesture carried charge: it backed blocked highways and burning police cars.

As Taylor recounts, then-president Barack Obama “quickly organized a meeting of some of the more
visible activists from Ferguson and around the country to discuss police violence.” It was a highly
unusual request: “[t]hat such a meeting was ever convened was proof alone that this was no longer just
about Ferguson. The nation’s political establishment was concerned about containing the movement”
(ibid). As 2015 began, #BlackLivesMatter seemed like a potential threat on the order of the US’s recent
past. The Occupy movement had happened in 2011, and had led to semi-coordinated riots and
takeovers. Black Lives Matter, however, aroused the white power structure’s memory of Black
militancy:
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, it often looked as if a major national uprising might possibly
happen. There were major [Black militant] rebellions in Rochester, Philadelphia, and Harlem in
1964; in Watts in 1965; in Cleveland in 1966, in Newark, Detroit, and Minneapolis-St Paul in
1967; in Chicago, Baltimore, Washington, DC, and Cleveland in 1968. Politicized bombings were
a regular occurrence. There were over 4,000 bombings [by various groups] between January
1969 to April 1970 in the United States.16 Universities were having a similar moment of
militancy in the 1960s with huge protests and shutdowns. After Kent State, as Kirkpatrick Sale
notes, “students at a total of at least 350 institutions went out on strike and 536 schools were
shut down completely for some period of time, 51 of them for the entire year.” (Spahr and
Young, The Program Era and the Mainly White Room)
It was in an atmosphere of political uncertainty and seeming (if dissipating) revolutionary possibility
that on March 13, 2015, at the Interrupt3 conference at Brown University, conceptual poet Kenneth
Goldsmith read a piece titled “The Body of Michael Brown.” The piece was what Goldsmith later called
a “massaging” of Michael Brown’s autopsy report (Steinhauer): Goldsmith edited the report so that his
recitation ended with the report’s routine and compulsory description of Brown’s genitals. (The
description actually occurs in another part of the report.) The poet John Keene, writing as a critic in
charactering the performance in the days immediately following it, places the performance in its
historical and political contexts, and names its interests:
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[T]he very fact that [Goldsmith], as a wealthy, socially privileged cis-gender straight white
male, chose to appropriate and perform the remixed report, within (and despite) the broader
and longstanding social and political context of the crisis of police harassment, the prisonindustrial context and the New Jim Crow, and the state-sanctioned murder of black people,
especially black men, made it an overtly political act. That he remixed it, ending with a riff on
the murdered black man's genitalia, to entertain a mostly white audience at one of the nation's
most elite universities, underlined the political valence of the performance. The
dismemberment and display of black bodies before white audiences has an ugly history in the
US, such that one might view Goldsmith's performance as a form of symbolic lynching. Here the
appropriate practice was neither “uncreative” [as Goldsmith often claims his work is] nor
apolitical; in its commodifying and reifying action-as-spectacle, it reinscribed the violence of
Brown's (and other black people’s) tragic death and its aftermath, and the erasure of his
humanity, in an effort at ironic, clever entertainment. It was thus an act of oppression-as-art
that fits well with the logic of white supremacy as it has long functioned in American society.
(Keene, Limit)
Keene goes on to name other Black men murdered by police in the period after Brown’s murder —
Walter Scott in North Charleston, South Carolina; Tony Robinson in Madison, Wisconsin; Eric Harris in
Tulsa, Oklahoma; Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Maryland—making clear the routine nature of the
extrajudicial executions of Black men, and women, in the US. That routineness is something
Goldsmith’s performance implicitly draws on when appropriating Brown’s genitalia, as Keene notes.
Goldsmith had in the years prior been working in a self-described “uncreative” “conceptual” mode of
composition, one that he described as rule-based and appropriative, and that was presented as
opposed to the individual “expression” of voice. That set it explicitly against so-called identity poetry;
voice-based expression is perceived as central to identity poetry, which is in fact a default-white
reception strategy and not anything immanent to the work it is used to denote. Conceptual poetry’s
self-canonizing anthology, published in 2011, is titled Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual
Writing.

While attacks on and critiques of conceptualism’s engagements with race had already been made by
the time the performance occurred, it’s hard to overstate conceptual poetry’s institutional dominance
in the US at the moment of the performance: Goldsmith, who teaches at the University of
Pennsylvania, had been selected to visit the White House on May 11, 2011 to help lead a poetry
“summit,” and in 2013 was appointed the first poet laureate of the Museum of Modern Art in New York.
As word of Goldsmith’s performance began at Brown to circulate, condemnations were immediate,
including Keene’s comprehensive critique. The poet Ken Chen, writing as a critic about the
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performance in August of that same year, compares the performance to a book Goldsmith had thenrecently published:
In Seven American Deaths and Disasters, Goldsmith transcribes news broadcasts responding to
the tragedies [the JFK, RFK, and John Lennon assassinations; the space shuttle Challenger
explosion; 9/11; the Columbine High School mass shooting; Michael Jackson’s death]—in other
words, an imagined public sphere. The tragedies are conceptualized as having happened to
“us.” In his most recent piece, Goldsmith did not transcribe mass media responses to Michael
Brown’s death, perhaps because he did not see Brown as one of “us.” Instead, he read Michael
Brown’s autopsy report. He literally performed the role of the state, the man slicing apart the
fallen body of Michael Brown. When I first heard about the performance, I was initially struck
by how Goldsmith’s reading felt less like a faux-pas or a mistake, than the kind of deeply
revealing slip from a psychoanalytic case study, that gesture by which the subject reveals the
unconscious self-knowledge that they did not know they possessed. What I learned when
Goldsmith read the autopsy report of Michael Brown is this: Conceptual Poetry literally sees
itself as white power dissecting the colored body. Goldsmith saw Michael Brown not as a body
but as a death-archive to be enumerated, dissected, and possessed (in the sense both of
property and haunting). He wrote in another lineage—not just Western Modernism, but also the
literary tradition that made modernity possible: the documents, the ledgers and the logs of the
slave trade.
The “us” that Chen invokes, from Goldsmith’s perspective, is the default white power structure of the
state and the elite university as expression of accumulated capital. Chen is arguing that Goldsmith’s
performance literally marshaled white power in the service of that audience, and that the performance
must be understood as an operation on the “death-archive” of slavery. Through Ferguson’s concept of
“archival power,” one clearly sees that the power that Chen describes really is a form of state power:
the framing of Black bodies and social movements within white supremacist narratives, hierarchies,
and discursive horizons. That is what Goldsmith’s piece did to Black Lives Matter in appropriating the
movement’s primary site of contention, Michael Brown’s body, and treating it as a “death-archive.” As
Chen notes, the moment was “deeply revealing” of the nature of default-white textual appropriation
within racial capitalism. Seeing more of the mechanism of that appropriation, in terms of its
relationship to the state, requires defining more of the terms under which it operates.

As Spahr and Young note in their piece “The Program Era and the Mainly White Room,” the Brown
University audience that received Goldsmith’s performance was “mainly white.” The piece details the
specific history of the “mainly white room” within the US university’s developing set of writing
programs. Following up that piece, Spahr’s monograph Du Bois’s Telegram pulls back to give a detailed
overview of the US government’s attempts to curtail social movements and related movement
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literatures of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. As Spahr shows, the US government made explicit and successful
attempts during that time to control the political horizons of US literature (and non-US literature) using
the US university and various funding strategies that run through it. The reason for the desire for that
explicit control has been laid out in the foundational study by Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial
Formations in the United States (1994). For Omi and Winant, as for everyone, the US is a “racially
organized social and political system” (Omi and Winant, Formation 245)—“a racial project that
combines essentialist representations of race (stereotyping, xenophobia, aversion, etc.) with patterns
of domination (violence, hierarchy, super-exploitation, etc.)” (Omi and Winant, Resistance). That
system’s appropriation, in the service of its own power, of mid-20th century social movements and their
attendant literatures is cogently summarized by Roderick Ferguson in making Ferguson’s own argument
about archival power.

Ferguson analyzes the US university’s response to the campus uprisings of the 1960s, which led directly
to the controls documented by Chatterjee and Maira, whereby the “nation-state used local differences
to mediate the upheavals brought about by the student movements.” Those movements were
confronted and absorbed, Ferguson argues, following Stuart Hall, by the “racial state” under the sign
of “difference.” The use of difference was codified, within the academy, under the sign of “identity
politics,” which, as Haider and others show, it had appropriated from a Black feminist activist and
scholarly collective, the Combahee River Collective. On the surface, within the academy, the term
“identity politics” was presented as immanent to the movements, as a “demand for inclusion in the
structure of society as it is” (Haider 25), erasing the collective’s actual transformative demands in the
process. Thus, as Haider argues, the term must be understood as “the neutralization of movements
against racial oppression… the ideology that emerged to appropriate [the] emancipatory legacy [of
Black social movements] in service of the advancement of political and economic elites” (Haider 12).
The erasing of transformative demands while capturing some of the energy and symbolic capital of the
movements in the service of distortions is what archival power does. For Ferguson, “[t]he racial state is
not simply the entity on which political demands are made. It is also that political formation that
receives its identity and contours from having archived”—or, in Omi and Winant’s terminology,
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“absorbed”—the social movements of the past (26). Ferguson goes on to detail Omi and Winant’s
argument in Racial Formations in the United States, whereby “state institutions within the United
States responded to political pressures of antiracist movements by, in part, adopting policies of
absorption” (27). He quotes a key passage in their study: “Absorption reflects the realization that many
demands are greater threats to the racial order before they are accepted than after they have been
adopted in suitably moderate form” (86). From there comes Ferguson’s key transformation:
What Omi and Winant refer to as “absorption” we might understand as the gestures and
routines of archival power. Indeed, in its absorptive capacities, the state becomes a subarchive
that “documents” past struggles and thus achieves power through control of that broad
assemblage of “documents” known as “the student movements.”
To speak through and with local culture and difference and to absorb them, state and capital
needed the assistance of the academy. In point of fact, the academy was positioned
prominently in this moment because of its historic task of representing national culture. In the
moment of the sixties—because of the student movements around race and gender—the U.S.
academy would take on the imperative of American literature. Put plainly, it would attempt to
resolve the contradictions that govern and constitute the U.S. nation-state. In the moment of
the multinational firm’s emergence and capital’s explicit engagement in local culture and
difference, the academy would become the handbook on the absorption and representation of
those differences, the manual for state and capital’s unprecedented deliberation. As such, the
U.S. academy would become the model of archontic power—using and assimilating texts to
engage the problematic of “e pluribus unum.” In doing so, U.S. higher education would become
the capitol of archival power, training state and economy in its methods of representation and
regulation. Rather than the academy losing importance because of the attack on national
culture, the American academy and things academic would become the place where enfeebled
institutions might make sense of difference, its fortunes, and its disruptions. to foster an
entirely new relation between academy, capital, and state. This new relation would revolve
around the very question promoted by the U.S. student movements, the question of minority
difference—how to understand it, how to negotiate it, how to promote it, and how to regulate
it. This question would inspire power to run a new archival errand. (27-28)
The purpose of archival power is to keep demands discursive; the US university is the major medium
through which that horizon-limiting power runs. Chen’s evocation of slavery’s ledgers is correct:
Goldsmith’s performance was a show of his project’s discursive power over a Black body, and,
explicitly, over Black sexuality and Black death. Goldsmith turned Michael Brown’s body into a text and
brought it into the university under the auspices of a white stereotype (a white narrative, a white
hierarchy, a white discursive horizon) that centered on Black male sexuality, presenting it as such to an
elite, default white audience. In doing so, Goldsmith was working to neutralize the demands of Black
Lives Matter by reframing its primary site of contention and appropriating it to signal the capacities of
his own project, aligned with state containment. The performance brought Michael Brown’s body into
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the university in order to begin to reframe the movement under state-sanctioned forms of signification,
and to limit its power to the discursive realm. Its aim was archival.

Archival power works in the same way that capitalism and (we are told) terrorism work: via agents who
act without explicit instructions in what they believe to be their own interests. Archival power works
by absorbing movements, and movement literatures, narratives, and documents, and those who create
them in exactly the same way. By appropriating Michael Brown’s death, Goldsmith was acting out of his
own interest (in ways that I detail further below); at the same time, he was doing the state’s work of,
in a moment of crisis, bringing the Black Lives Matter movement out of the realm of action and demand
and into a policed, paywalled archive. The Brown university performance, owned by Brown, has not
been released, at Goldsmith’s request, following its reception, which only underscores this point.

As Ferguson, following Stuart Hall, notes, social movements came under the auspices of US universities
specifically under the sign of “identity” and “difference”; Goldsmith’s reordering of the autopsy text
does so in the service of bringing Brown’s body into the US university under the terms of a white
narrative, one that explicitly invokes difference. Just as “the U.S. nation-state and American capital in
the 1960s used U.S. revolutionary movements to bolster the global standing of U.S. political economy,”
it continued to do so in 2015:
With the government’s overtures to minority communities and its promotion of nationalist
ideals like “self-determination,” the state began to refashion itself into a structure that would
partially and selectively affirm minority difference, evolving ways in which institutions could
use rather than absolutely dismiss the demands of minority activists. In such a context,
minority activism would be for power both a potential antagonist and a collaborator, inspiring
critical transformations and new funding technologies at the same time. … In order to refashion
minority difference as an opportunity for power, the state would also construct racism as an
increasingly illegible phenomenon in U.S. society, the unfortunate past that was gradually
receding. (Ferguson 41)
Ferguson’s concept of archival power is thus not concerned just with literal archives, although it is
built on top of the conventional sense of literal archives. When Ferguson talks about “absorption,” he
is talking about actual people, in the sense that many activists end up academics within departments
that separate the discursive side of demands for change from the direct action that must always
accompany them. You don’t crush social movements with archival power; you do that with state
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violence. At the same time, you can denature and neutralize histories though archival power (which
often takes the form of funding), and integrate them into stories you want to tell (sometimes about
incremental gains).

The strategy was showing signs of strain at the time of Goldsmith’s performance. It was, for
institutional poetry in the US, a step in a developing “crisis” following of decades of steps taken toward
diversity. The timing of Goldsmith’s performance makes clear it was an explicit response to a
contestation, within the university and within poetry specifically, over the control of archival power,
which was itself a step in the institutional crisis. That step itself, which I will now detail, had multiple
precursors. In September, 2013 Heriberto Yépez’s essay “Goldsmith y el imperio retro-conceptual,” a
series of theses, was posted in English on Guillermo Parra’s blog:
Goldsmith is emblematic of the decade of war against “terrorism.” His work consists of
accepting and retransmitting (as is) what power emits, finding it beautiful without having to
read it. Using the ready-made as take-over.
He transcribes texts, makes books of pure copy-paste, runs ubu.com, his celebrity prospers.
“Uncreative Writing” is already a part of the canon he desired.
His innovation is questionable. One example among others: three decades ago, Ulises Carrión
did things that are championed by North Americans today.
They reiterate colonialist practices. By means of manifestos, anthologies and membership, they
erase or take over other histories.
His politics attracts students, academics, writers and readers who are undecided between the
consensual and the arty. Conceptualism is a cultural manifestation derived from expansionist
North American politics. That’s why appropriation is its foundation.
His campaign for stardom and an enterprise of symbolic capital uses a retro-frivolous look as a
system of self-defense.
Goldsmith in the White House or on the Colbert Report isn’t the problem, but rather his
promotion of a “silly” conformity, complicit with capital and laugh tracks. By depoliticizing
writing, he disempowers emerging critical communities. His defect is ethical.
His aesthetic achievements, measured on an international scale, are scant. It’s not
conceptualism but a pastiche of other conceptualisms.
Vanessa Place or Goldsmith embody North American expansionism and they give it good taste,
post-experimental refinement, radical-soft.
They demonstrate what’s happening with critical post-theory writing that chooses to embrace
capitalism while boasting about the twist. A performance of hegemonic possession? No. That
would threaten its institutional click.
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By denying its apology for capitalist logic and leaving a supposed irony open, a referential
machine or a could-be role play, retro-conceptualism collapses. They could have been a
performative denunciation but they wanted spectacle and approval, they prefer cynicism to
criticism. …
The Language poets themselves lost credibility by encouraging heirs with reactionary ideals.
As with Chen, Yépez’s argument lines up directly with Ferguson’s description of archival power. His
reference to language poetry is to the movement that had proceeded conceptualism and that had
sponsored conceptualism institutionally (doing a complex baton-pass that is the subject for another
book). Dorothy J. Wang’s Thinking Its Presence, discussed earlier, was published in December 2013; in
May 2014, Sueyeun Juliette Lee, a poet writing as a critic, published “Shock and Blah: Offensive
Postures in ‘Conceptual’ Poetry and the Traumatic Stuplime,” a carefully theorized treatment on
conceptual uses of archival trauma;17 in October 2014, Cathy Park Hong, a poet writing as a critic,
published “Delusions of Whiteness in the Avant-Garde,” which, like Yépez and Lee’s pieces, targeted
conceptualism and Goldsmith specifically, along with language poetry. Hong’s essay, which explicitly
invokes Wang’s study, was the one to get institutional traction. It begins “To encounter the history of
avant-garde poetry is to encounter a racist tradition.” It frames the avant-garde as an intrainstitutional formation whose “most vocal, self-aggrandizing stars continue to be white and even today
these stars like Kenneth Goldsmith spout the expired snake oil that poetry should be ‘against
expression’ and ‘post-identity,’” picking up the thread of Wang’s argument regarding identity politics
in Thinking Its Presence.

Hong’s piece was widely read and commented upon, and on March 10, 2015, three days before
Goldsmith’s performance at Brown University, the Boston Review published “Race and the Poetic
Avant-Garde,” a set of responses to Hong’s essay that the magazine had commissioned, co-curated by
Dorothy J. Wang. Language poetry’s self-positioning as “against expression” has been well-documented
(Kreiner). Dorothy J. Wang’s book and Cathy Park Hong’s essay focus on identity politics as a barrier to
the work of poets of color being taken seriously within the academy; Hong’s essay contains attempts to
theorize so-called tokenism and “bean counting” within the academy. The target of Hong’s critique
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was creative writing program-based poetry reception, where poets “dread the possibility of being
tarred as an ‘identity politics’ poet, and perhaps to such a degree that it’s turned into our own
detriment: we may overly exercise a form of self-restraint, scraping our writing of explicitly toxic
racial matter, so we won’t be exiled to that ghetto.” Hong’s essay was published in a print journal in
October of 2014; Black Lives Matter probably had not happened by the time Hong finished the essay
and it began the process of production. Hong invokes the Black Arts Movement, but not the Black
militancy out of which the movement emerged. The sentence above signals is the limit of its target:
the discursive realm of institutional poetry. It is not a statement of wider solidarity outside of the
academy; it is a description of discursive strategies employed within it. As Wang and Hong note,
academic departments have (often unspoken) codes of enforcement for behavior, especially for nontenured faculty, about what kinds of demands are appropriate, and the decorum with which they
should be made. All of this changes the political horizon of literature’s representations of the world.
That’s one sense of Ferguson’s archival power: separation of the discursive realm from the material
realm in order to control the narrative—partially by controlling the very people creating, or who
created, the narratives and sub-narratives in question. Hong writes about attempts to accommodate
this phenomenon as a faculty member of color by avoiding demands for racial content. In that sense,
Hong, as a discursive subject inside the academy, becomes at once subject to and an agent of archival
power. That illegibility is located in the word “ghetto.”

While Hong is explicitly not advocating it, avoidance as a strategy seems less available to Black faculty.
I want to talk about individualization as a modality of archival power in poetry in that context. The
poet Reginald Shepherd, writing as a critic, framed the issue in the Michigan Quarterly Review in 2003:
The identity card school of poetry is very popular in our current era, when rhetorical fantasies
of democracy and equality in cultural life have become tin-pot substitutes for the real things in
social, political, and economic life. But literature is one of the few areas of life in which I do
not feel oppressed, in which I have experienced the possibility of freedom. In the literary
realm one is not bound by social constructions of identity, or required to flash one’s assigned
identity card: one can be anyone, everyone, or no one at all. This is one of literature’s most
precious qualities, the access it allows us to otherness (including our otherness to ourselves),
and it is one of the things that I cherish most about poetry. Unfortunately, black writers are
too often expected to embody and deliver a predictable and familiarly packaged commodity of
what used to be called Negritude. One is expected or even obligated to write in a certain mode
or address a particular subject matter in order to be considered a legitimate writer, or even in
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order to be considered at all. If one writes about a range of subjects in a range of modes, one’s
work is reduced to that portion of it which is recognizably “black,” and the rest is just ignored,
if not actively disqualified. Even if, like me, you don’t usually engage such subject matter,
many readers both black and white will see only that part of one’s work that fits into the box
marked “black.” (Shepherd)
By the time Shepherd is writing, “identity poetry” had already become a pejorative term within US
poetry institutions. There, it was seen as a non-rigorous, apolitical product developed in response to
MFA diversity agendas rather than something with deep roots in the social liberation movements of the
1960s, a particularly ironic state of affairs, and a direct illegibility effect of archival power.18 Shepherd
identifies racial capitalism’s effects in assigning value to race within poetry reception and the
academic job market, where demands are made in advance on the work in order to qualify for value.
Diversity initiatives come with requirements to which white writers are not subject. Shepherd’s
critique, written earlier, bears out Sara Ahmed’s analysis of academic diversity initiatives in every way.
Ahmed’s devastatingly and subtly articulated On Being Included: Racism and Diversity in Institutional
Life (2012) is a by-now canonical assessment of diversity in university hiring practices. Because it is so
well-known and well-cited, I will use a sharply cogent summative review to synopsize its argument:
Ahmed treats the apparent commitment to diversity as an ‘institutional speech act’ which
works in a circular manner, gaining value from its proximity to things that are already valued,
such as ‘excellence’. Institutions develop 'good’ diversity policies in a fetishistic manner that
makes such documents a ‘paper exercise’, the main purpose of which is to be auditable in
terms of compliance with legislation and policy. Diversity, she argues, is a ‘non-performative’
that does not produce the effects it names. But this is not due to a failure of intent, but a way
in which diversity is or can be a way of ‘not bringing something into effect’. The response of
universities and ‘critical’ scholars to accusations or suggestions of racism brings together the
main arguments. As Ahmed shows, when racism is raised as an issue, universities respond as if
it is the institution that is ‘suffering’ a blow or injury to its reputation. As with the response to
institutional racism, a kind of ‘institutional therapy culture’ operates in which an admission of
racism is made to pave the way to ‘treatment’ as a way of ‘getting over it’. Having an
embedded diversity policy or a commitment to anti-racism becomes, Ahmed argues, a way of
not recognizing racism at all. It becomes a method for protecting whiteness from injury
because diversity policies enable white subjects to ‘feel good’ about their anti-racism.
Diversity workers find out what becomes sedimented in institutions when they try to bring
about change in them. (Murji)
The anger in Shepherd’s passage is right on the surface, but also I read the passage as a writer’s
attempt to clarify one writer’s ability to survive and continue despite that. For Shepherd, literature
allows a momentary transcendence of larger social conditions through which, as writer and as reader,
individually, he has “experienced the possibility of freedom.” The individualization of that moment
that is, I think, key here. Shepherd is, pointedly, trying to get at individual experience. “Identity,” in
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the individual sense that it is being imposed on Shepherd, the sense produced by archival power, is
looking to colonize that space, and to do so it presents identity as a domain of production. It is, in fact,
a domain of reception, a sleight-of-hand that the US university helps train readers to perform.

It is thus not an accident that Goldsmith seizes on this formulation of identity in trying to explain how
conceptualism works:
If my identity is really up for grabs and changeable by the minute—as I believe it is—it’s
important that my writing reflect this state of ever-shifting identity and subjectivity. That can
mean adopting voices that aren’t “mine,” subjectivities that aren’t “mine,” political positions
that aren’t “mine,” opinions that aren’t “mine,” words that aren’t “mine,” because in the
end, I don’t think that I can possibly define what’s “mine” and what isn’t.
BUT—and here’s where subjectivity enters—it’s my choices that make the work “mine.” I have
chosen—for some specific reason—a certain text to appropriate or to reframe. (Goldsmith)
This quote, to which Ken Chen, Cathy Park Hong, Dorothy J. Wang, Heriberto Yépez and other poets
writing as critics refer in critiques of Goldsmith, is the inverse of Shepherd’s literary transcendence
argument: in the “up for grabs” formulation of identity, the author’s subject position can, supposedly,
through production, shift; in Shepherd’s formulation of reception, the reader can, through reading,
become anyone. Through reading, Shepherd says he can experience, on an individual level, “the
possibility of freedom” and “access” to “otherness,” while insisting that outside of that moment of
literature, oppression remains. Goldsmith attempts to make that moment the truth about identity, one
that writing, in production, “reflects.” They are both specifically individualized instances produced by
identity’s own categorizations and value-assignments. As Hong puts it, the writer who is marked,
individually, with “identity” is marked out racially rather than granted the right to transcendence. For
Chen, to perform identity is to become the opposite of “a disembodied white self: the self as hero of
individualism and technology, a cogito levitating freely above the racial mob.” (Chen). Identity and
difference discourse in US institutions thus works to produce what Ferguson calls “the hegemonic
affirmation of minority difference” (54). It does so through the individual, which is the level at which
legitimation takes place, as at a job interview. As Shepherd notes: “One is expected or even obligated
to write in a certain mode or address a particular subject matter in order to be considered a legitimate
writer, or even in order to be considered at all”: a case-by-case process.
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This individualized racial demand is a recognized strategy in the US for controlling labor. Consider a
discursive distillation of a form of the demand from more than 100 years ago:
In the 1913 Mr. Block [comic] strip “He Meets Others,” [IWW artist Ernest] Riebe shows workers
in the Louisiana Piney Woods region as a most diverse group, a fact not lost on the boss. A suitwearing manager circulates among a group of workers, drawn with slight variations to identify
them as being of varied races and nationalities—Anglo-Saxon, Irish, German, Italian, Chinese,
Polish, and Black. These various others are easily set against one another by the manager. The
boss threatens and cajoles them to compete by appealing to masculinity, to fears of
joblessness, and especially to their willingness to believe in racial and national differences
among themselves. Management-by-race proceeds individual by individual in the comic,
suggesting that the idea is to keep competition alive by putting each individual worker on trial,
racially and personally. By the last frame in Riebe’s strip, the manager is reclining serenely,
successful in getting the men to work frantically while swapping racial slurs among themselves.
(Roediger and Esch 4-5)
The personalization and individualization of race is a very old technique in the US, utilized even in the
US university, where workers fight over ever smaller and less secure parcels of work. At the same time,
the individualized space of freedom from oppression granted in reading alone, and even in writing
alone, is denied on entering the institution in the form of the identity demand, where it is presented
only as a possibility for, and a demand on, production. The individualization of reception, meanwhile,
is used to maintain the circular production of identity and, through diversity, a false simulacrum of
structural change—with which Shepherd begins. Individualized transcendence will always be there in
reading and writing. It is powerful. As Shepherd makes clear, though, it is not a politics.

It is thus “not simply that ‘diversity is for white people’ but rather that diversity itself is a product of
whiteness,” as sociologists Ray, Randolf, and Underhill note (151). Diversity discourse, in tandem with
identity, serve “white individuals and organizations” and “reduce minority life and concerns to
commodities whites may consume for pleasure or advantage” (153). Understanding identity and
diversity in this way helps explains the persistence of Spahr and Young’s “mainly white room.”
Diversity within programs allows white powers within these institutions “to position themselves as a
different kind of white—one who is tolerant, progressive, and cosmopolitan” (152) while actually
working in the service of racialized power. Doing so literally adds monetary value: “Diversity enriches
(white) organizations” (ibid).
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As Ray, Randolf, and Underhill note, diversity thus brings the greatest amount of benefit to non-Blacks,
and leaves whiteness at the center of diversity projects: it is, after all, whiteness that requires
diversification. For Black writers, all of this presents very specific contradictions, given “the
distinctness of antiblackness from other forms of racism” (149). Following Sylvia Wynter on the
construction of humanness, Ray, Randolf, and Underhill summarize those conditions in summarizing
“Afro-pessimism” as a sustained critique:
Afro-pessimism is an influential account of antiblackness among humanities scholars, which
sociologists have been slow to adopt. Although Afro-pessimism shares [Critical Race Theory’s]
skepticism about the racial progress narrative, it departs from CRT in several ways. Afropessimism insists upon the distinctness of antiblackness from other forms of racism.
Antiblackness is the notion that the construction of blacks as nonhuman structures the status of
all other racial groups (Sexton 2016).
Afro-pessimism also resists the push to abandon the black-white binary for studying race in the
West. Instead, Afro-pessimism argues that existing scholarship inaccurately portrays the blackwhite binary’s role in structuring racial inequality. Afro-pessimism replaces the binary between
whites and blacks with an antagonism between blacks and nonblacks. Therefore, for Afropessimism, antiblackness, not white supremacy, explains the social conditions of blacks across
the globe (Sexton 2016). Afro-pessimism challenges the idea that a triracial hierarchy is
emerging and would identify the “collective black” as a construct hiding the specificity of
being a person of African descent (Bonilla-Silva). Additionally, Afro-pessimism critiques the
construct “people of color” as inadequately conflating largely incomparable group experiences.
Afro-pessimism is also concerned with slavery and slavery’s “afterlife,” or how slavery lives on
in modern times (Hartman). A basic tenet of Afro-pessimism is that slavery has changed form
since its formal abolition (Sexton 2016). Sociologists such as Loïc Wacquant have made similar
claims. Wacquant (2002) outlined four “peculiar institutions” of black subordination, claiming
mass incarceration is the functional surrogate of slavery. Historians and criminologists have
begun to focus on the legacy of slavery, charting the empirical continuities and divergences in
markets, organizations (Roediger and Esch), and the penal system (Wacquant).
Ray, Randolph, and Underhill’s article, and its bibliography, make a very good starting point for piecing
together the bigger picture of archival power and the institutions of racial capitalism. Unfortunately, it
is behind a paywall. If one does not have university library access, buying the article is, as of this
writing, $36. If one uses the DeepDyve service ($49 a month) one may “rent” the article (whatever that
ends up meaning). I have added all of the above references to my bibliography; Jared Sexton’s “AfroPessimism: The Unclear Word,” to which Ray, Randolf, and Underhill refer repeatedly, is an open
access article. I will discuss closed-access scholarship’s role in archival power in the next chapter.
What I want to stress here is that, as Keene, Chen, and others make clear, Goldsmith’s performance
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was a reactionary, specifically anti-Black attempt to use archival power to contain Black Lives Matter,
which was providing the social force behind the critiques made by Cathy Park Hong and others directly
attacking Goldsmith’s work.

As the contradictions mounted for conceptualism, however, the eventual response in the US by the
institutions that had supported it was disavowal. Goldsmith and Vanessa Place, another conceptualist
poet, were eventually de-platformed within the US (although not, apparently, within Europe): the
market of US academic readers decided that Goldsmith and Place did not have the right to these, as
Goldsmith puts it, “choices.” There was an intentional, targeted heightening of institutional
contradictions that played a large role in making that happen: as Heriberto Yépez, Juliana Spahr and
Stephanie Young, Ken Chen, and others note, not only the institutional rejection of Goldsmith and
Place, but Goldsmith’s performance itself almost certainly happened in response to the Mongrel
Coalition Against Gringpo (MCAG).19 The Mongrel Coalition was itself an intra-institutional response to
Black Lives Matter (McArdle) from a group that included poets and then-graduate students, which, in
January 2015, “began to issue a series of statements about race and contemporary literature” (Spahr
and Young) through various media. Members of the coalition have remained basically anonymous, but
are known to have attended the University of Pennsylvania, where Goldsmith teaches, and the
Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Much of their critique was focused from the
beginning on conceptual poetry, including that of Goldsmith and that of Place. MCAG has been
described as hastening the end of “the white privilege-enabled dominance of conceptual poetry in the
United States,” in a moment when “American writers of color [used social media] to undo the
misappropriation of minority races and cultures by networks of white literary privilege” (Harrison and
Villa-Ignacio). The reality, as Yépez saw right away, is both simpler and more complicated.

While there was relative institutional furor about Goldsmith’s performance online almost immediately,
and the event was eventually slowly and carefully critiqued despite the lack of a video, what Yépez
called the full institutional “crisis” actually took hold a little later. On May 16, 2015, conceptualist
poet Vanessa Place became the subject of a petition for her removal from the committee that selects
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participants for the Associated Writing Programs’ annual conference. The reason was that she had for
several years been tweeting out the novel Gone With The Wind, including passages containing the nword, ostensibly to get Margaret Mitchell’s estate to sue her (Helmore). As Keene points out in his
critique of May 18, 2015, Place’s project had been ongoing for years, but in the wake of Goldsmith’s
performance Place’s project became a more visible target for the Mongrel Coalition in particular. As
the group continued, on social media, to troll poets it deemed complicit in maintaining Place’s
position, Place was eventually disinvited from the conference, issuing what Chen calls a “non-apology”
for the project on Facebook. Keene, in his piece, recognizes the bad faith of the petition, pointing out
that Place’s project had been “reproducing the very power relations she allegedly aimed to be
critiquing” for years with no comment from poetry institutions, and with plenty of power accrual for
Place. Keene notes that, in addition to the Twitter account tweeting out the novel, in 2009 Place
published a poem in Poetry that lineated a fragment of it.20

In addition to issuing statements, the Mongrel Coalition specifically targeted poets of color it deemed
complicit in sustaining Goldsmith and Place’s projects. The targeting included significant archival
research, going back many years, into places like the Buffalo Poetics List. From there, it took David
Antin’s racist dog-whistle at the end of a post-9/11 post to the list—about the need to “squash”
terrorists like “bugs”—and threw it back at poets of color: the coalition promised to similarly “squash”
poets of color who did not disavow Goldsmith and Place. The threat of violence was as ironic as it
turned out to be completely discursive. As Yépez noted at the time, what MCAG was doing was the
same thing that Goldsmith and especially Place were doing, with a slight shift in who benefits
institutionally. The tactics also resemble those detailed by Roediger and Esch. A further problem was
later pointed out in the title-based aside of Wendy Trevino’s about-something-much-greater poem
Brazilian Is Not a Race, which was that some members of MCAG were, in fact, white.

The Mongrel Coalition was understood relatively quickly as a purely discursive entity with a limited
membership, and not a collectivity on the scale of a movement with engagements outside of the
university. That the Mongrel Coalition’s tactics, as a semi-anonymous group, were deemed, at the
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time, a “threat aesthetic” (Low, House) points up the difference between the individualized
institutional construct of identity, and what are often conceived of as “collective identities that can
stand in opposition to the colonial and postcolonial state” (Harrison and Villa-Ignacio). As Brazilian Is
Not a Race makes clear, that collective action requires a collective identity is one of the myths of
archival power; mass action is what the institutionalization of social movements sought to archive
through identity and difference. Militancy’s surfacing as a purely discursive “threat” during US
institutional poetry’s 2015 crisis is an kind of false echo: the tactics of archived social movements came
back to haunt the English departments that had helped to archive them. Harrison and Villa-Ignacio
attempt to tie MCAG’s trolling tactics back to the student editors of the mid-1960s Moroccan journals
Souffles [in French] and Anfas [in Arabic]. The stakes, however, were quite different for those poets:
Abdellatif Laâbi and others were opposed to the Moroccan monarchy; Laâbi went to jail for eight years.
The contrast points up not just differences in context, but the effectiveness of archival power in
effacing the difference in the stakes between institutional critique and struggle, and the awareness (if
often inarticulate) of writers in the US that they are working within discursive limits. Yépez, in
summing up these events, had a keen awareness of this, and concluded, with some approbation, that
the “undeniable facts” were that: “1) a cycle of North American poetry officially ended in 2015 and 2)
the new North American poetry will be more and more dominated by non-white poets. … The struggle
between literary white (matriarchical-patriarchical) supremacy and the poetics of minorities will
determine the path of poetry in this new century” (Yépez, Berkeley).

The recognition of that institutional struggle was immediate, as was the expression of its institutional
demands and contradictions. On May 20, 2015, just after the institutional de-platforming of Goldsmith
and Place in the US, the poet Tricia Low published an entry in her then-ongoing series “On BeingHated” at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art’s Open Space blog: “On Being-Hated:
Conceptualism, the Mongrel Coalition, the House That Built Me.” The essay, as an intra-institutional
response, attempts to reconcile conceptualism’s failed appropriations along with Mongrel Coalition’s
explicit use of identity to highlight them:
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With the Mongrel Coalition come real questions of what it means to write as a person of color.
And although I’m glad these questions have been raised, answering each one feels like another
complication, another emotional labor: about the ways in which race has been made legible in
aesthetics and how problematic assumptions about that legibility can be, about whether racial
heritage must always be engaged positively, about whether a person of color’s work will always
either be reducible to one’s identity position or a “passing whiteness” via aesthetic strategies
they choose to engage, about assimilationist impulses and the value of being honest about
them, about gratitude and lineage, about the grand institution of Poetry that has a history,
beyond conceptualism, of structural racism and cultural appropriation. Answering any of these
questions has real consequences for the way I look at myself, my identity, my work, the way I
want to write, read, be read. (Low, House)
The passage begins in a similar vein to Shepherd’s point about compulsory Negritude: entertaining
questions about the legibility of race in aesthetics feels like an emotional labor; in the moment Low is
writing out of, pressure from MCAG and others for making race “legible” made it feel like a demand of
the same kind that drives many diversity job searches. The passage wants the right to refuse that
pressure, even as it wants the questions answered, too. The moment is marked by individualization,
which Low is clear about throughout: the piece opens with specificity about her class background. The
tension Low’s piece is trying to negotiate between structural issues as they played out in particular
instances among those close to Low, and the reception that the writer would like to control, is
involuntarily mediated by racialized identity, which the passage then pushes through an individualized
conception of art and agency. That structural issues are boiled down to issues of Low’s own work and
authorship is a conscious product, here, of the Low’s explicitly confessional approach, and by the
piece’s tacit background: Low had been a student of Goldsmith’s at the University of Pennsylvania;
Goldsmith published her early writing in Against Expression. While moments of “access” (in Shepherd’s
sense) may be available to individuals at particular moments in protected spaces, they cannot be
enacted in public with guaranteed outcomes, as Low is again very clear about: whether one answers
the questions for oneself or not, their entailments are part of the labor to which the passage refers.
The passage is in line with an earlier piece of Low’s in the “On Being-Hated” series, where she
synopsizes the project of artist Lee Lonzano, and asks “But what if hyper-materialized performances of
being-hated could become a method of, as she says, ‘TOTAL REVOLUTION SIMULTANEOUSLY PERSONAL
AND PUBLIC’?” (Low, Violette).
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In working through these questions, Low gets at the contradictions produced by “identity politics” as a
form of reception in Wang’s sense, as further articulated by Haider:
In its contemporary ideological form, rather than its initial form as a theorization of a
revolutionary political practice, identity politics is an individualist method. It is based on the
individual’s demand for recognition, and it takes that individual’s identity as its starting point.
It takes this identity for granted and suppresses the fact that all identities are socially
constructed. And because all of us necessarily have an identity that is different from everyone
else’s, it undermines the possibility of collective self-organization. The framework of identity
reduces politics to who you are as an individual and to gaining recognition as an individual,
rather than your membership in a collectivity and the collective struggle against an oppressive
social structure. (23-24)
In Ronald Aronson’s essay “The Privatization of Hope,” individualization, or privatization “displac[es]
aspirations and responsibilities from the larger society to our own individual universes. The detaching
of personal expectations from the wider world transforms both,” which in turn “weaken[s] collective
capacities to solve collective problems, but … also deadens the very sense that collectivity can or
should exist, as the commons dissolves and social sources of problems become hidden.”21 As a form of
reception, identity poetry has thus worked as designed. Goldsmith’s disavowal of it in his description of
his production (or “practice”) is explicitly formulated in opposition to fixed identity and “expression,”
and thus to racialization, yet conceptualism relied on individualization as a mode of reception not
applicable to it as a way to distinguish itself. Foucault’s opening paragraph of “What Is an Author?”
should be familiar to anyone reading a literature dissertation: “The coming into being of the notion of
‘author’ constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge,
literature, philosophy, and the sciences” (205)22; despite the disavowals, as Yépez repeatedly makes
clear, the work authorizes relentlessly, “recapitulate[ing] the globalizing logics that treat immigrant
populations as reservoirs of disposable, recombinant, and plastic laboring subjects” (Sheldon). The
liberal sociological literature on individualization, meanwhile, largely sees individualization as a good,
a process by which an individual strives to become “the author of his or her own life” via making
choices while navigating “institutional guidelines and regulations” and finally “tak[ing] personal
responsibility for the choices they make and the consequences that follow” (C. Ray).23 Conceptualism,
as a self-proclaimed out from that, skated on the resulting contradictions within institutional forms of
reception within which it explicitly operated; it relied on the individualization of reception that it
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disavowed in production to produce the contradictions and ambiguities that fueled it, and finally
destroyed it (at least as an explicit movement), in reception.

I don’t want to end there. In New York, City College’s Search for Education, Elevation, and Knowledge
(SEEK) program, founded in 1965, was “established to provide comprehensive academic, financial, and
social supports to assist capable students who otherwise might not be able to attend college due to
their educational and financial circumstances” (CUNY: The Office of Special Programs). Many SEEK
students were, and are, Black. Hiring for the program was one way that CUNY diversified its faculty.
Toni Cade Bambara, June Jordan, and Audre Lorde simultaneously taught at CUNY’s City College
through SEEK, and remained a part of social movements for Black liberation and women’s liberation.
Together, they developed an identity and difference discourse with a collective sense, one that was
subsequently turned against it in the manner Haider documents. To try to summarize it here in a few
lines will do violence to it. Instead, please stop reading this, and find the poet and scholar Alexis
Pauline Gumbs’s account of Audre Lorde and June Jordan’s teaching at CUNY, “Nobody Mean More:
Black Feminist Pedagogy and Solidarity.” The piece was published in Chatterjee and Maira, which is
paywalled. It is, Gumbs writes,
a meditation on what it means to be nobody in a university economy designed to produce
somebody individuated, assimilated, and consenting to empire. Is it possible instead to become
nobody in the academic space? Is it is possible to align with the illegible
oppressed/contemporary subaltern, the falling apart abject nonsubject, inside a university
English class?” (237)
Gumbs’s reading of Lorde’s composition of the poem “Power,” which Lorde wrote while teaching at
CUNY through SEEK, is as powerful an example of norm translation as one will ever find in criticism. It
includes Gumbs’s account of how Lorde and Jordan worked within and were made to accommodate the
university.24 For Lorde and Jordan, as Gumbs shows, the university was an attempt at refuge (in the
sense detailed in Harney and Moten’s The Undercommons) 25 that ended up working them “literally to
death,” denying them, at different points in their later, separate careers, time to seek cancer care. I
will end with entreaty to read the piece, and with the observation that the Poetry Foundation and
Poetry magazine, the focus of the next chapter, did not publish “Power,” even though it can now be
found on the Foundation’s website.
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Chapter 3: The Poetry Foundation as Site of Archival Power
The previous chapter looked at the way archival power and the surface-representational strategies of
diversity work within the US university of racial capitalism. With the coming of the Internet over the
last 30 years, the process by which global non-exclusively anglophone poetries come in contact with
archival power has been very effectively streamlined. In that process, one player, as they say, has
come to define the space.

In 2002, Eli Lilly & Co. heiress Ruth Lilly granted the posthumous steward of Harriet Monroe’s Poetry
magazine—the then-explicitly reactionary, semi-moribund Modern Poetry Foundation—nearly $200
million US dollars (Kinzer), (Goodyear). In February 2004, John Barr, poet and founder of the Natural
Gas Clearinghouse, aka Dynegy, was appointed to chair the board, and oversee the foundation’s
transformation (Goodyear). In 1999, Barr had published a book-length verse-defense of empire in the
dialect-equivalent of blackface called Grace, recently carefully critiqued as such by Spahr (Du Bois's
Telegram 158-162). Alongside that fact, the foundation worked to transform itself into an entity that
has a relatively expansive, markedly inclusive view of what poetry is, and can be. The reason for that
transformation was touched on in the previous chapter, and has been tracked (if not within poetry) by
scholar Jodi Melamed, in her account of “official or state antiracism.”

Melamed, in her 2011 book Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial
Capitalism, cites the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America as a “great
document” of “official or state antiracism,” an articulation of “racial equality as part of U.S.
international manifest destiny.” Melamed points to the self-represented end of segregation in the
1960s US as “meant to prove the moral legitimacy of U.S.-led transnational capitalism,” and describes
how the “neoliberal multiculturalism” that followed “portrays an ethic of multiculturalism to be the
spirit of neoliberalism, and, conversely, posits neoliberal restructuring across the globe to be the key
to a postracist world of freedom and opportunity.” Melamed ties the ethic of multiculturalism to Aihwa
Ong’s concept of “differentiated citizenship” whereby “to maximize profitability, governments subject
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populations to differing treatments according to their [relative] worth.” Melamed specifically
documents the way the US figured “literature as an antiracist technology” that was then “enfolded into
the charge of universities to produce individuals of value for globalization.” From there:
[L]iterature entered into the training of global transnational professional-managerial classes as
an element of the technologies of subjectivity that influence the self-making of elites and of
the technologies of subjugation that elites learn to exercise in order to manage less profitable
populations[.] … [L]iterary training prepares them for the part they play in within discipling and
civilizing / disqualifying regimes that manage populations cut-off from (or exploited within)
circuits of global capitalism. (Melamed 137-141)
Melamed’s study was published in 2011, the year that Occupy happened, and the year that, arguably,
globalization’s image of having a multicultural ethic began to fall away. The partial loss of image has
not, however, curbed the effectiveness of the technologies described, or changed the dynamic with
regard to “cut-off” populations of non-exclusively anglophone poets. It also has not changed many
institutions in terms of their actual power structures. In 2016, the Poetry Foundation appointed
another late-life white man, Willard Bunn III, who “has served as chairman, chief executive and/or
director of several commercial banks during his 40-year career” to the position of Chairman of the
Board (The Poetry Foundation). The editor of Poetry magazine is a white, Boston University MFAtrained man named Don Share. In curating multiculturalism for Poetry, Share recently published a
poem by poem Toby Martinez de las Rivas in November 2018 featuring fascist imagery with a positive
voicing; it was not Martinez’s first poem to do so. There are lots of rationalizations one can make about
this, but it points up the generally alienated place from which Poetry’s top-down multicultural curation
is emanating. Poetry, under Christian Wiman’s editorship, also published Vanessa Place’s “Miss
Scarlett,” a blackface dialect poem soliloquizing sections of the film version of Gone With the Wind, in
its July/August 2009 conceptualism issue (Keene, Limit). The poem is still up on the Foundation
website (Place).

Following Ferguson and Melamed’s analyses, it becomes clear that The Poetry Foundation’s website has
made itself into the de facto archive for global anglophone poetry as part of its national orientation
and pluralist vision of US poetry, mediated by cis white male plutocrats. Its president, Henry Bienen,
an octogenarian white man, is a former “member of the board of directors of the Council on Foreign
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Relations, serving on the executive committee and chairing the nominating and governance
committees” (The Poetry Foundation, Bienen).26 The Foundation’s form of archival power assigns racial
value that helps maintain a multicultural image of US hegemonic power. As Ferguson writes, “minority
activism would be for power both a potential antagonist and a collaborator, inspiring critical
transformations and new funding technologies at the same time.” 27 This thesis is borne out clearly in
many activities of The Poetry Foundation, and particularly in its Website. It’s a very well-run site. The
value produced there is re-represented within English departments, which in turn represent the US. As
one poet remarked to me: “if you are not there, you don’t exist”—because you are not inscribed with
the value it generates.

At this point I should make a full sour-grapes disclaimer, and not in a footnote: I am not in Poetry as a
poet; I also haven’t been asked to write paid essays for their Harriet blog/subsite. I sent Poetry one
poem a number of years ago, after Share took over, and it wasn’t an experiment: I wanted it to appear
there. My point in saying this here is that I am not making an argument about purity of intent with
regard to people who publish in Poetry or with the Poetry Foundation. I don’t have the moral or
affective authority to do that, even if I wanted to.

What Poetry and the Poetry Foundation are doing, however, is working to manufacture consent to
empire in the sense that Gumbs invokes. And the fact is that Ruth Lilly did not give her money to
Poetry as a form of reparations or because the magazine had a history of egalitarian publishing
practices. Anyone who remembers Joseph Parisi’s editorship, long in force at the time of the grant,
will understand what I mean without the tedium of my having to dissect his selections, or rehearse the
story of Lilly’s own submissions and rejections from the magazine.

Poetry is also not, historically, the magazine of Tolson, Brooks, and Baraka, even though all were
published there, or of Hayden, Knight, and Clifton. Hayden was published there once; Knight and
Clifton not at all: if one looks at Knight’s or Clifton’s or Audre Lorde’s Poetry Foundation page, one
finds no little “P” beside any of the poems because none of them originally appeared in Poetry. The
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same is true for June Jordan’s page and work, and that of Jayne Cortez, and that of Wanda Coleman.
Sonia Sanchez has one poem, and it does have a “P.” It is from April 2018; Sanchez was 83 when it was
published.

When readers look for Audre Lorde poems and the Foundation comes up first, few are going to notice
the lack of a little “P.” This is what allows institutions like the Poetry Foundation to remake
themselves without explicitly acknowledging their histories. In this, as in much else, they are like
candidates in electoral politics. At the same time, the foundation does not represent itself as a
specifically US institution. Its website mission statement says nothing about the US: “The Poetry
Foundation, publisher of Poetry magazine, is an independent literary organization committed to a
vigorous presence for poetry in our culture. It exists to discover and celebrate the best poetry and to
place it before the largest possible audience” (The Poetry Foundation, History and Mission). As of this
writing, the Poetry Foundation site houses significant samples of the oeuvres of more than 4,000 nonexclusively anglophone poets, with a thoughtful design and searchability. It remains centered on USbased work, however, and insufficiently represents current anglophone poetry from outside the US.
What “our culture” actually means, however, is intentionally illegible.

It doesn’t seem to mean, for example, canonical poetry by living poets outside the US. Cursory
searches turn up no poems or author pages for Jussawalla or Nongkynrih in India, or Dionne Brand
(close by in Canada), among established poets. Among the dead in India, there are two poems by the
often-abroad Moraes, and a ton by Ramanujan, who emigrated to the US and taught at the University of
Chicago. Here Melamed’s analysis comes into play, as Ramanujan played a role in managing lessprofitable populations abroad, or Melamed’s “charge of universities to produce individuals of value for
globalization.” It’s an arrangement that continues to reproduce itself, and that guides the Poetry
Foundation like an invisible hand. For example, there is a lot of material by or on Aditi Machado, a
younger poet from Bangalore who recently got a US MFA, has a book out with a US small press
publisher, and is now teaching in the US university system, but there is nothing from Kala Krishna
Ramesh, who lives in Bangalore, and published a recent poetry debut with HarperCollins India in 2016.
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Following Melamed, the Foundation’s role as arbiter of “our culture” means that it “prepares [poets]
for the part they play in within discipling and civilizing / disqualifying regimes that manage populations
cut-off from (or exploited within) circuits of global capitalism.” Following Roderick Ferguson, those
roles exist explicitly within nation-states, with the US as the current mediating anglophone dominant.
That is why, in the Poetry Foundation version of cosmopolitanism, “our culture,” means, tacitly, who
can play a role in the US, which means that Machado matters, and Nongkynrih and Ramesh don’t. This
doesn’t say anything at all about Machado’s or Nongkynrih’s or Ramesh’s work, and is obviously not
Machado’s fault or intent. Rather, it is the mechanism by which racial capitalism assigns value based on
access to possible roles. Access to possible roles within the US university requires physical presence in
the US.

Digital accesses also plays a big part in how racial capitalism assigns value based on access to possible
roles: Melamed’s conception of “cut-off” populations can be linked directly to ideas of digital
cosmopolitanism (as “discursive appearance”), and, relatedly, of open access. To get to open access,
which is crucial to a less-national cosmopolitanism, I will look quickly at definitions of open source.

“Free software” and “open source software” are not the same thing, though they have been
compressed into the same term (“free and open source”) and acronymized as FOSS. One group, the
Free Software Foundation, founded in 1985 by Richard Stallman to support forks of UNIX (an operating
system developed at Bell Labs in the 1970s that has become the basis of the open Web and open
computing generally)28 maintains a definition of free and open source:
“Free software” means software that respects users' freedom and community. Roughly, it
means that the users have the freedom to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve the
software. Thus, “free software” is a matter of liberty, not price. To understand the concept,
you should think of “free” as in “free speech,” not as in “free beer”. We sometimes call it
“libre software,” borrowing the French or Spanish word for “free” as in freedom, to show we
do not mean the software is gratis.
We campaign for these freedoms because everyone deserves them. With these freedoms, the
users (both individually and collectively) control the program and what it does for them. When
users don't control the program, we call it a “nonfree” or “proprietary” program. The nonfree
program controls the users, and the developer controls the program; this makes the program an
instrument of unjust power. (Free Software Foundation)
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While it may be easy to download something and look at the code (i.e. open source code) that does not
necessarily mean the user (notice the creator is not mentioned) is “free” to modify or redistribute it.
An analogy might is copyrighted sheet music that is printed by someone and made available for free.
People might be able to play the song and sing it, but if certain rights are reserved and licensing codes
enforced, they are not free to change the chorus, reprint, and redistribute the song. It is there that
software licensing rules come into play: even open source projects (where the source code is able to be
viewed) can come with restrictions on use, modification, and distribution. The many software licenses
that have evolved to help community and corporate users alike deal with that—the Apache, BSD,
Creative Commons, GNU, Mozilla, MIT licenses among them—have different sorts of permissions and
ways of articulating them (GitHub/Microsoft).

Software can thus be free and open source (as in free to modify), or unfree and open source (as in not
free to modify), or free (as in free beer) and closed source—meaning that an application is distributed
freely, but the user can’t easily see its source code, let alone modify or redistribute it. There are
degrees of being closed: software may have pieces that are completely open dependencies (i.e.
modules or functions or algorithms that the software needs to work) of a greater proprietary whole
that is closed. In terms of academic scholarship, the fact is that that most scholarship is neither free
(as in free beer) nor free (as in free of copyright). The argument of Open Access and the Humanities:
Contexts, Controversies, and the Future by Martin Paul Eve, a scholar and expert developer at
Birkbeck, University of London, is that scholarship should be free as in free beer and free as in free as
in free of restrictive copyright—i.e. open access, or “freely available, digital, online information”
(Cornell University Library). One of Eve’s main arguments is that scholarship should be free because
academic labor is (relatively) compensated by universities: the for-profit production and distribution
system that has been built on top of academic scholarship is an artefact of a time when basically free
(as in free beer) printing and design were beyond the reach of groups of scholars, scholars who are
already paid to produce the work. The facts on the ground, as Eve acknowledges, do not bear this out:
the underfunding of tenure lines and of scholar salaries generally is a product of the capitalist
university, which is not designed to serve faculty or primarily advance knowledge, but rather is

83

designed to generate prestige for students, and thus value. As Eve notes in an interview, “[w]e
designed a system to free academics from the market. We then came up with a model for research
dissemination that entailed selling work (i.e., is market based)” (Berlatsky).

In September of 2014, Eve published a notification of the publication of Open Access and the
Humanities on Eve’s website, and noted that, while the book would be published by Cambridge
University Press and be for sale, it would also be available as a free PDF “under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license”
(Eve). Thus a practitioner in the field, whose doctoral degree was granted only two years before, in
2012, took a stand: Cambridge University Press does not usually give away texts for free, but allowed
Eve to do so because it wanted Eve’s book. Eve was able to engage a systemic player into practicing, in
this one case, open access, by refusing to publish the book in an unfree manner. Even within digital
humanities scholarship, however, things usually go quite differently.

The recent title New Digital Worlds: Postcolonial Digital Humanities in Theory Praxis and Pedagogy, by
scholar and expert developer Roopika Risam, engages issues of the archive, the capitalist university,
and of non-open access publishing. As part of a scholarly collective, Risam collaborated on the Torn
Apart / Separados project, which gathered, visualized, and published open data on the US system of
concentration camps for asylum seekers, along with the camps’ funding sources (Group for
Experimental Methods in Humanistic Research at Columbia University). New Digital Worlds itself is a
seamless, deeply researched end-to-end survey of the state of archival scholarship and of the contours
of the global “digital cultural record,” in terms of what kinds of projects are out there, and the ways
and places in which they are produced. To the latter point, Risam offers multiple suggestions as to how
scholars in the digital humanities can avoid reproducing colonialist practices and relations when doing
digital scholarship, or when assisting communities in constructing or analyzing their own digital
archives. Risam is careful to note the importance of caution and self-awareness in these situations. Of
the digital cultural record as a whole, Risam writes: “Because the digital cultural record exists in a
media environment that is caught in a battle between public interest, academia, and the cultural
heritage sector, racial and cultural politics, and consumer power, that record itself has become a spoil
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of war” (10). Risam goes on to detail the ways in which “paywalled scholarship” reproduces colonial
practices, and lauds the Digital Commons platform for open access. The book repeatedly calls for open
access in scholarly publishing and demands the “interrogat[ion of] colonialist and neocolonialist
projects through project design.” In short, “digital humanities practitioners of the Global North must
redress their practices” (19). Doing so “requires considering how digital archives perform and resist
colonial violence, examining how scholarly organizations influence digital humanities practices on a
global scale, teaching students that they can intervene in the digital cultural record, and
understanding the forms of the human that are sanctioned through digital humanities scholarship”
(ibid).

Passages such as the above are exactly on point, and thorough scholarship throughout allows Risam’s
densely packed examples and meticulous footnotes to serve as an exemplary introduction to a
profusion of fascinating projects. At the same time, however, Risam’s book is priced at $34.95 US for
either the paperback or the digital edition, and $99.95 in cloth for the library edition. That puts it far
out of reach for most of the people that Risam, as a scholar working in the Global North, is writing
about—both outside of the Global North, and those who are within the Global North but cannot
routinely spend that kind of money on a 144 page book (excluding notes). The book’s conditions of
publication perpetuate precisely the relations that Risam warns against, and that Melamed outlines
between scholarship within the US, and “cut-off” populations outside of it. Why did Risam fail to make
the same stand that Eve made for such an important title?

At the time of the book’s publication, Risam was untenured tenure-track faculty at Salem State
University, a small, under-funded college in Massachusetts. That suggests that Risam, as a digital
humanities scholar aware of open access, might have felt compelled to make a choice based on the
prestige publishing equation, or the symbolic compensation that paid-access university press publishing
affords, despite the extreme contradictions for New Digital Worlds. As a non-tenured woman of color
at a non-major university, Risam was not in a position that would make is easier to make the sort of
demand of Northwestern University Press that Eve made of Cambridge University Press. Women

85

scholars of color in the US have to prove their merit to a much greater degree than white male
scholars, in part to combat claims (or whisper campaigns) that their hires were based on diversity
mandates and not based solely on merit. Everything about the US university system under capitalism,
including, crucially, scholarly publishing, is designed to get scholars to make this same choice in order
to create their own value, part of what Melamed calls “produc[ing] individuals of value for
globalization.” Ted Underwood, a leading digital humanities scholar who is white, male, tenured, and
from a working class background, published his recent Distant Reading as a closed access book just a
few months after New Digital Worlds appeared. It is $27 for a paperback in the US. The careers of
scholars are sustained by the symbolic capital of the university press brand, while the capitalist
university system is sustained by closed access publishing, which makes the scholarship produced
within the university very difficult to obtain outside of it.

As much as scholars like Risam and Underwood are aware of the issues and their potential role in
US/Global North-based domination, they are also aware of a great release from this structural
problem: piracy. It’s unclear how much of a role piracy plays as a kind of pressure-valve when scholars
like Risam and Underwood, who are aware of the stakes, decide to publish conventionally. Piracy
allows scholars in the Global North to escape the contradictions of knowing that many of the people
that one is writing about will never be able to afford the closed-access scholarship of which they are
the subject because those books and papers do, in fact, become available for free over time, housed
on servers that are out of the reach of US-based academic publishers. Those publishers have neither
the time nor the resources to go after those who upload them or those who download them (as opposed
to the way that, say, pirated recent Hollywood films are scrubbed from YouTube). Piracy, in addition
to allowing a form of (often degraded) access, allows scholars of the Global North to play a role in
perpetuating the system without delving too deeply into the contradictions, or the risks to others,
including malware, of doing so. As detailed in the documentary Paywall: The Business of Scholarship
(Schmitt), the fact is that while scholars, particularly scientists, may not like closed access, university
boards do. Closed access is part of what keeps universities intact: it allows a monopoly on information,
which is part of what students pay for. I, for one, could not have written this dissertation without
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access to a university library. Most of the works I consulted I consulted electronically, from home, via
the university library, using a proxy service called Zotero. Almost all of the works were available only
after I authenticated as a student in good standing. Without the paywall, a big part of the mechanism
that keeps education university-based goes away. It’s not the only thing, but it’s a big thing, and it’s a
net moneymaker, even as university presses themselves struggle. Closed access is part of what keeps
universities in business. It’s a form of state power. It’s part of a monopoly on the production and
dissemination of legitimatized knowledge.

This begs the question of why the Poetry Foundation is not actively working to change this situation
with all of the many resources at its disposal. Poetry, as a literary form, as we know it (i.e. within
racial capitalism) has always been about the tension of receiving, transforming, and re-representing
impressions under the auspices of the state, ultimately in the service of its ends. Government-level
funding of the Poetry Foundation makes it a de facto arm of the US and “our culture,” of the US of Barr
and Bienen and Bunn. Its publication and arbitration of contemporary poetry are part of this same
system of value creation. The Poetry Foundation operates in tandem with the US university: it provides
symbolic capital which poets can use within their academic careers. Its website is free as in free beer;
it posts things quickly and in response to developing events; poems are easy to screenshot and share.
At the same time, users do not “have the freedom to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve
the software” behind the Foundation’s website. Users cannot add poems, comment on poems or posts,
or directly download work. Despite its origins as poet Harriet Monroe’s project, Poetry has not, for
many decades, been something that happened organically from within the poetry community, and it
was never subject to the demands of the poets it represents. In remaking itself following the Lilly
grant, the Poetry Foundation, in getting itself up to speed with current cultural conditions, has
basically drawn on existing poetry communities of the past and used them to brand itself. (Thus, again,
all the missing “P”s on poets’ pages—including that of Theresa Hak Kyung Cha.) Its mission in “our
culture” is legitimation: it is to be a responsive, in-the-moment site of archival power, a preliminary
site of neutralization, a state horizon for demand operating in near-real time. Most magazines and
presses operate on a time-line of months and years. That is true for much of Poetry, but not for its
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website, which responds to political and cultural events with relative news-cycle quickness. It has the
relative resources for that.

A further revealing tell is that the site does not allow comments. One problem with comments, one
that the foundation itself points to, is trolls. “Trolls have applied the same basic model—show up, turn
a social networking platform and community against itself, lol—to countless online spaces,” (Phillips
130) including those devoted to poetry criticism. Abuse has been a problem in previous blog-based
poetry discussions: Ron Silliman, who hosts Silliman’s Blog, once a hotbed of poetry discussion, had to
turn off comments in 2010 when he proved unable to moderate effectively on his own (Clauser). The
Poetry Foundation site did, in fact, allow comments on certain sections of the site when it was first
inaugurated.29 The Harriet blog (named after founder Harriet Monroe), was founded in 2006 (Marvin),
and, for a number of years, allowed comments on its guest author posts. Those comments, which are
still findable, were a major place where anglophone poets from outside of the US could find one
another, as well as poets inside the US, and exchange ideas. Eventually, comments were turned off due
to trolling. When, in 2011, the Poetry Foundation inaugurated its editorial blog, editor Don Share
wrote: “No, we won't have comment boxes—for what I presume are obvious reasons” (Share). Offensive
content, however, is manageable, especially for a Foundation with resources as vast as the Poetry
Foundation. That’s not the reason for the lack of comments. Comments interfere with value creation,
with “produc[ing] individuals of value for globalization.” They interfere with the control of who
participates in value creation.

If the Poetry Foundation were serious about “our culture”—the one that includes everyone—they would
be allowing discussion, publishing open access books, and generally empowering poets. That is not
what it has been designed to do, however. That is not its function.
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Chapter 4: TextFrame: An Open Archive for Poetry
As a means of getting at the inherent “corruptibility,” in M. Jacqui Alexander’s sense, of archival
power, this chapter describes TextFrame, an idea for free and open source software that can be used
to facilitate, in real time, the self-archiving of global non-exclusively anglophone poetry communities.
It describes the scope and objectives of the project in an implementation-agnostic manner, partially
because technological landscape continues to shift, and partially, but crucially, because the logistics of
building things collaboratively and transnationally (as the project must be if it is to be built at all) have
to be worked out by those participating. As noted in the introduction, Thomas Farrell’s idea of a
rhetorical culture—“an institutional formation in which motives of competing practices are intelligible,
audiences available, expressions reciprocal, norms translatable, and silences noticeable” (1)—is
operative within global non-exclusively anglophone poetry communities inside and outside the US.

The Poetry Foundation has a $200 million head start on pulling together the technologies for containing
the world’s anglophone poetries. The Foundation is top-down: it is paid-curator rather than
contributor-based. University press publishing, for-profit scholarly journals and closed-access small
presses have locked up a large segment of poetry and poetry scholarship, usually via prohibitive cost.
Those outside the US can get around this via piracy sites, but those sites and that practice are not safe.
The same is true, if usually unwittingly, for much fugitive cultural productions such as paper-only
chapbooks—they are inaccessible to much of the world, and most local non-exclusively anglophone
poetries. In proposing TextFrame in this project, I am outlining a shitty substitution: i.e., instead of
abolishing discursive value relations within poetry (which an application obviously cannot do), I am
proposing a potentially more autonomous form of archiving, with a pitch towards transition. It is a form
of incrementalism for something “only ever to come,” as Stefano Harney and Fred Moten put it. That’s
what makes it a shitty substitution. If it’s ever built, whatever form it takes, TextFrame, or whatever it
ends up being called, will not be able to resist being re-inscribed into racial capitalism. It will become
a medium of power and value within the rhetorical community of global non-exclusively anglophone
poetry, which still exists within racial capitalism, and never exists outside of it. It will be part of the
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way capitalism is inscribed into the institutional value relations of the community. At the same time, it
may be possible to find ways of “building away” from the nation-state, in that the application can truly
be produced and maintained collaboratively transnationally, and in a bottom-up, collaborative,
contributor-based model, rather than via a top-down, foundation-funded front. Devolving control of
archiving to global non-exclusively anglophone poetries themselves—as a Farrellian rhetorical culture,
which really is “our” culture—will not accomplish actual changes in economic relations, but it might
improve and strengthen non-exclusively anglophone poetry’s rhetorical culture, a set of discursive
relations.

“Virtual” discursive relations created or maintained on the Internet are real; the interactions, textual
or otherwise, on the Internet are as real as other kinds of discursive interactions. They form a “real
virtuality”, rather than a “virtual reality”:
What is historically specific to [the Internet], organized around the electronic integration of all
communication modes from the typographic to the multisensorial, is not an its inducement of
virtual reality but the construction of real virtuality[:] “virtual: being so in practice though not
strictly or in name” and “real: actually existing.” Thus reality, as experienced, has always been
virtual because it is always perceived through symbols that frame practice with some meaning
that escapes their strict semantic definition. … [A]ll reality is virtually perceived. (Castells 403404)
Disputes over the mechanisms of reality perception are less problematic than believing that discursive
changes necessarily lead to material changes, to changes in actual economic relations. Reappropriating archival power by allowing poets, globally, to self-archive local struggles might foster a
real virtuality, but it would be subsumed at all times by larger social forces. Risam’s New Digital
Worlds looks in detail at a number of inspiring projects that can help in thinking through how the selfarchiving of global non-exclusively anglophone poetries might look. At the same time, it’s very
important to have a sense of the limits of any such project. A crucial work that looks at non-discursive
archival realities is Ward One: Race, Urban Renewal, and Community Memories in Columbia, South
Carolina, which virtually reconstructs a Black voting district in Columbia, South Carolina that was
literally destroyed and incorporated into the campus of University of South Carolina (Cooley and Buell).
It is a case where an actual living community has been physically displaced and then archived—first into
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the capitalist university, and then again, this time recuperatively, as an application and writing
project.

In terms of pedagogy, which I think should be one focus in poetry’s self-archiving, the project
“Reassessing Inequality and Re-Imagining the 21st-Century: East Harlem Focus,” is instructive. It was a
POOC (or participatory, open, online course) which, among many other things, worked to open the
university seminar room to the East Harlem community that was its subject (as well as to the world at
large), while still working to preserve a seminar’s feeling of scale. The project provides a case study in
what grassroots pedagogical development requires. Top-down aspects of the project led to critiques
from within the community, which found it a form of neo-colonial practice. At the same time, the
collective running the seminar made technical achievements that are exportable. The scholarly
collective that ran the course, in its write-up after the fact, seems responsive to criticism and to be
genuinely working to “provide a vision of digitally augmented learning that prizes openness,
community-building, and participatory action above massiveness of scale” (Daniels and Gold).

The cosmopolitanism that I imagine for TextFrame also does not make massiveness of scale, in terms of
initial participation, a necessary value. That scale itself doesn’t guarantee anything should be clear
from, to take one prominent example, Reddit. I discuss what Reddit is and why its specific community
model won’t serve as a corollary in chapter eight. Other social media company products, such as
Facebook and Twitter, have certainly been used, and continue to be used, by poets. A cogent
discussion the question of why existing apps like Reddit (or, in this case, Facebook) don’t work for
rhetorical cultures in general, and for pedagogy in particular, came out of the Looking for Whitman
project, an “inquiry into the relationship of Whitman's poetry to local geography and history” (Gold).
The following condenses points made there:
•
•
•

the need for “data ownership” and “data portability”
the fact that using Facebook or Reddit constitutes “building equity” for Facebook or Reddit
(and the same can also be said for the digital pedagogy framework provider Blackboard)
the desirability of Christopher Kelty’s idea of “recursive publics”: “publics concerned with the
ability to build, control, modify, and maintain the infrastructure that allows them to come into
being in the first place”
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•

in pedagogical situations (often the case with poetry), the fact that “meeting students where
they are” risks “undesirable interactions between personal and professional lives” whereby
institutional presences on social media come off as what Jared Stein describes as “creepy
treehouses.”

The idea of recursive publics has a lot in common with Farrell’s rhetorical cultures. Kelty defines
recursive publics as follows:
A recursive public is a public that is constituted by a shared concern for maintaining the means
of association through which they come together as a public. Geeks find affinity with one
another because they share an abiding moral imagination of the technical infrastructure, the
Internet, that has allowed them to develop and maintain this affinity in the first place.
I call such publics recursive for two reasons: first, in order to signal that this kind of public
includes the activities of making, maintaining, and modifying software and networks, as well as
the more conventional discourse that is thereby enabled; and second, in order to suggest the
recursive “depth” of the public, the series of technical and legal layers—from applications to
protocols to the physical infrastructures of waves and wires—that are the subject of this
making, maintaining, and modifying.
To get to Farrell’s rhetorical cultures and to poetry: for a “series of technical and legal layers” one can
see Farrell’s “competing practices”: layers of small presses, and volleys of critical essays. For Kelty’s
“shared concern” one can read Farrell’s “motives of competing practices,” or the thing that drives
poets and critics of poetry. Gold’s own advocacy of recursive publics in Looking for Whitman points to
a belief in self-sustaining, and perhaps self-archiving, communities—communities who build the frames
and maintain the infrastructure behind them by which they are understood. For poetry, small press
publishing, often by individuals from within the communities themselves, has played that role both
before and after the internet.

All of the issues Looking For Whitman raised came to the fore in a more general way following the 2016
US presidential election, when Facebook’s misuse of user data gained widespread attention (Halpern),
instantly making scholarship on adapting Facebook itself to the classroom (Lipton) look naïve at best.
Any application that is built with a classroom-like pedagogical component should also be designed to
allow the kind of permission controls that Facebook does not. Facebook does allow fine-grained
controls on who sees what, but posting on Facebook also means “you grant us a non-exclusive,
transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or
in connection with Facebook (IP License)” (Facebook). The same is true were the application to feature
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messaging; the Slack platform, while having a less proprietary relationship to user data, is explicitly
task-based: it’s the “collaboration hub that moves work forward” (Slack Technologies), but it is not
free or open source. While open source platforms like Mastodon solve many of these problems, they do
not quite solve the creepy treehouse issue for pedagogy, and they are not fully customizable as
applications. The Commons In a Box (Commons In a Box), which extends the WordPress platform, does
solve this problem, and is a possible implementation of a LMS around which one might build
TextFrame. A possibility in terms of collaboratively developing tools for TextFrame is the relatively
language-agnostic Glitch platform; its terms explicitly grant full intellectual property rights, and thus
make attempting to code up a collaborative coding app unnecessary (Glitch).

TextFrame, then, might be engineered by the global non-exclusively anglophone poetry community to
work in the following ways:
•

Provide a means for uploading and indexing individual poems in an easily searchable manner. It
should allow both uploads in some form of open standard (unlike PDF), and some form of
markup-based uploads, whereby input is uploaded, presented on a correction-screen for
adjustment, and then published. Uploads should, ideally, be OCR-ed for indexing and search.

•

Provide a means for uploading, indexing, and publishing individual monographs, allowing it
both via direct finished upload (and OCR for indexing) of uploads, and by the transformation of
some markup text into a finished digital book.

•

Provide a means for poets and teachers of poetry to debate, together, the assertions and force
of individual poems, based on the information they can, in concert, bring to bear upon it—and
to do so either in an open manner, or in a privacy that they themselves can contrive and
control.

•

Provide robust real-time broadcasting, video upload, and organized embedding of other
platforms’ ability to do the same.

•

Provide a real-time open source social media platform an accelerant for the global poetry
community, one where varying sets of assumptions grow ever more legible even as meanings
proliferate in concert with connections among people.

•

Consider providing some form of Twitter search functionality and the ability to embed Twitter
threads on a page. Allow users to enter a poet’s (or really anyone’s) Twitter username, and a
timeframe, and have a series of Tweets come up. Allow users to maintain lists of usernames for
easy one-click searches. Allow a set search results to be presented within a TextFrame for
discussion.

•

Provide playlist functionality allows a user to compile, save, and share lists of links to poems to
create virtual anthologies, syllabi, and other list-like constructions.
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In addition to its main archival function, TextFrame should prioritize building a means for allowing a
self-defined group of people to present and respond to a text in a collaborative manner. In that sense,
TextFrame can be thought of as an implementation-neural way of saying: any digital re-presentation of
a text that allows collaborative commentary. A TextFrame is the unit of presentation after which the
application is named.

In terms of publishing texts oneself, I suggest that the best current existing technology is Manifold 2.0,
a collaborative project of University of Minnesota Press, CUNY GC Digital Scholarship Lab, and Cast Iron
Coding, a dev shop based in Portland Oregon. Manifold is designed to serve the transition of academic
journal and monograph publishing away from for-profit publishing and toward open access. It provides
a free and open source platform that allows the creation of digital texts from multiple sources, and it
has support for cross-platform (here I mean device) comment and annotation functionality. Instead of
the author-pages of the Poetry Foundation, one imagines Manifold-based author anthologies with
multiple contributors, and content from multiple sources—poems, but also videos of readings, scans of
archival material, pages from the web, and any number of other sources. The uses of Manifold are only
at the very beginning of coming into focus. And it is completely free and open source.

Manifold could also help address lingering issues of the availability of contemporary US-based poetries,
in the sense that many poems from smaller or older presses are unavailable, inside the US or outside.
In term of work from the past, the Eclipse project, led by conceptualist Craig Dworkin, were an earlyish model of presenting archival reading texts of rare poetry (Eclipse). The ubu project, led by Kenneth
Goldsmith, provides reading copies of a wide variety of texts, along with an extensive archive of digital
video and sound (Ubuweb)—often presented without permission. Conceptualism’s experiments with
archives are a topic for another study. Many small presses in the US now provide free PDF versions of
the works they publish, or they publish only in that form—as do some individual poets and critics.

94

The TextFrame project should also be designed for users whose hearing or sight or other abilities are
different from what one usually imagines as a default user. Users with different abilities should be part
of the build team.

In terms of group annotation of the web that does not involve publishing texts or other documents,
another possible currently-existing technology choice, one that might complement Manifold, is
Hypothesis, an open annotation platform that puts a “conversation layer over the entire web that
works everywhere, without needing implementation by any underlying site” (The Hypothesis Project).
A Hypothesis instance would allow the build group to deliver social annotation fairly quickly: it’s
basically a means for maintaining a stable identity for users while they comment on existing web
pages—not using those pages’ own comment functionality (if it exists), but that of Hypothesis itself.
The privacy controls allow users to select who can and cannot see the pages they comment on, and
what they say.

If TextFrame, as an application, is developed from scratch, poems might be uploaded to it and
presented for discussion in a manner similar to a Poetry Foundation poem page, given rights to the
works in question (a big if, one that suggests the use of Hypothesis if encountering issues and the text
is available on the Web). One can imagine linking a main screen for a particular poem to what one
might call context screens, where a text, photo, video or other piece of relevant non-poem material
could be uploaded and similarly presented for discussion—such as a letter a poet wrote in relation to a
poem. Ideas such as this are covered in the Manifold documentation.

In terms of preventing commenting abuse, participant-based flagging systems, as on the programming
site Stack Overflow, have come a long way in the last few years in terms of helping moderators.
Moderators, in turn, depend on terms of service (TOS) and a codes of conduct in order to make
decisions. This project assumes that groups will do this for themselves, collaboratively, but flagging
capability for posts and comments are essential tools for any user or moderator.
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One can also imagine, in an application built from scratch, a slightly different take on current
implementations of “threads” for discussion. Currently, when subthreads develop out of main threads
of discussion on most platforms, things get messy fast, with applications having to decide what to
display with what: check any long Twitter thread to see what I mean. One might thus put the ability to
re-define and re-display subthreads into new threads in the hands of users, perhaps using a distinction
between what one might call “knots” and “threads.”

By marking a post as a “knot,” users define a post as the beginning point of a particular discussion. This
is basically what quote-tweeting on Twitter does: resets the origin point of a discussion for the things
that follow, with clicking on the quoted tweet leading to the original thread. On other platforms, like
Facebook and Reddit, indented sets of comments indicate who is responding to what, and at what
level. Different still is the sophisticated annotation that is available at the site Genius. For example,
for the poem “Sunday Morning” by Wallace Stevens, Genius allows portions of the text to be clicked on
with user commentary coming up in a sidebar; separate user commentary appears at the end of the
poem; and an embedded video of a reading of the poem is also available (Genius Media Group. Inc.). I
don’t think Genius is an answer for the global anglophone poetry community (again, please see chapter
eight on why), but annotation functionality at this level seems definitely desirable for TextFrame. At
the same time, it seems worth noting here a very impressive commercial pedagogy site that does a
pretty amazing job explicating “Sunday Morning” with a very simple but thoughtful design: the site is
called shmoop (Shmoop Editorial Team). The close reading of the poem that is walked through there is
engaging and colloquial in genuinely trying to get at the poem’s meaning.

At classroom scale, one can imagine a discussion screen centering on a poem that features lists of users
who have defined knots. Perhaps hovering over the name shows the assertion itself; multiple knots can
be displayed on hover. The current user clicks on an assertion to reveal the thread. Or the current user
can click on "new knot" (with an icon for knot) and start a thread. Users could also break out their own
comments that start out as thread responses and turn them into quote-knots. Permissions settings
could allow users to distribute texts to a defined group that can comment on them collaboratively, i.e.
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control in a fine-grained manner who can see the text, who can see the comments, and who can
comment—with the global option available. Outside the classroom, in a perfect world, one would like
to be able to represent the all the various knots of a discussion, and see its various permutations, but
that already is starting to feel like it is getting into surveillance territory, which brings me to my next
subtopic.

As of this writing, Twitter is the de facto app for poetry discussion. Discussion often happens, however,
via subtweet, where the person or thing being discussed isn’t explicitly named, which makes it very
hard in terms of search, for example. As an archive, Twitter is pretty terrible: the search that the
service does provide via its client seems skewed in opaque ways. Twitter does have an API that makes
it easy to pull in sets of tweets by user, date, and search string, and it would not be difficult to then
embed those tweets on a particular poet’s page. Doing so, however, feels like it would be an intrusive
thing: people seem to rely on the clunky-ness of the application clients (mobile and desktop) that
twitter itself provides, in the sense that people really have to work hard to find old things that one
tweets. That allows a kind of freedom, I think, analogous to conversation. At the same time, some
poets produce incredibly incisive Twitter threads, as good as poets’ letters, or criticism in any other
form. Perhaps a solution is an opt-in on a poet’s TextFrame (or whatever the unit ends up being),
allowing users to use an UI built on top of the Twitter API that does search-and-embed. At the same
time, all of the reasons for not using Facebook or Reddit apply to Twitter, yet the sense of being in the
larger world that Twitter provides makes retreat to a specialized application unattractive.

In terms of real-time video broadcast, the commercial platform Twitch (“a community where millions
of people and thousands of interests collide in a beautiful explosion of video games, pop culture, and
conversation”), based around video streaming with comment functionality (Twitch Interactive, Inc.). It
is perhaps possible to imagine coding real-time broadcast video into TextFrame, but there are
numerous problems with doing so in lower-bandwidth contexts where real-time video transmission is
too laggy or too costly—what is known as the “digital divide” (Bessette), which reproduces the same
colonial relations that costly texts do. In the spirit of minimal sufficiency, regardless of its full suite of
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capabilities, TextFrame should have a lightweight client available that automatically cuts out highbandwidth content (perhaps via feature flags).

Funding would certainly be an issue from the start. The global non-exclusively anglophone community
itself is a kind of hybrid, in that many, but not all members of the community are institutionally
affiliated. Supra-institutional professional organizations in the US, such as the Modern Language
Association (MLA) and the Association of Writers & Writing Programs (AWP) are already captured by the
Poetry Foundation, at least in terms of who gets presented there. TextFrame, by contrast, is designed
to approach the Freireian horizon of not requiring any institutional affiliation or money for adding work
or for commenting. And it should be able to be run by anyone, at any scale: one TextFrame application
(or set of applications) for everyone, or lots of little sub-applications, all open. A set of, say,
Victorianists, could break away at any moment and start their own thing, either forking by the code
repository or repositories and customizing them, or running the code as is. One ambition I do have for
TextFrame, though, is that there be a recognizably central instance running at global scale, maintained
by a dedicated team, supported by individual anonymous donations. Funding sources would obviously
be an issue in trying to “build away” from the nation-state. Maybe lots of little networked applications,
in the manner of Mastodon, solves that.

Lastly, I should clarify the sense of the term “build” used throughout. For the purposes of digital
pedagogy and scholarship, “[b]uilding is constructing something digitally, through which a scholarly
discourse community can generate knowledge” (Endres 46). In the context of an English department,
however, I should note that, in preparing to thinking about building TextFrame, I faced moments of a
common departmental prejudice: against building, and toward critical writing:
Building faces the challenge of not being writing. However, the commonalities between writing
and building far exceed their differences. The present circumstances that exclude building
from institutional rewards, especially tenure and promotion, have more to do with the
institutionalization of scholarship. (Endres 44)
The “present circumstances” are likely due to a lag in departmental conceptions of what the field is,
or should be—which has in itself become a field of study. It is likely, however, that future scholars will
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not only be building, but will be floating extra-institutionally, running their own courses, and building
their own student bodies in the manner that one currently builds a following on social media. That is
already the main way that scholars and practitioners keep up in fast-changing and growing fields:
“growing a diverse personal learning network [PLN]… often is more useful than having a large,
homogeneous social network,” writes Internet scholar Howard Rheingold, “I learned from master
educators on Twitter that growing and tuning a PLN of authoritative sources and credible colearners is
one of the success strategies in a world of digital networks.” (Rheingold, Net Smart 25, 144). Further,
applications themselves serve a rhetorical function through their very construction:
[D]igital objects are rhetorical objects. Recognizing their rhetorical nature increases
understanding of their limits in generating knowledge and kinship with scholarly text. … Digital
objects are made to participate in an ideologically charged scholarly discourse community and
to generate, transmit, and debate its knowledge. (Endres 49-50)
The digital humanities scholars Stephen Ramsay and Geoffrey Rockwell address the problem of getting
institutional credit for digital work within traditional departments by proposing a version of the Turing
Test:
As Alan Turing proposed “What happens when a machine takes the part of [a human
interlocutor] in this game?” as a replacement for “Can machines think?”, so may we substitute
“What happens when building takes the place of writing?” as a replacement for “Is building
scholarship?” The answer, too, might be similar. If the quality of the interventions that occur
as a result of building are as interesting as those that are typically established through writing,
then that activity is, for all intents and purposes, scholarship. (Ramsay and Rockwell)
In terms of building TextFrame or some other collaborative poetry project, I don’t want credit. What I
want is for the same thing that has happened over and over not to happen again. That will require
something more than building a collaborative application for archiving poetry.
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Chapter 5: Narayanan’s Language Events as Free-Tier
Application
After deciding not to try to build TextFrame, for reasons that should be clear from the last chapter, I
still wanted to build something for this project. Around that time I went to visit the poet Vivek
Narayanan, who teaches creative writing at George Mason University, which is in Fairfax County, VA.
Narayanan told me about a classroom practice he had developed based on the “Language Events” of
Robert Desnos.

I first met Narayanan in when he was doing a residency at the Sarai Centre for the Study of Developing
Societies in Delhi in 2008. Since 2000, the Centre has centered on questions of “media, urban life, and
the public domain”; at the time, Narayanan was putting together a performance with the artist Sophea
Lerner for the KhojLive Performance Art festival. The project was driven by the idea that “the
audience itself should… generate poetry” and that the work that resulted should be “site-specific
while, at the same time, addressing dislocations of time and place” (Narayanan, Lines). For the
project, Narayanan developed prompts for audience-based line generation that were deliberately
simple: “I heard…” and “It is…” Narayanan assembled lines that he solicited “walking around with a
clipboard during the Khoj performance festival and convincing people to sit down and compose a
couple of sentences for me; in addition, I solicited lines over email.” Narayanan and Lerner also set up
a dedicated phone number whereby people could respond to the prompts via SMS, with the thought
that they could also be projected live in real time on a screen during the performance, though the
latter idea had to be abandoned due to time constraints (Narayanan, Lines). The performance, titled
“What Have You Heard,” took place on March 28. After being read, the poem was eventually posted
(Narayanan, Heard).

During my visit in the summer of 2018, Narayanan described a classroom practice whereby he had
adapted Desnos’ Language Event One and Language Event Two for the real-time classroom. Here is
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Desnos’ recounting of the events, and couplets produced by the exercises that Desnos published as
examples:
Language Event One
Sitting around a table, each participant writes on a sheet of paper, without looking at those
of the others, a clause beginning with “if” or “when,” and, on a separate sheet of paper, an
independent clause in the conditional or future mood, unrelated to the preceding. Then the
sentences are shuffled at random, two by two, & read together.
1
If night was endless
there would be nothing more, nothing, nothing at all.
(Louis Aragon, Georges Sadoul)
2
When shoestrings grown in the workers’ gardens
railwaymen will blow their noses with sugar tongs.
(Benjamin Péret, Suzanne Muzard)
3
When children slap their father’s face
all young men will have white hair
(Yves Tanguy, André Breton)
4
If tigers should prove grateful to us
sharks would volunteer to be used as canoes.
(Elsie Péret, Suzanne Muzard)
5
If orchids grew in the palm of my hand
masseurs would have plenty of work
(Benjamin Péret, André Breton)

Language Event Two
Two poets. Questions and answers are always independent.
(Suzanne Muzard, André Breton)
What is a kiss?
A divagation, everything capsizes.
What is daylight?
A naked woman bathing at nightfall.
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What is exaltation?
It is a blob of oil in a brook.
What are eyes?
The night watchman in a perfume factory.
What is hovering between Suzanne and Me?
Great black threatening clouds.
What is a bed?
A fan quickly opened. The sound of a bird’s wing.
In Narayanan’s initial adaptation, he collected responses to Desnos’ prompts from writing students via
their phones using a variety of intermediate internet-based steps. Narayanan explicitly wanted to
eschew SMS/text-messaging for collecting the student responses, as there are sometimes fees
associating with texting depending on one’s phone plan. He eventually settled on Mentimeter, a livepolling app, for collecting responses. He chose Mentimeter for its free-tier service, its “crystal clear”
user interface (as Narayanan described it to me), and for the ability of students/participants to use the
university wifi network to access it. Narayanan waited until mid-term to stage the events; the timing
allowed relationships among the students to form, which in turn would allow sharing in cases where a
student did not have a smart phone (a situation which in fact did not arise).

There were several issues with this iteration of the project. The major one was that Mentimeter did
not have a means for combining and presenting the responses in the manner Narayanan wanted.
Instead, Narayanan developed a manual process for combination and presentation: he exported the
responses to an Excel Workbook, and, as the students stood by, chose combinations to paste into a
presentation projection from his laptop. It was a cumbersome process that broke the flow of the event.

As we discussed Narayanan’s process further, we decided to collaborate on writing a custom
application. We finished the first iteration on June 16th, 2018: a Jupyter Notebook in Python that readin Narayanan’s existing Excel Workbooks and printed out random combinations of the existing
responses to the prompts. The combinations were selected via using Python’s pseudo-random number
generator picking elements from among the sets of responses from the Desnos’ couplets. The main bit
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of presentation logic that we worked out that evening was the rate at which combinations would be
displayed: too quickly, and the resulting poem soon became overwhelming; too slowly, and the poem
seemed to drag, as if someone were speaking too slowly. After many iterations, we settled on a rate of
one couplet every three seconds. With the notebook code in hand, I left to develop an web application
version on my own, one that would both collect the lines from participants and display them.

In the days that followed, I thought about the publication of the US version Narayanan’s debut book of
poems, Universal Beach (Narayanan, UB) and the ways in which its publication reflected the
participatory and accessible nature of his teaching. The book is concerned with exactly the themes its
title promises: the nature of the universal, in a very material sense. The book was published in India by
the poet Anand Thakore’s Harbour Line press; I had been the co-publisher of the book in the US. I
mention this here because it was Narayanan’s demand that the book be freely available as a PDF (in
addition to the for-purchase print edition) that set the press’ policy of publishing free PDFs three
months after print publication, a policy that other small presses in the US employ (with some providing
free versions from the start). And I saw those same aims in Narayanan’s version of the Language
Events: take the events out of the classroom, and they could be scaled-up as much as one liked. I
wanted to make sure that the implementation allowed that.

As I was building Narayanan’s Language Events, I began thinking that shifting the entire TextFrame
project to being pedagogically-based might rescue it from some of the contradictions of a social app
(trolling, value-creation). I quickly came to the conclusion that making the project entirely pedagogybased would not save it from anything. At the same time, though, I wanted part of the application to
serve as a repository of writing exercises and prompts, either as sets of written instructions,
application programming interfaces (APIs), or fully functional single- or multi-page applications.30

Part of the reason for seeing a pedagogical need within poetry is negative experience with Blackboard.
Blackboard is a commercial, for-profit, closed-source product developed for large institutions, and it
has an institutional feel.31 The fact is, “the way [instructors] teach in those spaces,” i.e. electronic
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learning management systems (LMS) is “shaped by the limitations and constraints they perceive as
existing in those spaces” (Salisbury). That was definitely true for me. And implementing something like
the Language Events within Blackboard would feel icky, like I was giving them something that does not
belong to them.

As I starting thinking through the implementation details of Narayanan’s project, and how it might fit
in with a larger pedagogy-based project, it occurred to me that another major problem with some of
the versions of what I had in mind—the need for one centralized app to serve world-wide, and the costs
and logistical problems with collaboration associated with that—disappeared when one began thinking
about individual events, workshops, and classrooms such as Narayanan’s. One classroom, one event,
one instance, is what I thought. What I mean is, it occurred to me that classroom-scale is also free-tier
scale: that I could implement Narayanan’s language events as a stand-alone Flask application that
would run on free-tier services from cloud providers such as Amazon or Heroku without incurring any
charges. And that anyone with a credit card and a little bit of developer knowledge, while neither
trivial requirements, could do the same. In our initial discussions, I had told Narayanan that I would try
to incorporate the Language Events into the larger project, which at that point was a skeleton
application that had a working authentication flow that included a working database connection, and
working drafts of two projects I had worked on earlier on my own (and which are detailed briefly in the
appendix) and which could be re-focused toward pedagogy. Incorporating the Language Events in this
way, however, committed me to running a centralized server, the users to an auth flow, and likely
costs. The login itself, I soon thought, also posed problems: what was the point of adding another step
to the student experience, adding yet another password to their lives, and also collecting and storing
information about them in a database that might at any point be demanded by some state agency. And
if I decided to go the OAuth2 route, then I was introducing—requiring, really—a third party provider
such as Google/Gmail. At that point I decided: no login should be required for the instructor or
students to use the app, and the app should do one thing and do it well (the language events, and
that’s all), and it should be free to deploy using free-tier.
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Free-tier is a shitty substitution for free as in free beer, free because free for all, and not tied to
someone’s property. Free-tier relies on tech surfeit for its existence. It’s nice for hobbyists and for
projects like this that it exists as a business model, but that’s what it is: a business model.

I poked around on AWS and the on Google Cloud Platform, neither of which I had used in more than
three years. They had both changed a lot, and I didn’t feel like getting involved with figuring out how
they now worked. I thought about starting up a Digital Ocean instance, but it’s not free, and it’s not
super easy to manage everything involved, despite their excellent tutorials. I ended up on Heroku,
which takes a Docker-like proprietary Procfile, the one concession I had to make to the platform. I had
never used Heroku, but it was as advertised: easy to configure, and still free for hobbyists. I built the
app around a Redis cache, assuming that I could scale it up with Cassandra if need be (though again,
scalability was not the goal). I designing the endpoints such that they are made unique by the users,
and that’s what makes the event itself unique. That leaves the app open to denial of service attacks
(by flooding the instance with bad requests to bogus events), but I figured each classroom could get
around that problem by naming its Heroku app something unique just before class.

The free-tier Heroku Redis says that it does not persist: it self-erases after 24 hours if one does not
upgrade to a non-free tier. We found that didn’t happen, but I still upgraded for a month ($15 US) so
that the students would definitely have access to their work. I ended up naming our Heroku
deployment desnos, rather than Narayanan or language_events, but it doesn’t feel right. The current
endpoints are available in the digital manifest at the beginning of this document. The user creates
specific “event” by making up something unique for the “some-random-id” field: for use in the
classroom, the instructor can change that to whatever makes sense for that session: each time you
want to start a new session, or anytime you want to keep a set of responses together, create a new id.

After a demo for Narayanan, he asked that I add an easy way for him to cut the displayed poem out
from the browser so that he could paste into a text file—something that would strip out all the HTML
etc. He also asked for a pause button: something that would stop the flow of generation of the poem so
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that he could discuss it with the students as it unfolded. The first time Narayanan used the app in the
classroom, in the Fall of 2018, the pseudo-random line picking operation gave a lot of repeated
entrees, and some entries didn’t get used at all. This disappointed some students greatly. For the
second iteration, I changed the line picking such that once a pseudo-random element has been chosen
for combination and display, it cannot not be chosen again until all the elements from that set of
responses have been shown. That fixed it.

You should be able to try it right now. Just make sure you put in all the slashes in the address (one
known pitfall). Also: every time you refresh a “combine” page, it is a new set of combinations that will
be created and displayed. For now, the deployment is backed by a free-tier in-memory cache, which
means that your texts are not guaranteed to persist more than 24 hours, and that if the site somehow
suddenly gets a lot of traffic, things should start to fall out. I haven’t load-tested the deployment at
all, actually. The digital portion of this thesis includes screen captures of the two language events as
deployed, plus captures of two free-tier scale projects in a working but unfinished state. The code for
all of the projects is also included. What follows is a brief description of the unfinished projects, parse!
and xlanguage, which can also be seen in the screen-captures included with the project.

The first project, parse!, does sentential and phrasal parsing. Its goal is to develop into an application
that allows arguments about the effects of various sentence structures to have an ostensive basis. Right
now it does one best parse, and diagrams the input text. The goal is for this tool to be configurable to
produce alternate parses when a sentence or phrase is grammatically ambiguous. This can be especially
useful in the discussion of enjambment: ambiguities among different grammatical resolutions for
particular sentences, when broken in different ways, could be easily produced and displayed. For
example, “The horse raced past/ the barn fell/ everyone was distraught” might be parsed several
ways. The first two lines might mean: “The horse raced past. The barn fell.” Or they could mean: “The
horse [that was] raced past the barn fell.” The competing parses would be shown, allowing easy
reference during a discussion. A second phase of development using the parse functionality would allow
for stylistic analysis, such that a poet’s entire oeuvre could be uploaded via PDF (or other format) and
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parsed, with a report on the most common phrasal structures used, and the contexts or points in the
poem where they generally appear. For example, a poet might turn to the conditional as inflection
point three-quarters through a poem, and this might be a kind of signature, demonstrable across more
poems in the oeuvre than not.

There are many suggestive possibilities for stylistic analysis of uploaded poems, but doing so would
require that the uploaded poems be encoded in some sort of markup language. A recent pedagogical
experiment within The Text Encoding Initiative (TEI) documents the “painstaking process of selecting
bits of text and wrapping them with tags reframed reading as slow, iterative, and filled with formal
choices” in putting together a digital edition of a poem using “the Text Encoding Initiative’s broadbased humanities tag set” (Singer). If the set of tags could be restricted to getting the title, stanzas,
line-breaks, and sentences correct, then it’s possible that some form of machine learning (ML) could be
used to do markup. A natural language processing (NLP) pipeline specific to phenomena like
enjambment could then be developed utilizing the tags. I’m wary of advocating this, however, as I
think it would be abused and be used to draw meaningless conclusions. The simple diagramming
functionality, in contrast, can be used to teach the (lost art of) sentence diagramming, whereby user
hand-parses can be quickly compared with machine parses.

The second unfinished project is called xlanguage, or “cross-language.” It was inspired by work
attempting to measure the “distance” of one language from another (Petroni and Serva). It lists a
number of languages, and asks the user to choose one, and to enter some text in English. It then
transposes texts entered into the text box into the other language, by the following criteria: each word
entered is transposed into a word in the chosen language by applying the Levenshtein distance
algorithm, or by the fewest insert, delete, or substitution operations at the character level needed to
change one word (in one language, in this case) into the another word (in this case, from another
language) (Petroni and Serva). In the implementation included with this project, the list of available
target languages is currently limited by the number of languages that the Ubuntu Linux distribution is
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available in; it’s from there that I have taken the lexicons for each language. The given transpositions
can then be used as writing prompts. Or the transposed text can be taken as a poem in itself.

Critic Jerome McGann and poet Lisa Samuels, writing together, note that “we may usefully regard all
criticism and interpretation as deformance,” whereby the original work is subjected to a form of
reduction. For McGann and Samuels, paths toward interpretation involve actual material reductions or
changes to the text itself in order to ascribe meanings to it: “interpretive lines of thought spin out of
some initial nondiscursive ‘experiment’ with the primary materials,” including reversing the order of
the lines of a poem as a form of “reading backwards,” or reading a poem by erasing all but its nouns,
or, in a separate move, all but its verbs. In performing the latter operations on Wallace Stevens’ “The
Snow Man,” McGann and Samuels are able to identify a “noun arc… from ‘mind’ to ‘nothing’” and a
“verb arc from ‘have’ to ‘is’, from (imperative, self) possession to (indeterminate, absolute) being”
(McGann and Samuels). One can imagine automating a number of deformance techniques for criticism.
I imagine xlanguage as a composition tool for generating new sounds and relationships, but it could just
as easily be a critical tool, revealing words just a short “distance” from one another, unarticulated
within a text. One could also imagine allowing for different kinds of distances to be calculated (like
N+7, where the word seven places further on in a lexicon is substituted for the original word in a
poem). The articulation of distances reveals unspoken affinities.

That ends the first section of this thesis, the main argument for TextFrame. What follow are case
studies: conventional historicist criticism that I imagine could be represented with TextFrame. The
argument involves things like the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Goethe’s
theory of colors, and Google n-grams, all things that lend themselves to dramatic display, as well as to
discussion, on the web. It is with that use in mind that I ask the next section be read.
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Chapter 6: An Unendurable Age: Ashbery, O’Hara, and 1950s
‘Self’ Psychology Precursors
In 1924, Gordon W. Allport (1897-1967) created and taught “Personality: its Psychological and Social
Aspects” at Harvard. The course was the first at a US college to treat personality theory as a discrete
branch of psychology (Nicholson 1997). Allport formally joined Harvard’s psychology faculty in 1930,
and, in 1937, published Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, which became the standard US
textbook of personality theory (Nicholson 2003). He remained at Harvard for the rest of his career,
publishing his 1954 book The Nature of Prejudice from there. The book, which describes prejudice in
terms of “In-Groups,” “Out-Groups,” “ego defenses” and “rejection,” arrived right at the beginning of
the Civil Rights Movement, and it “defined the field of intergroup relations for social psychologists,”
making the focus “the study of prejudice and its effect on group interactions” (ibid). Coming from the
author of a textbook that was compulsory for anyone who took a psychology course in the US, the book,
after being reprinted in paperback in 1958 (de Carvalho), sold more than a half-million copies in the US
over the next 25 years (Dovidio, Glick and Rudman 17). “Almost four decades after its appearance, [the
book remained] one of the most influential and oft-cited publications in the field of intergroup
relations” (Katz 125). The book is likely the source by which the term “in-group” entered the American
vernacular, as the term’s use spikes around the book’s publication, as can be seen in the below n-gram
of “in-group”:
Illustration 6.1: Google. N-gram view for "in-group"
When Allport’s Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality was published in 1955,
it thus received more widespread academic attention than a set of essays on personality theory
normally would, despite the fact that the paperback had not yet hit the shelves (Dovidio, Glick and
Rudman 25). In Becoming, Allport elaborates the concept of the “proprium” (or self) partially through
“Personalism,” a long-extant philosophical construct with multiple contradictory meanings (Williams
and Bengtsson). Allport’s concept of Personalism describes every mental function as embedded in
“personal life”: there is no separable symbol processing or space perception; there are only people
who have senses, feelings, and impressions. The Personologist—a real Allport construct—approaches the
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work the questions “How shall a psychological life history be written?” and “What are the individual
consistencies?” (Polansky). The Freudian “depth psychology” then-prevalent in the US, Allport felt,
“may plunge too deep” (Allen 419); being in the moment and being present were, he thought, the keys
to psychotherapy and to development (Allen). Allport used the terms “proprium” and “Personalism” to
distinguish his constructs from the nascent “Self” psychology of Heinz Kohut (1913-1981), and from
work by Abraham Maslow (1908-1970) (ibid). In a 1943 paper titled “A Theory of Human Motivation,”
Maslow adopted Kurt Goldstein’s concept of “self-actualization” and placed it atop a “hierarchy of
human needs.” Maslow defines “self-actualization” as “the desire for self-fulfillment, namely the
tendency for man to become actualized in what he is potentially” (Maslow). Carl Rogers (1902-1987), in
Client-Centered Therapy (1951), favors terminology whereby it is the “client” who “has within himself
or herself vast resources for self-understanding, for altering his or her self-concept, attitudes and selfdirected behavior,” which are resources that require “a definable climate of facilitative psychological
attitudes” adding up to the “freedom to be” (Rogers). When The Nature of Prejudice started selling,
Personalism, as part of Allport’s work, reached a very wide audience.

Allport’s “person” was defined alongside Rogers’s “client” and Maslow’s motivation; all were subject,
or so it seems, to an indelibly tossed-off poetic parody by poet Frank O’Hara, who had attended
Harvard in the late 1940s, and who was then living at the center of US psychoanalytic culture. Being
young and gay in the 1950s, even when white, and even in New York, normally afforded a greatly
reduced set of public opportunities for “self-actualization” and the “freedom to be,” with the threat of
stigma and even criminalization constantly in the air (Roffman). Whatever else it is (and it is many
things), O’Hara’s “Personism: A Manifesto,” written in 1959, a year after the paperback of The Nature
of Prejudice appeared, can be read as a parody of Personalism, of related strands of 1950s US
psychology, and of the poetry that developed alongside them. While critics have mentioned
Personalism and Personism in the same breath (Nelson 88), I have not found a specific claim vis à vis
Allport in the extensive literature that O’Hara’s piece has inspired.
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O’Hara graduated from Allport’s Harvard in 1950 (a year after John Ashbery). In the piece, he writes
that he “founded” Personism “on August 27, 1959,” in conversation with Amiri Baraka (then known as
LeRoi Jones); “Personism: A Manifesto” was dated September 3, 1959 when it appeared in the 1961
issue of the little magazine Yugen, edited by Baraka and his then-wife Hettie Jones. A year seems a
reasonable amount of time to have passed from the paperback release of The Nature of Prejudice for
Allport’s Personalism to get vernacular traction. Just as circumstantially, and just as compellingly, the
soi-disant founding happens to coincide exactly with the release of Robert Lowell’s collection Life
Studies, published in the spring of that year (Byrne). In interviews at the time, Lowell said the
composition of Life Studies was part of his psychotherapy, and indeed a whole subfield of Lowell
studies has come to be dominated by his mental illness and relationship to therapy (Jamison). M.L.
Rosenthal’s genre-founding review of the collection, titled “Poetry as Confession,” appeared in The
Nation issue dated September 19, 1959 (Rosenthal). Rosenthal likely chose the term “confession” to
recall Lowell’s 1940 conversion to Catholicism, much discussed when Lowell won the 1947 Pulitzer
Prize, at age 30, for Lord Weary’s Castle (Hamilton). In his review, Rosenthal says that Life Studies
contains the equivalent of “a series of personal confidences, rather shameful, that one is honor-bound
not to reveal,” and that Lowell himself “seems to regard” the book as “soul’s therapy.” For Personism,
meanwhile:
[O]ne of its minimal aspects is to address itself to one person (other than the poet himself),
thus evoking overtones of love without destroying love's life-giving vulgarity, and sustaining the
poet’s feelings towards the poem while preventing love from distracting him into feeling about
the person. (O'Hara, Personism: A Manifesto)
I think O’Hara is serious about this, at some level, but I also think it can be read as a parody of the
analysand-analyst relationship, where “overtones” are all that is allowed, and the “poem” is therapy
itself. Whether one is willing to entertain such a reading or not, it is clear that “Personism” is
immersed in its moment, attempting to put forth (even as it disavows them) “the most lofty ideas of
anyone writing today.” “Everything is in the poems,” O’Hara says in the opening of the piece:
but at the risk of sounding like the poor wealthy man’s Allen Ginsberg I will write to you
because I just heard that one of my fellow poets thinks that a poem of mine that can’t be got
at one reading is because I was confused too. Now, come on. I don’t believe in god, so I don’t
have to make elaborately sounded structures. I hate Vachel Lindsay, always have; I don’t even
like rhythm, assonance, all that stuff. (O'Hara, Personism: A Manifesto 27)
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The reference to believers creating cathedrals, or “elaborately sounded structures,” is probably a
reference to Lowell, who was known for his baroque technique from Weary onward (or possibly to
Anglican convert T.S. Eliot). Vachel Lindsay, who committed suicide in 1931 by drinking Lysol—”They
tried to get me—I got them first!” were apparently his last words (Masters 361)—was known as a
moralist and a socialist: “Would I might rouse the Lincoln in you all” begins his poem “Lincoln”
(Lindsay). The parsing of poetic form using traditional metrics (“rhythm, assonance”) was, of course, a
hallmark of the then-ubiquitous New Critics. Offhand ripostes directed at the generation or two ahead
of him are common in O’Hara: “Memorial Day 1950” contains the line “Our responsibilities did not
begin/ in dreams, though they began in bed” (O'Hara, Selected Poems 7) which inverts Delmore
Schwartz’s “In Dreams Begin Responsibilities,” itself a borrowing from Yeats’ epigraph from 1914’s
Responsibilities (Corcoran).32

Stephanie Burt’s reading of “Personism” inadvertently finds that self psychology—as the collective work
of Allport, Maslow, Rogers, and others came to be called, in opposition to “ego psychology,” once
Heinz Kohut added his contributions—may have served as an influence (as well as a straw person):
The style O’Hara gradually invented (you can see it as early as “Autobiographia Literaria,”
though it doesn’t take charge until maybe 1956) reverses the process by which you think more,
get more from a poet’s work, judge the work more sympathetically, give it more play, if you
already know and like the poet personally. Instead, O’Hara’s poems give strangers the feeling
that we know and like him.
That’s how a Personist poem works, and it’s why Personism isn’t (as I once believed) just a
parody of manifestos, but a good way to describe what O’Hara invented, though not an
explanation of why it works. (Burt)
Burt is essentially saying that, for O’Hara, “depth psychology may plunge too deep.” And if Personism
is a good way to describe O’Hara’s poetic idiom (i.e. using charisma—being a person being like and
want to be like—to sustain a relationship), it is also a clarifying way of seeing what O’Hara invented in
terms of a way of being in the world of the 1950s US: his life and work were, in some ways, a model of
public self-actualization, of going on your nerve.

At the same time as O’Hara’s idiom was developing, his fellow Harvard alum John Ashbery was reacting
against similar discursive realities in some very different ways. In a story told countless times in the
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literature (by Marjorie Perloff, Brad Gooch, Mark Ford, John Shoptaw, Aiden Wasley, and, most
recently, by Jesse Zuba and by Karin Roffman), in 1955, Ashbery and O’Hara, very close friends33 sent
poems to W.H. Auden. The occasion was possible publication in the Yale Series of Younger Poets, then,
as now, “designed to provide a publishing medium for the first volumes of promising poets.” Both
Ashbery and O’Hara’s manuscripts had been initially removed from consideration by Auden’s assistants
before they reached Auden himself; both poets re-sent their poems directly to “Wystan” upon hearing
(from Chester Kallman) that Auden was unhappy with the field as it stood (Perloff). Ashbery’s
manuscript became Some Trees, number fifty-two in the series. Perloff quotes an unpublished letter
from Auden to O’Hara, where Auden explains his decision:
I’m sorry to have to tell you that, after much heart searching I chose John’s poems. It’s really
very awkward when the only two possible candidates are both friends.
This doesn’t mean that I don’t like your work: lots of the poems I like very much, in particular
Jane Awake.
I think you (and John, too, for that matter) must watch what is always the great danger with
any ‘surrealistic’ style, namely the confusing of authentic non-logical relations which arouse
wonder with accidental ones which arouse mere surprise and in the end fatigue. (Perloff 249250)
The difference between “authentic non-logical relations which arouse wonder” and “accidental ones
which arouse mere surprise and in the end fatigue” apparently preoccupied Auden with regard to
Ashbery’s poems, perhaps in part due to the fact that his hand in picking anyone at all was forced
(Zuba). Perloff, and Ashbery himself (Roffman), point to Auden’s introduction to the Yale edition of
Some Trees as “curious.” To better understand Auden’s take on the poems (a take one might consider
emblematic of its time, given Auden’s stature then), it’s worth looking closely at what Auden says, in
his compulsory foreword to Some Trees, about the poet’s role in society, and about poetic inspiration.
For “the ancient Greeks,” Auden opines,
a man or woman is only real when he or she impersonates a god or goddess; in what we should
call “themselves” they are of no account. Real events are sacred ritual actions ... An event
that does not re-occur is nothing. The particular, the individual, the secular are nothing.
Poetry, too, is a rite, which is why the poet speaks not in his own name but as a mouthpiece of
the Muses. … Particularity appears only as the particular details of a rite; it is important, for
example, that Hercules should perform neither more nor less than twelve labors or that iambic
verse should only be used for satires and curses.
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Such a period is golden for the poet because he has no problem of subject matter,
communication with his audience, or style, and, in addition, is a highly valued member of
society. (Some Trees 11-12)
This is the Plato of Ion, where the poet is “a passive agent of muses… ignorant both of the nature of
poetry and of his personal contribution” (Partee 87). In Auden’s version, poetry, via the poet, elevates
language above the particulars of the world by ritualizing language itself. In this view, the poet is not a
particular person using language as a means of describing or representing the world, but a vessel taking
dictation, à la Cocteau’s Orphée (where the poet is depicted sitting in a car, writing down the crackly
emanations from its radio, to the detriment of his marriage). Through language, the poet, as medium,
produces a sacred space removed from false divisions. Orphée was released in 1950. Ashbery saw it
“repeatedly” at the 55th Street Playhouse in New York (Roffman 194). I haven’t yet found evidence that
either Auden or O’Hara definitely saw it (but how could they miss it?). Nevertheless, by 1956, Auden
was able to feel that that view of language and poetry had all but disappeared, at least with regard to
the actual lived world:
How different such an age is from our own... no one seriously regards [our rituals] any longer as
sacred. ... For us, there is a sharp distinction between reality and meaning. Only concrete
particulars seem real, and all concrete particulars seem equally real. … Human experience of
time is an experience of a succession of unique moments, each of which is novel and will never
recur. (ibid 12)
Auden’s “Greeks” see poetry as the medium by which reality and meaning become one; Auden’s
younger contemporaries, having lost this sense of language as ritual to a world of “concrete
particulars” can no longer reach this sacred place; they must settle for meaning in personalized,
individual instances. All of this has the feeling of a hobby horse, but it also sets up a critique of
Ashbery’s work that Auden never quite comes out and delivers. It would be inappropriate to critique a
young semi-protégé’s work in a foreword having chosen that work for a prize, and the selection itself,
coupled with Auden’s hedging, may also reflect an inarticulate knowledge that Auden was out of his
depth. What Auden does do next is chart a line of descent “[f]rom Rimbaud down to Mr. Ashbery” that
locates “old magical notions” of imaginative life “in childhood largely, dreams and daydreams
entirely,” an individuated approach that commits such poets to “strange juxtapositions of imagery”
and “singular associations of ideas” (13). Singular is a pejorative here, set against Greek holism.
Dreams without responsibilities are also not a good thing, for Auden, and they are, I think, the crux of
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what Auden thought of Some Trees: Auden liked the ritualistic affect of the poems, but couldn’t follow
the point of Ashbery’s constant linguistic misdirection, seeing it as (mere, for him) subjective
intellectual inventiveness. In the two poems he quotes in the foreword, he looks for the literal: In
“Illustration,” he reads an angel’s suicide as a literal ritual rejection of modern life, while in “The
Instruction Manual,” Ashbery is faulted for “demanding an active re-creation by [the reader]” of a kind
of “private property” of the poet’s imagination, a demand that “ancient poetry with its public
references does not” make (14). At the same time, Auden is not wrong about the influence of
surrealism on Ashbery (though he does not utter the word, about which more in a moment), just as
Burt is not wrong with regard to manifestoes and O’Hara. As Auden probably knew that at the time of
the book’s selection, Ashbery was preparing to begin Fulbright-based work on Raymond Roussel
(Roffman). But for Auden’s purposes, in following out juxtapositions and associations from the realm of
dreams, the poets of the surreal will be “tempted to manufacture calculated oddities, as if the
subjectively sacred were necessarily and on all occasions odd” (16). That’s not what Ashbery, or
O’Hara, were doing. Because of all the misunderstandings still surrounding Surrealism itself and its
influence on the New York School poets in particular, I want to say a little bit about why, though in a
circuitous fashion, through the “coded” reading of Some Trees that have become the standard for it.

If one were to try to take inventory of “calculated oddities” in Some Trees, one might think that Auden
was reacting to the talking-past-each-other faux shepherds in “Eclogue” (“Father, I have long dreamed
your whitened/ Face and side to accost me in dull play) (24); the anthropomorphized “patience” of
“Sonnet” that notes “His pain is the servant’s alive” (49); or “The Mythological Poet” that asks “Might
not child and pervert/ Join hands in the instant/ Of their interest” (48). Calculation was certainly in
the air in the 1950s: Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics; or, Control and Communication in the Animal and
the Machine had appeared in 1948. The theory of communication found there is a lot closer to what
Ashbery was doing than what Auden ascribed to him:
a message is “a sequence of measurable events distributed in time” and… the information it
carries is a selectional indication that allows the receiver to pick one of a pre-established set
of alternative meanings. [I]t is not meaning that travels in a communication channel, but
signals that cannot be interpreted except by receivers who are in possession of the particular
code. (Glasersfeld)
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Following Shoptaw, critics Wasley, John Vincent34, and Catherine Imbroglio read Some Trees as less
calculated than coded: the book has been productively read as performance of Ashbery’s gay (white,
US, male) identity—an angle that Auden could not have explored in his YYP foreword even had he the
inclination. Auden knew that Ashbery was gay; that he selected the book says that he knew something
was happening, even if he did not know, or was not able to allow himself to know, what, specifically, it
was. Whatever Auden really thought of Some Trees, the “coded” readings of Shoptaw and others have
become primary for it. I am not arguing that Ashbery was directly adapting Wiener. Most poets, as
bricoleurs, don’t pay too much attention to the disciplinary history of the ideas that surround them.
Western lyric forms have always developed alongside theoretical trends to cope with and articulate the
very same problematics faced by the scientific purveyors of explanatory paradigms. But the turn in US
poetry, beginning with Gertrude Stein, to a kind of abstracted syntactic approach that effaced
conventional word-meaning associations, can be seen as part of a general intellectual trend in US
thought that included behaviorism and, later, generative grammar (defined in the next chapter). Those
two disciplines were part of a larger a reaction against US-based versions of psychoanalysis and the
Freudian interpretive impulse. At the same time, US-based psychoanalysis explicitly saw homosexuality
as pathological arrested development, and played a major role in upholding its medicalization (and
criminalization). As Shoptaw and others argue, Ashbery’s early poetry is explicitly reacting against
that, and that its oddities are in fact coded. Ashbery himself says as much, telling Karin Roffman that
after ejaculating for the first time during a teen encounter with a friend, “he wrote a poem-note in his
diary made up with phrases from their conversation that he did not want to forget. John wanted to
remember what happened, but he also did not want anyone else to know or find out” (Roffman 87-88).
This was the first instance of “this leaving out business” (Molesworth) that evolved into Ashbery’s
poetic—and also the nascent ethos of the poems. Ashbery later said, half-jokingly, while composing the
poems of Some Trees that “[m]y poems are usually in form of solemn precepts for spiritual conduct”
(Roffman 198). I want to argue that the poems are actually coded “self-actualization”—that the
humanistic (later ‘self’) psychology of the moment is one of the explicit pressures on the work: as
psychology’s is medicalizing and criminalizing homosexuality, it is, at the same time demanding the
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manifestation of an authentic self. As Catherine Imbriglio’s puts it: “Ashbery’s poetry... especially the
early poetry of the 1950s, reflects, in part, some of the difficulties of articulating sexual difference in
the face of repressive social and cultural prohibitions. These prohibitions produce for gay men and
women a condition of social and cultural unacceptability that Ashbery might be responding to…”
(Imbriglio 257). What I have to add is a further reconstruction of the context that I think the work is
coding within and against, with some discussion of how Surrealism also plays in.

It’s not an exaggeration to say that by the end of the first third of the 20th century, language had
become the incorporeal organ of the psychological. While it was to be some years after Freud that the
unconscious would come to be described (by Lacan) as “structured like a language” (Gasperoni) most
means of access to it—if it exists—were and are linguistic. Using the dream’s reliance on syntagmatic
bits of waking life, strung together metaphorically and piled up metonymically, Freud made language
the road to psychical structure. Dream narrative, taken as means of access to the dream itself, became
a record of the patient’s conversion of drives into symbols. Interpretation converted them back again.
For the pre-Lacanian analyst, a particular dream-narrative, while not always necessarily seen as an
explicitly linguistic performance, was the product of a chain of associations, which were traced down
via lexical ambiguity, yielding up the condensed source material. Interpretation, here, depends on a
strong but ambiguous form of lexical and syntactic symbolism, where verbal descriptions of dream
objects and actions “stand for” something else, for the “truth” of the form one’s desire takes, and the
objects it settles upon. There is, however, a secret history of resistance in the US to the idea that
interpretation is the correct way to experience a dream, a desire, or psychic life in general. Some
Trees, beautiful on its own, is a part of that history. To put it another way, there is a history of US
resistance to the idea that “‘interpreting’ a dream implies assigning a ‘meaning’ to it” (Interpretation
170), a history of the idea that interpretation may be the wrong way to experience a dream, a desire,
or psychic life in general. US interpretations of psychoanalysis were often much harsher in their
pathologizing than Freud’s relative neutrality (Bayer). Freud, who thought homosexuality was
essentially environmentally or temperamentally stalled progress from an essential bisexuality to
hetero-identification, was skeptical about the possibility or value of trying to bring homosexuals into
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the hetero-fold. Despite Freud’s insistence that homosexuality “cannot be classified as an illness” and
that “[i]t is a great injustice to persecute homosexuality as a crime – and a cruelty, too” (Freud,
Letter), the US psychiatric establishment characterized homosexuality as a “deep disturbance” and set
out with “therapeutic zeal for its ‘cure’” (Hale 298). In resisting that, it is not far from Some Trees to
“an erotics of art” as called for 10 years later by Susan Sontag (Against Interpretation). The process of
historicizing the psychoanalytic and psychological constructs of mid-century America, the process of
recalling their pervasiveness and inextricability from ideas about identity, and ways of talking about it
continues, from frameworks like the “anti-psychological” (Pfister and Schnog) and on. At the same
time that psychological theories of language were tying the self to linguistic expression in ever closer
and arguably more repressive ways, theoretical and philosophical linguistics were moving further and
further away from views of language that made appeals to meaning in explaining the functions of words
and sentences. And linguist theory was showing up in psychology.

Four years after Freud’s 1909 lectures at Clark University in Massachusetts, J.B. Watson (1878-1958), a
psychologist at Johns Hopkins and editor of the Psychological Review, read his paper “Psychology as the
Behaviorist Views It” at Columbia University, and later that year published the paper in the Review
(Cohen). Claiming that psychology had “failed signally” to take its place “as an undisputed natural
science,” Watson placed the blame on the use of introspective method [reported feelings] and that
method’s assumption of underlying states of consciousness. What provoked Watson was the use of such
states to explain behavior—the argument that such states were behavior’s cause. Behaviorism, by
contrast, would look only to external causes and observable effects to account for behavior.
Behaviorism would, Watson argued, at once enable psychology to become a “purely objective branch of
natural science,” with its “theoretical goal” being nothing less than the “prediction and control of
behavior.” Watson went on to have a large impact on the culture-at-large, not only in his infamous
experiment with “Little Albert” (whereby a nine-month-old infant was taught to fear a rat by
associating it with a loud noise), but in his writing for popular magazines like Harper’s. His 10-page
article “The Analysis of Mind” appeared in a 1922 issue of the Dial, and thus reached the avant-garde.
Watson, after a marriage scandal, went into advertising (Cohen). Gertrude Stein’s Tender Buttons,
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published in 1914, a year after Watson’s “Psychology as a Behaviorist Views It,” was widely read, by a
young B.F. Skinner and others, as having accomplished the “destruction” of meaning, even as Stein’s
brother Leo was being psychoanalyzed (Wineapple). In the summer of 1933, sections of the
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas were published in the Atlantic Monthly; they mention her time
studying with William James at Harvard, and her work in his lab. In the January 1934 issue of the
Atlantic, B.F. Skinner published an attack on Stein, who, after attracting a flurry of popular press
attention in 1914 with Tender Buttons, was now, with the Autobiography, again a focal point for
debates about the merit of ‘modern’ art and writing (Leick). A lot was at stake. If Skinner could show
Stein’s writing to be simply automatic “verbal behavior,” rather than inspired artistic genius, then
much modernist practice would seemingly have no basis, given then prevailing ideas about
intentionality, art, and the artist (Will).

Recall that in Skinner’s behaviorism, it is the law of effect, rather than cause, that controls learning
and behavior. A cat’s reduced response time in getting to food in a maze is not due, for Skinner, to the
pleasure of getting it, since Skinner thought pleasure was a mental construct. It is that the actual
getting of the food “strengthens”—i.e. increases the probability of—the response. One cannot observe
the cat’s satisfaction, only its actions. Key controls to behavior lie in the environment, not in the
interior. Skinner, now at Harvard himself, dug up Stein’s 1896 article titled “Normal Motor
Automatism,” co-authored with one Leon M. Solomons, and proceeded to use it to deconstruct Stein’s
writing style (Watson).35 Skinner titled his paper “Has Gertrude Stein a Secret?” and argued that Stein’s
seeming stylistic innovations were nothing more than the mind’s equivalent of motor movements. If the
source of Stein’s perceived “unintelligibility” were “ordinary,” then Skinner could claim that it was
“more probable that meanings are not present, and that we need not bother to look for them” and
therefore that “there is no experimentation at the time the writing is produced.” Skinner refers to a
number of Stein’s works in his article, including Three Lives, Tender Buttons, An Elucidation and Lucy
Church Amiably. The article did not, obviously, succeed in destroying Stein or modernism. What I want
to highlight is that Skinner saw something in Stein’s work that reflected what he thought were his own
ideas, and thus could not help but put his work through her lens, over and over again. The major work
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of his early career, The Behavior of Organisms, would not appear until 1938. It explores Skinner’s
rejection of “pleasure” as explanatory of behavior, pairing it with Stein’s explicit incorporation of
pleasure in her essay “Poetry and Grammar,” with a detour through “Beyond the Pleasure Principle.”
The something that Skinner saw in Stein is probably something like an anti-psychological impulse, if by
psychology one means determinate meanings used to describe and explain behavior. A closer look at
Skinner and Stein is beyond the scope of the present work, but I want to register them both as unlikely
fellow resisters of US-based Freudian determinism.

At the time Stein was writing the Autobiography, she was also at work, in her notebooks, on Stanzas in
Meditation, which would not be published until 1956. Stein, who lived in Europe from the time of
Freud’s Clark lectures on, didn’t have to contend with the clinicizing atmosphere of America that
reached its height after World War II. John Ashbery departed as well, beginning a decade-long exile in
Stein’s beloved France in 1955, the year before the publication of Some Trees. He names the cultural
climate regarding homosexuality as a major cause (Shoptaw). Ashbery reviewed Stanzas in Meditation
in 1957 on the occasion of its being published by his own publisher, Yale University Press (Ashbery,
Impossible). It’s worth lingering over his opening paragraph:
This is the latest volume in the series of the unpublished writings of Gertrude Stein which the
Yale University Press has been bringing out regularly for the last decade. It will probably please
readers who are satisfied only by literary extremes, but who have not previously taken to Miss
Stein because of a kind of lack of seriousness in her work, characterized by lapses into dull,
facile rhyme; by the over-employment of rhythms suggesting a child’s incantation against
grownups; and by monotony. There is certainly plenty of monotony in the 150-page title poem
which forms the first half of this volume, but it is the fertile kind, which generates excitement
as water monotonously flowing over a dam generates electrical power. These austere “stanzas”
are made up almost entirely of colorless connecting words such as “where,” “which,” “these,”
“of,” “not,” “have,” “about,” and so on, though now and then Miss Stein throws in an orange,
a lilac, or an Albert to remind us that it really is the world, our world, that she has been
talking about. The result is like certain monochrome de Kooning paintings in which isolated
strokes of color take on a deliciousness they never could have had out of context, or a piece of
music by Webern in which a single note on the celesta suddenly irrigates a whole desert of dry,
scratchy sounds in the strings.
I don’t think Ashbery is merely rehearsing the set-up litany of complaints against Stein’s writing; he
seems rather to be venting passing feelings he has caught while reading her work over the years.
Ashbery was at a very different point in his career, but one can’t help noticing how much more
generous he finds a way to be in this introduction-like review than Auden was to Ashbery: there is no
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sentence like “[The work] generates excitement as water monotonously flowing over a dam generates
electrical power” anywhere in Auden’s piece. Although he doesn’t come out and say it, Ashbery implies
that the power is located somewhere in the relations between words that do not belong together
syntactically.

Pauline Kael may have had this sentence in mind in 1961 when she said of Billy Wilder’s One, Two,
Three that the comedy “pulls out laughs the way a catheter draws urine.” Also, when Ashbery says
“colorless” in 1957, one can’t help thinking “Colorless ideas sleep furiously”: Chomsky’s Syntactic
Structures was published the same year. Ashbery’s description of Stein’s Stanzas might apply equally to
something like the following:
“I was . . . in there . . . shooting some pool . . . I was in there shooting French . . . and . . . I .
. . touches . . . What’s his name put the 3-ball in the pocket.” (Sullivan 82)
Using a microphone “concealed by an ornamental piece” on his desk, psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan
(1892-1949) recorded his analytic sessions with some patients (Sullivan xxi). Sullivan, who was Director
of Clinical Research at Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Towson, Maryland, published “The
Peculiarity of Thought in Schizophrenia” in the American Journal of Psychiatry in 1925. It was the most
extensive published selection of schizophrenic discourse, along with case histories and examples of
analysis, ever for the time (Sullivan 23):
“Well, you’re smoking . . . you’re burning . . . your building is burning down . . . . symbolizes a
cigar. . . . in my mind . . . it symbolizes man.
“I slept with my brother ‘till after the war * * * that homosexual feeling H— spoke of. I’d tell
him . . . anything, and . . . it seemed I got worse and worse. All our actions and talks were
tensions between us, you see. It was on the morning of the eclipse . . . I was relating it to
myself . . . and the morning it came, I was wild, I thought I was dying or something. * * * I was
supposed to be in hell, I guess . . . and they had a language there; I’d hear things . . . I
couldn’t smoke a cigarette or drink water.” (Sullivan 82-83)
For Sullivan, as for Jung, dissociated schizophrenic thoughts “are products of ideas and feelings that
have been split off from waking consciousness and thus freed from the control of the ego” (Monte 312).
Most often, for Sullivan’s many male patients, the thoughts and feelings that required splitting off,
effecting a “unwitting recoil from the world” (Sullivan 96), were homosexual. Much of Sullivan’s
writing on schizophrenia centered on schizophrenic use of language. For Sullivan, language has a
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“peculiar” relationship to thought for the schizophrenic, being simultaneously the means of association
and dissociation in interpersonal relationships. The explicit thought-word-world link here is significant.
If a shared language is part of the social contract, then the schizophrenic’s inability to produce
discourse conforming to expectations of exchange is major source of his or her estrangement:
[N]ot your meaning of the word, but its meaning to the patient must govern its use. The latter
must be most often constructed from the contexts in which the word occurs in the patient’s
productions. When there are no data to help in this procedure, we are but bucking ourselves up
to talk about “scattered speech,” incoherence and so forth. In general, it is wise to be very
wary of conclusions based upon the use by a patient of words well known to be highly
ambiguous, or very diffuse in reference.” (Sullivan 89-90)
Sullivan was also the first to work through the implications of Jung’s analogy between schizophrenic
discourse and dream work, attempting to trace the chain of associations back to the source of
repression, as one would a with a dream (Kasanin). In “Peculiarity,” Sullivan describes the onset of
schizophrenia as the failure of “adjustment” in young men. For Sullivan, “factors” in 1920s US society
conspired to “effect castration of the boy” who, “loaded with dogma completely divorced from his
biological necessities,” is “taught more or less clearly that his hand on his penis is his hand against
God....” The boy is thus “confronted by a problem of no mean proportions” and “[i]t is not strange that
such boys attempt to carry on the late juvenile attitudes and to satisfy the new impulses by the stimuli
obtainable from members of their own sex. But this usually requires, in our so advanced society, an
infinity of rationalizations.” Sullivan’s interpretation is in line with Freud’s characterization of
homosexuality as a kind of arrested development, but Sullivan adds a coda that suggests that what is at
stake is more than “stimuli”: “Moreover, the homosexual love object all too frequently fails to ‘stay
put,’ and the youth is subjected to one disappointment after another” (Sullivan 95).

Sullivan was born and raised on a farm in Smyrna, New York, in south central Chenango county.
Ashbery was raised on a farm near Sodus, NY, in Wayne County. On August 3, 1947, in the Sunday New
York Times Book Review, the sometime poet and painter Lloyd Frankenberg, who became a friend of
Ashbery’s, published a review of Harry Stack Sullivan’s Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry
(Frankenberg). I have not yet been able to establish a definitive link between Ashbery and Sullivan,
who died just as Ashbery was graduating Harvard and beginning the poems of Some Trees, but
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Sullivan’s ideas about schizophrenic discourse, and its links to homosexuality had become the standard
thinking at the time within psychology, due to, as Frankenberg’s review makes clear, Sullivan’s
heralded ability to successfully treat some cases of schizophrenia, which had previously been thought
basically untreatable: Sullivan is the “psychiatrist who removed schizophrenia from the class of
necessarily incurable disorders.” Frankenberg quotes Sullivan’s definition of psychiatry as “the study of
what goes on between two or more people, only one of whom need not be illusory.” The “self” for
Sullivan, he continues, is “composed of ‘reflected appraisals’: it is constantly adjusting to the approval
and disapproval of others. To escape strong disapproval it will suppress whole systems of behavior by
shutting them out of awareness, or ‘disassociating’ them. … It is when these ‘dissociated tendencies’
come into conflict with the conscious self that we have major or minor disturbances characterized as
mental illness” (Frankenberg). Or, in the case of a supremely attuned poet, we get in the invention of
a poetic idiom.

The performance of coded mid-century queerness of Ashbery’s poem “A Boy” in Some Trees forms a
basis of John Shoptaw’s discussion of Ashbery’s early poetry. Shoptaw calls the poem “a tense
encounter in which patriarchal and nationalist pressures are deflected” where “Ashbery’s evasive
maneuvers against the enemy within are evident” (Shoptaw 8). Shoptaw finds this (self-)deflection
particularly in the deployment of “the homophonic, homophobic stereotype audible in [the poem’s]
last line,” where one hears “mincing fag” for “mincing flag.” Such “cryptography,” Shoptaw argues,
“cannot simply be equated with concealment” (ibid). He instead calls the poem a “misrepresentative”
(ibid 2) instance of “homotextuality” (ibid 4) that is a gesture of resistance: to mainstream culture, to
homophobia, and to the persecutions of the era.
A Boy
I’ll do what the raids suggest,
Dad, and that other livid window,
But the tide pushes an awful lot of monsters
And I think it’s my true fate.
It had been raining but
It had not been raining.
No one could begin to mop up this particular mess.
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Thunder lay down in the heart.
"My child, I love any vast electrical disturbance."
Disturbance! Could the old man, face in the rainweed,
Ask more smuttily? By night it charged over plains,
Driven from Dallas and Oregon, always whither,
Why not now? The boy seemed to have fallen
From shelf to shelf of someone’s rage.
That night it rained on the boxcars, explaining
The thought of the pensive cabbage roses near the boxcars.
My boy. Isn’t there something I asked you once?
What happened? It’s also farther to the corner
Aboard the maple furniture. He
Couldn’t lie. He’d tell ‘em by their syntax.
But listen now in the flood.
They’re throwing up behind the lines.
Dry fields of lightning rise to receive
The observer, the mincing flag. An unendurable age.
(Ashbery, Some Trees 32-33)
Code and coded messages were a pervasive trope from WWII films, and Ashbery was an avid filmgoer.
Ashbery wrote the poem “A Boy” after seeing John Huston’s film adaptation of The Red Badge of
Courage in December, 1951 and with the ongoing McCarthy hearings in explicitly mind (Shoptaw,
Roffman). Here is the voiceover that begins the film:
Stephen Crane wrote The Red Badge of Courage in 1894. From the moment it was published, it
was accepted by critics and public alike as a classic story of war, and of the boys and men who
fought war. Stephen Crane wrote his book when he was a boy of 22. Its publication made him a
man. Its story is of a boy who, frightened, went into a battle and came out of it... a man with
courage. More than that, it is a story of many frightened boys who went into a great Civil War
and came out... as a nation, of united, strong, and free men.” (Huston)
In the film, a young soldier “perform[s] his mistakes in the dark” (as the voice-over narration also tells
us) in order to find the sort of numb, non-courage to lead his regiment into battle, picking up the flag
that leads the troop when its original bearer is shot. Shoptaw writes that “[the poem] finally raises the
white badge of cowardice. The author behind these strange lines never quite surrenders them to
understanding” (5). While that can be argued, it is the lines “He/ couldn’t lie. He’d tell ‘em by their
syntax” that directly invite a schizophrenic interpretation of the poem’s language. “A Boy,” and other
poems in Some Trees, are not surrealist (in a sense to be defined shortly), and they are also not coded
in one-to-one fashion, or fully misrepresentative.
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The Catcher in the Rye was published in 1951. Chapter 19 finds Holden Caulfield meeting up with his
old student adviser Carl Luce, who “knew who every flit and Lesbian in the United States was.”
Holden, who has already voiced, extendedly, his suspicion that that Luce is closeted (Salinger 143),
asks Luce whether Luce’s psychoanalyst father ever psychoanalyzed him. Luce allows that his father
helped him “adjust myself” (ibid 148). Connections, at the time, between “homosexuality” (in the
pathological sense of the ‘50s) and a lack of psychological “adjustment”—i.e. the self that is
“constantly adjusting to the approval and disapproval of others”—were a given in the post-war US.
Homosexuality was, as is now widely known, listed in the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual for Mental Disorders, the American Psychological Association’s “official nomenclature of
disorders” (Bayer 12) first published in 1952. Taken there to be an undefined type of “pathologic
behavior,” homosexuality is one of a number of “Sociopathic personality disturbance[s]” with the
accepted diagnosis for “Sexual deviation”:
000-x63 Sexual deviation
This diagnosis is reserved for deviant sexuality which is not symptomatic of more extensive
syndromes, such as schizophrenic and obsessional reactions.
DEFINITION OF TERMS

The term includes most of the case formerly classed as “psychopathic personality with
pathologic sexuality.” The diagnosis will specify the type of the pathologic behavior, such as
homosexuality, transvestism, pedophilia, fetishism and sexual sadism (including rape, sexual
assault, mutilation).
(American Psychiatric Association 38-39)
The connections and perceived pathologies go deeper, in the thinking of the time, to disturbances that
manifest themselves linguistically as well as bodily. Recall that Freud’s main discussion of
schizophrenia centers on the memoir of the German judge Daniel Paul Schreber (Freud, Schreber).
There, Freud links Schreber’s elaborate fantasies of being “a woman submitting to the act of
copulation” to the lack of an outlet in his life for “normal homosexual affections” (57), or what one
might today still call homosocial desire—given the death of his father and brother, and his boy-childless
(in fact, any-childless), marriage. However finely wrought and carefully distinguishing Freud’s account
is, many US analysts, with lots of case histories to back them up, took the homosexuality-schizophrenia
link to be a cause-and-effect relationship, where one pathology begets another, larger-scale disorder.
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(See also: “hysteria.”) I think that “A Boy” explicitly ironizes the inability of the “homosexual” of the
30s-50s to pass from arrested development (Freud’s own take on the “why” of homosexuality) to
“mature sexuality.” This irony is present in the poem’s very pointedly disjunctive syntax, which can be
read as mirroring the failure of schizophrenic discourse, like that we’ve just seen, to progress from
parataxis to narrative—to develop. It’s a rhetorical gesture very similar to Gertrude Stein’s, and, as
when reading Stein, I think of it as a deliberate intervention: the language’s refusal to progress enacts
the poet’s own stance of refusal of repressive ideas of socio-sexual development. While all disjunctive
poetries can be read as “resistant,” Auden’s frustration with Some Trees points up the unfamiliarity of
Ashbery’s coded approach at the time.

Their “calculated oddities” are throwing the age’s calculations and equations—its “this means that”ness, its pressurized adjustments—back on themselves. It is in the poem’s syntax that “patriarchal and
nationalist pressures” come to bear on the boy, who must truthfully pony up his identity as if to a
house subcommittee. The non-accretive syntax of the poem, which resembles the seemingly unrelated,
strung together declaratives published and evaluated by Sullivan, really means it as it asks us to tell it
by its syntax; rather than raising the (false) flag of cowardice, “A Boy” can be read as a deliberate
courting of danger. If to be homosexual in the late 40s and early 50s was to have an institutionalizable
pathology, then a deliberate display of its symptoms, simultaneously is a sort of swagger or dare, a
challenge to the definitions and structures that make behavior so. The poem’s final line is one of the
great double-entendres of 20th century poetry: “An unendurable age.” It invokes the boy’s
adolescence, and the entire set of culturally proscribed choices available in the US of the 1950s.

The linguistic choices available to the poet of “A Boy” are all unacceptable for what he wants to say,
and so he resists with irony, with an interruption of the cultural telos. “This particular mess” and the
“vast electrical disturbance” of the poem can refer both to the poem itself, and to the seismic
upheavals within “the boy”—who “seem[s] to have fallen/ From shelf to shelf of someone’s rage”—rage
that, despite the perfection of its sublimation (or perhaps due to it), I think one can connect back to
the poet. Again: if a shared language is part of the social contract, then the schizophrenic’s inability to
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produce discourse conforming to expectations of exchange is major source of his or her estrangement.
And estrangement, in this poem, and in this book as a whole, is ironized completely. To go one step
further: if “[i]rony is the permanent parabasis of the allegory of tropes,” and if the “parabasis,” or
interruption, that defines irony is “not just at one point[,] but at all points,” (de Man 179) then the
ghosts, lexical and otherwise, that divert a poem’s seeming trajectory toward a familiar trope or
subject are irony’s vectors. In poetry, where “irony is everywhere” (ibid) one must read each word,
each sound unit, each phrase, as containing the interruption of the poem’s own telos, and, by
extension, of culture’s. “A Boy” thus “interrupts”— to use de Man’s own gloss on “parabasis”—a
number of mid-century discourse norms and established lyric tropes at once.

The critic Nikki Skillman has recently codified the term “mindlessness” to describe a generative
evasiveness and negation in Ashbery’s later work:
Ashbery evokes mental life in its wholeness through constant negation, relishing the
possibilities of the incomplete. Ashbery’s unawareness, his forgetfulness, his narrowness of
vision, his distractibility, his failures of comprehension, are qualities I condense in the term
“mindlessness”—a condition he ascribes to objects and people alike, declining to distinguish
between nonconsciousness of insentient matter and the forms of inattention and noncomprehension that distinguish the “experience of experience,” his major theme. From
Ashbery’s first book… to his more recent ones, this mindlessness retains a close association
with the resistant surfaces of the object world… (Skillman 169)
Whatever one might want to do with this as a lens for looking at Ashbery’s work, what I want to pick up
on is here is that the “negation” at work, as already seen in “A Boy,” has specific psychological and
linguistic qualities in Some Trees, qualities that come further in focus when looking at an Ashbery
review of a 1968 MoMA exhibition of surrealism, where Ashbery points out that Breton’s banner of
liberté total included
every conceivable kind of sexual act except for homosexuality. ... This exception may seem
unimportant, since homosexuality affects a relatively small fraction of humanity, but to
restrict something proclaimed as ‘total’ is to turn it into its limited opposite. (Reported
Sightings 50)
For de Man, “submit[ting] the evaluation of a certain ironic moment in history to its place in history”
(183), i.e. describing of the particulars of the work’s situation, is how one connects works of art back
to the conditions from which they emerged. Auden had tried to do this, in a way, by repeatedly tagging
Ashbery and O’Hara, in various contexts, with Surrealist influence. But it turns out that, while a
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surface influence (in terms of the similarity of the surface codes) is certainly there, deeper affinities
are not. The surreal quality in Some Trees, the dream-life of the would-be Roussel scholar, is negated
throughout.

Ashbery’s refusal of the surrealist tag has been documented (Suarez-Toste). Theorist Hal Foster has
elaborated on surrealism’s ultimate failures in achieving its own aims. As a movement of “love and
liberation,” it used “related sets of complex practices...[and] involvements in desire and sexuality”
designed to get at “an unconscious based on originary unity rather than primal repression” (Foster 3).
Breton’s idea of the unconscious was removed from Freud’s conflictual forces: “a champ magnétique of
associations registered through automatist [practice]... a synthetic end rather than dissociative means”
(ibid). What was one supposed to find when one got down to the magnetic field of associations
operating outside of one’s conscious control? A path to our true selves, to self-understanding and
freedom from repression. Foster finds, however, that surrealist work “exceeds its self-understanding”;
what it isolates within the unconscious is not an essential unity, but “the uncanny... a concern with
events in which repressed material returns in ways that disrupt unitary identity, aesthetic norms, and
social order” (xvii). While the latter effects were not necessarily a bad thing, the determination of the
surrealists to reach bottom took them too far, for they failed to realize that their practices “might not
be liberatory at all, not because [they] voided the controls of the (super)ego (such was its express
purpose) but because [they] decentered the subject too radically in relation to the unconscious” (4-5).
Foster finds late Freudian psychoanalytic structures (the uncanny; the death drive) driving this
fundamental dissociation. Ashbery and his predecessors, like Elizabeth Bishop, are often mentioned as
either surrealist or influenced by surrealism. The strict senses of those claims—that the work is actually
surrealist, or has surrealist aims—are demonstrably false, and it’s worth looking at the mechanics of
why, as it has bearing on the general anti-psychological quality of Some Trees.

André Breton’s 1932 poem “Le grand secours meurtrier,” a haunting meditation “en qualité de
convulsionnaire” can be justifiably called characteristic of the US dissemination of surrealist output.
Along with its publication in Breton’s 1932 collection Le Revolver à cheveux blancs, it appeared in This
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Quarter’s surrealist number that same year, and was chosen by Julien Levy for Surrealism, a 1936
collection that was the culmination of various explicitly surrealist exhibitions at Levy’s gallery in the
30s; in his introduction to a facsimile edition, Mark Polizotti notes that it was the first collection to
include a contemporarily representative range of surrealist output from Ernst to Éluard, Dalí to
Duchamp, for US readers (Levy). It was a particular touchstone for the young John Ashbery: after
seeing an article on the Surrealism exhibition in Life magazine in 1936 (at the age of nine), he asked to
be taken to the Rochester Central Library, where he found and devoured a copy of Surrealism that
December (Roffman 40). Paul Éluard reports that “Le grand secours meurtrier” was a piece of
automatic writing, and that “Breton had no idea what its subject would be when he sat down to write”
(Bohn 112). In Surrealism, the poem, titled “Lethal Relief,” is found only in translation, done by one
Samuel Beckett, whose debut novel, Murphy, would appear two years later, in 1938. It is an astonishing
translation, not just for Beckett’s adaptation of Breton’s tone to English, but for its highlighting of the
central problem faced by the seeming speaker of the poem, and, perhaps, by surrealist poets
generally: namely, in an attempt to get at the real, unmitigated ‘stuff’ of the psychological, how can
one stage the self in verse while at the same time explicitly undermine its ego structures?

“Lethal Relief” begins with a paratactic inventory of objects and figures that form a disjunctive
allegory of the state of French poetry:
Breton:
La statue de Lautréamont
Au socle de cachets de quinine
En rase campagne
L’auteur des Poésies est couché à plat ventre
Et près de lui veille l’héloderm suspect
Son oreille gauche appliquée au sol est une boîte vitrée
Occupée par un éclair l’artist n’a pas oublié de faire figurer au-dessus de lui
(Breton 99)
Beckett:
The statue of Lautréamont
Its plinth of quinine tabloids
In the open country
The author of the poetical works lies flat on his face
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And near at hand the hiloderm a shady customer
keeps vigil
His left ear is glued to the ground it is a glass case
it contains
A prong of lightning the artist has not failed to
figure aloft
(Levy 106)
The poem continues without punctuation, reeling off figure after figure, association after association:
“Le ballon bleu ciel en forme de tête de Turc/ Le cygne de Montévidéo dont les ailes sont déployées”
The notes to Breton’s Oeuvres Completes point to Paris statues, extant before WWI but replaced soon
after, of the chemists who isolated quinine (Breton). Breton has replaced the “missing” statues with a
single imaginary one of the surrealist father-figure, Lautréamont. Few of the poem’s similarly
complicated resonances detailed in the notes would seemingly have been available to contemporary US
readers: minor fallen Parisian landmarks, the history of 16th century religious “convulsionary” practice
in France, even the poem itself en version originale. The difference, then, between Auden’s
“authentic non-logical relations which arouse wonder” and “accidental ones which arouse mere
surprise and in the end fatigue” depends on the reception context, on what one knows and doesn’t
know when reading, at least in some cases. Beckett, for his part, has located the source of the
narrator’s detachment precisely in the paratactic nature of his descriptions. The structure is flat; there
are no subordinate clauses, and prepositional phrases get their own lines. “I” am objectified, implied
only, an onlooker, a watcher of my own dream, a movie-goer in that much of what “I” do in the poem
is reel off observed details without comment.

Along with Foster, the theorist Rosalind Krauss has extensively documented surrealism’s engagement
with psychoanalysis, particularly with dream-work and fantasy (Suarez-Toste). For my purposes, I
would point to the direct similarities between the structure of the above poem, and the structure of
the dream narrative as written within psychoanalytic discourse. Before any interpretation of dreams
could be done, the patient had to be trained to “keep track” of his/her “involuntary” thoughts. In the
famous piece of self-analysis that inaugurates “The Interpretation of Dreams,” Freud states that “I
myself can do so very completely, by the help of writing down my ideas as they occur to me” (Freud
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136). The resulting descriptions of dreams and scenes were written in a characteristic formula. Short,
paratactic, with no analysis (that would come later), scenes were narrativized, but from the
perspective of a writer-as- onlooker with no control over events, of a movie-goer:
-- She then opened her mouth properly and on the right I found a big white patch; at another
place I saw extensive whitish grey scabs upon some remarkable curly structures which were
evidently modelled on the turbinal bones of the nose.--I at once called in Dr. M., and he
repeated the examination and confirmed it...My friend Otto was now standing beside her as
well, and my friend Leopold was percussing her through her bodice... (Freud, Interpretation
139-40)
One can hear paratactic echoes of Freud’s dream/memory descriptions in the above poem. It would
seem that it was not just the content of psychoanalytic theory that can be discerned in the content of
the surrealism, but that the form its explorations took may have been inspirational as well. The “I”
produced in such narratives carries over, as does the feel of a set “scene.” Beckett’s attention to the
tone, however, does not prepare us for his key act of interpretation, which transforms these lines:
J’ai accèss près de lui en qualité de convulsionnaire
Les femmes ravissantes qui m’introduisant dans le wagon capitoné de roses
Où un hamac qu’elles ont pris soin de me faire a de leurs cheveleurs m’est réservé
De toute éternité
(Breton 99)
into these:
Convulsionary in ordinary I have access to his side
The ravishing women who introduce me into the
rose-padded compartment
where a hammock they have been at pains to contrive
with their tresses for
Me is reserved for
Me for all eternity
(Levy 106)
When the “I” appears here, for the first time in the poem, it is rather helpless before the idealized,
erotic, maternal image; “maternal plenitude” is typical of surrealism (Foster 25). The poet fails to fully
totalize the images and figures he has become subject to; the “I” fails to unify its own perceptions.
Beckett, by putting “Me” at the beginning of the lines here, where in the French the first person direct
object pronoun is attached to the verb and buried in the middle of the lines, emphasizes this failure. It
can be read as a direct comment by the translator on the poet’s lack of irony in grasping after some
sort of symbolist unity-within-woman, a wish for a female source of “relief.” The original lines do not
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seem to have this effect (at least, not as powerfully). However, note the line directly following: “Me
recommandant avant de partir de ne pas prendre froid dans le lecture du journal”; Beckett begins his
translation “Exhort me...,” which may in fact emphasize the first person slightly less strongly than the
French line. The line may also have been Beckett’s inspiration for moving the “Me”s of the previous
lines to the fore. At any rate, Beckett did transform the previous lines radically. Echoes of Shelley’s
“The Triumph of Life” here are also almost certainly deliberate:
—I among the multitude
Was swept—me, sweetest flowers delayed not long;
Me, not the shadow nor the solitude,
Me, not the falling stream’s Lethean song;
Me, not the phantom of that early Form
Which moved upon its motion—but among
The thickest billows of that living storm
I plunged, and bared my bosom to the clime
Of that cold light, whose airs too soon deform.
I bring “Lethal Relief” into play as a poem that Ashbery read at a very young age, and almost certainly
re-read. And the poem seems to have had a discernable influence on one of Ashbery’s biggest early
influences: Elizabeth Bishop. Bishop was also often tagged, in her early work, as a “surrealist.”
Shoptaw notes that Ashbery has said he “read, re-read, studied and absorbed” Bishop’s North & South
and its sestina, “A Miracle For Breakfast” before writing his own sestina, “The Painter” which Shoptaw
says is dated July 17, 1948, making it the earliest poem of Ashbery’s to be included in Some Trees
(Shoptaw 28-29).36 Bishop’s early formalist poems address the above problem by revealing the
question—in an attempt to liberate oneself from repression, how can one stage the self in verse while
at the same time explicitly undermine its ego structures—to be the wrong one. “A Miracle for
Breakfast,” first published in Poetry in July of 1937, is just one of several poems in Bishop’s first
collection which use familiar verse forms to heightened grammatical effect, especially in her use of
pronouns. Its reception has included the same sort of folk conception of surrealism that Auden used to
tag Ashbery:
Interviewer: I wonder if you could reveal the donée for your sestina called “A Miracle for
Breakfast.” It has an attractive surrealist quality about it, but I’m curious about the kind of
experience that brought the poem into being.
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Miss Bishop: Oh, that’s my Depression poem. It was written shortly after the time of souplines
and men selling apples, around 1936 or so. It was my “social conscious” poem, a poem about
hunger. (Monteiro 18)
As Bishop’s “poem about hunger,” begins, the poet-speaker is included among the “we” who are
“waiting for coffee and the charitable crumb/ that was going to be served from a certain balcony.”
The poem continues permuting the end-words—coffee, crumb, balcony, miracle, sun, river—and with
each repetition they start to lose their commonplace associations. After imaging that the coffee would
be hot enough to warm them, and that the bit of bread they were to receive would by miraculously be
buttered, the poem takes its turn. A man “step[s]” onto the regal balcony (“like kings of old”) and
proceeds to crumble a single roll into the waiting hands of those below (one crumb per person, which
“some flicked scornfully into the river”), and pour down a single drop of coffee for each. It is not just
the regulated repetitions and word appearances of “A Miracle for Breakfast” that produce this
“surreal” act; it is the dissonance produced by seeing the antagonism of possession vs. dispossession
described, deadpan, in matter-of-fact terms that repeat like conveyor-belt items, and end in a
dispossessed fantasy of possession:
I can tell what I saw next; it was not a miracle.
A beautiful villa stood in the sun.
and from its doors came the smell of hot coffee.
In front, a baroque white plaster balcony
added by birds, who nest along the river,
—I saw it with one eye close to the crumb—
and galleries and marble chambers. My crumb
my mansion, made for me by a miracle,
through ages, by insects, birds, and the river
working the stone. Every day, in the sun,
at breakfast time I sit on my balcony
with my feet up, and drink gallons of coffee.
When the “I” emerges, in the fifth stanza, it does not signify the poet’s “true” persona, but rather a
negation of the significations of the previous four stanzas. The imagery of the poem is surreal: not just
in the uncannily ornate villas, the real one and the imagined, appearing within this scene of
desperation, but in the fact that the imagined one has been constructed “through ages, by insects,
birds, and the river”—making dispossession a fact of life in geologic time. The imagery is not being used
to undermine the ego structures of the speaker, but rather to highlight the contradictions of actual
existing outer reality. The poems of Some Trees, none of which, according to Shoptaw, was written
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before the sestina “The Painter,” adapt Bishop’s formalism and her use of shifting pronouns, not only
in the poem just mentioned, but in poems like “He” and “Pantoum.” Both Bishop and Ashbery seem to
pick-up on surrealism’s failed diction and marshal a de-psychologized version of it, one that is thus not
really “surrealist” at all. (The “insects, birds, and the river/ working the stone” in “A Miracle For
Breakfast” find an echo in the “baskets, birds, beetles, spools” of Some Trees’ poem “Sonnet,” one of
two poems with that title in the book, a practice perhaps derived from O’Hara’s multiple poems titled
“Poem.”)

Bishop’s “From the Country to the City,” written during her stay in Paris in the 1930s (Goldensohn), at
the height of surrealism, is a starker case in point. Its elegant arrangement of the lines on the page,
studded with complicated end-rhymes and elaborate assonance and alliteration, twists along, in the
poem’s opening sentence, filling out more than a third of its total bulk. The length of the sentence is
underscored as such by the lack of capital letters at the beginning of each line; they are “the lines/
that we drive on.” Though the print of the harlequin’s costume forms a pattern, it “carries the city
nowhere,” is meaningless and unable to convey anything but the harlequin’s own mute form. Anything
we try to inscribe on such a body is “nonsensical” and does violence to the dumb form’s mock
splendor. The description unravels as the costume seems to have, details are piled up by a “neutral
‘we’ whom we accept as the necessary plural of ‘I’”—as Ashbery himself notes in discussing Bishop’s
work (Ashbery, Bishop Complete). Yet the observer registering or reporting these fantastic details has
no need to point them toward an epiphany, or some emergent structure that, while not fully revealing
itself, might be glimpsed. If there is a “poet” presence here, it is one that is there only to make us
“conscious of the inevitable mediations of selfhood, the intrusions of the “I,” that make direct contact
with any literality—with any truth—an impossibility” (Edelman 182). The harlequin and the poem here
might be the same figure, each bedecked in meaningless splendor (gold lamé; assonance and
alliteration: “...throned ‘fantastic triumph’ ...shines through his hat” etc.), each aware that they are
incapable of communicating anything beyond their own form. “We” then come closer, and actually
peer into the mind of this “wickedest clown,” finding, inside, the sort of “ravishing sirens,/ each
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waving her hand-mirror” we might expect from surrealism. However, these wild reflections seem
contained here; what draws our attention are the “telephone wires” of the road:
Flocks of short, shining wires seem to be flying sideways.
Are they birds?
They flash again. No. They are vibration of the tuning-fork
you hold and strike
Against the mirror-frames, then draw for miles, your dreams
out countrywards,
We bring a message from the long black length of body:
“Subside,” it begs and begs.
Dreams, here, are vibrations, meaningless, if slightly menacing, sounds that are saturated with desire—
not portentous, symbol laden harbingers. What’s holding the poem together here, holding together
images one might be tempted to deem “surrealist,” is the combination of form (the poem itself as a
“long black length of body) and a blank “we” which associates them through “its” perceptions without
connecting them to its own drives. Whereas the statue of Breton’s poet, with which the poet himself
was bodily associated, was “tuned each night like a piano,” the “tuning fork/ you hold and strike” is
observed by the poet here, without him/her experiencing it, or feeling the repercussions. Dreams lead
back to the body, not the “self.” The final rhyme of “begs” with the opening “legs” deepens the
somatic pangs of the line; the harlequin seems lit up and shorted out, a spectacle off-course, out of
place when pointed “countrywards.” Perhaps it is the dream impulse, the impulse to compress meaning
within a structure which cannot articulate the forces which produced it, that is being ordered down.
Bishop’s move is to remove the implication of repressed content from even the headiest of symbols.
What “we” get is an extended definition of a phenomenon, rather than its effects on the speaker. The
abject, observing “I” of surrealism is transformed into an “I” capable of play, of the diffusion of
(sexual) impulse. The empty structures of poetic form are perhaps more generative than automatic
writing, since they allow the simultaneous subversion and retention of the ego, so thoroughly
undermined in a poem like “Le grand secors meurtrier.”

In Some Trees, “The Mythological Poet” captures an emptiness similar to “From the Country to the
City”—ironically by describing “a form/ So rarified there was no emptiness/ of sensation”—and
purposefully ascribes it to the voice of classical poetry. In its opening lines, “snow-capped mountains
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and heart shaped/ Cathedral windows,” seem more like distant, idealized forms than actual world
objects—tokens not of this world. However, we begin to suspect that world does in fact intrude on this
ritual, as the speaker(s) must leave an actual space, stopping to “pack[] the picnic basket.” In the
second stanza, we become aware that the entire poem is a case of reported speech, rather than an
address to reader by the “us” of the poem, in that the third person plural is introduced. Thus someone
(the mythological poet?) is watching, or has watched, this scene for us. The “lighter than the air”
participants realize that they, at any rate, have not been able to transcend “the world of things”; it is
“beside” them, even though “they do not sustain” it. The world, in fact, “rages like a virgin” at the
speakers’ attempt to transcend it, at their shunning of physical contact. In finally allowing it contact
with their “silken thoughts,” their isolated “trellis” collapses, and “a new music, innocent and
monstrous” is created. It sickens them, and they thus recognize in this new music “a warning we were
not meant to understand.”

The failure to “understand” stems from an inability to admit the world, and the world of desire, to
their thoughts and actions, and to then attempt to “touch” it from without, hermetic explorers. The
subject of this poem, then, is, partially, the impossibility of hermetic poetry (discussed further in the
next chapter). Any attempt at transcendence carries the world “beside” it, in the form of a shunned
lover. The “warning” felt by the speakers is contained in the poem itself, in the “world of things” it
admits. We then find out, in section II, what has become of Auden’s poet of antiquity, the one who has
existence since before this cleave: “He has eloped with all music and does not care.” This is a
mythological poet who is trying to mediate this lover’s quarrel:
...he is merely
An ornament, a kind of lewd
Cloud placed on the horizon. (47)
Beauty is taken in antiquity as an essence, as something that exists beyond its vessels. Thus, in the
moment where the actual song of the muse is received, the poet, in this view, is little more than a
distortion in the circuit of transmission of meaning, “a cloud placed on the horizon.” We can
understand then, that “close to the zoo, acquiescing to dust, candy, perverts,” this poet, too, has

136

fallen for the world, less virginal here. In the interest of this corrupted “final diversion” which is
“greater because it can be given”
Might not child and pervert
Join hands, in the instant
Of their interest, in the shadow
Of a million boats; their hunger
from loss grown merely a gesture?
This art is “greater” for its contact with the world; it might even be a reclamation of “essence.” It is
no longer clear who is the child and who is the pervert, each side hungering for previous completeness
of expression. The poems of Some Trees reflect a deepening awareness that meaning remains in
structure when the natural associations of words have been stripped from them. The poems, in
conceiving of language (and of a language of desire) in the above fashion, directly reflect the direction
linguistic theory was taking in the early 1950’s: a skepticism of meaning as extension, and of a belief in
the autonomy of structure. In the next chapter, I will detail some of its period articulations.
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Chapter 7: “Baskets, Birds, Beetles, Spools”: Ashbery, O’Hara,
and Three 1950s Views of Meaning and Reference37
What I claim is to live to the full contradiction of my time, which may very well make sarcasm
the condition of truth.
—Roland Barthes, 1957

Gerald Bruns, in 1974, traced the history of the split between the ideal and the particular in literature,
particularly within modernist poetry and poetics. In Bruns’s terminology, poetry of the ideal is
“hermetic”: a hermetic work functions “as a self-contained linguistic structure” which in its “pure
expressiveness” seeks “to displace or arrest the function of signification” (Bruns 1). It does so through
the use of formalism, as well as through subverting “the structures of ordinary discourse,” the idea
being that in suppressing meaning through use of form, both language itself and any reference
language may make to a world are transcended. By contrast, “orphic” poetry tries to come as close as
possible to actual reference; it takes “poetic speech as the ground of all signification—an expressive
movement which ‘objectifies’ a world for man...or establishes the world within the horizon of human
knowing” (ibid). The latter is taken to enable near absolute signification, in that it names from within
experience. Naming thus allows reference from without, coming as close as possible to its object, if
not becoming it. I want to apply this distinction in looking at some differences in approach between
the 1950s poems of Ashbery and O’Hara, and at theories of language and meaning from the era. I am
not making a strong cause-and-effect argument in either direction between the poetry and the
theories, but rather seeking a kind of historical description and theoretical norm translation of the
moment (for which Bruns’s later distinction also seems productive). Doing so, I think, clarifies some of
the poems of Some Trees, and also Auden’s evident discomfort with them.

What troubled Auden was Ashbery’s failure to completely “reconcile truth to nature with accuracy of
communication.” That is what led to the charges of surrealism. Some Trees is largely hermetic. The
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objects in Ashbery’s poems are not to be depended upon. In “Glazunoviana” the poet sets up a sort of
diorama of staged objects, a Cornell box on which a small scene is played out.
The man with the red hat
And the polar bear, is he here too?
The window giving on shade,
Is that here too?
And all the little helps
My initials in the sky,
The hay of an arctic summer night? (34)
In setting up this scene, and placing himself “here” as observer, the poet gives the reader a false sense
of security. I, at least, feel comfortable within the confines of this expansive yet restrained and set of
images, a kind of peopling. (The arctic hay makes me think of idealized reindeer.) So one is unprepared
when “The bear/ Drops dead in sight of the window” and the poet simply continues adding to the
image:
Lovely tribes have just moved to the north.
In the flickering evening the martins grow denser.
Rivers of wings surround us and vast tribulation.
It is to work against the poem to try to pull narrative content from it. If one reflects, however, on the
scene as it is constructed, a bear is “in sight” of the window, that is, on the other side of the window
from the poet. I read this as a kind of joke: both “real” reference and its extension (maybe as in
surrealism) fail, but one can still write lyric poetry, even if the things of it are fake (in reality and
psychically). The poem’s final line is disruptive; is it that “rivers of wings” surround both the poet and
the reader, or the poet and the objects he has gathered around him, as well as surrounding “vast
tribulation”? The “and” in the line is thus unsettling—where one expects a preposition, there is an
extension of the province of the wings to a non-concrete term, a seeming impossibility. The signal here
is that the dead bear, in the poem, is a dead orphic bear.

O’Hara’s poems unfailingly use “the particular, the individual, and the secular” (as Auden puts it in his
Some Trees introduction)—icons of the everyday—in an attempt to grasp experience by naming it. They
communicate on the ground of experience instead of attempting to transcend it:
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Radio
Why do you play such dreary music
on Saturday afternoon, when tired
mortally tired I long for a little
reminder of immortal energy?
All
week long while I trudge fatiguingly
from desk to desk in the museum
you spill your miracles of Grieg
and Honegger on shut-ins.
Am I not
shut in too, and after a week
of work don’t I deserve Prokofieff?
Well, I have my beautiful de Kooning
to aspire to. I think it has an orange
bed in it, more than the ear can hold.
“Radio,” published in March of 1956, contains the following objects which refer to the real world: “the
museum” (New York’s Museum of Modern Art, where O’Hara was a special assistant in the International
Program); “Grieg”; “Honegger”; “Prokoffieff”; “de Kooning”; and perhaps “Saturday afternoon” (in
that one must know what it signifies within the western workweek), as well as a narrative of the
speaker’s life with them. The poem talks, using the phatic devices of spoken discourse (“Well, I
have...”), and the simple nominative declarative (“I long”; “I trudge”; “I have”; “I think”). In order to
know what sort of “miracles” the speaker finds tiresome in O’Hara’s “Radio,” one must be familiar
with the world of composers that it mentions. If here “it is by the means of poetry that the world finds
itself present before man” (Bruns 3), then orphic poetry relies on the power of names. Naming, here,
differs from reference, in that it goes beyond mere type (O’Hara did not say “your miracle of late
romantic composers”) to token (Grieg et. al.), the difference between denotation and designation
(Quine, Quiddities 180). In order for such to tokens to have meaning for a reader, they must be
designated within the reader’s actual experience. Orphic poetry is often seen as “lower” than hermetic
because of this higher dependency on the world of things, on the writer and reader’s common
experience with certain particulars. O’Hara’s poem does not work properly on me, not having heard
Grieg or Honegger, and also not knowing anything about their particular personal histories (which may
have something to do with why O’Hara wanted them specifically at that moment). A cursory Web
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search didn’t really help. In this way, orphic poetry requires a kind of norm translation, or something
beyond it. And orphic poetry does not depend only on tokens, for one must be familiar with the general
sound of what one might call late romantic composers in order for the poem to be present in even a
less specified way. Both denotation and designation depend on the world.

W.V.O Quine attempted to make a distinction between tokens of experience and denotation (including
associations), in his “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” which appeared in 1951:
Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some
fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings
independently of matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The
other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some
logical construct upon terms which refer to some immediate experience. (Two Dogmas 20)
As Quine relates it, analytic truths have been taken to mean relations between entities that hold in “all
possible worlds,” meaning truths that would hold even if the most fundamental properties of the
universe were to change—truths that hold “independently of matters of fact.” Being “grounded in
meanings” rather than “grounded in matters of fact,” analytic truths hold from within a self-defined
set of parameters, subject only to the internal relations among predicates, and not to the world. The
analytic/synthetic distinction thus mirrors that of hermetic/orphic poetry. Any theory of meaning, for
Quine, must be “sharply distinguished” from theories of reference, in that the theory of meaning must
not be dependent on any connection with an object of reference, any “thing” or class of things. Orphic
poetry, then, can be said to depend on the success of reference in order for its meanings to come into
being, while purely hermetic poetry needs no such guarantee.

In trying to get at analytic truths, Quine distinguishes between meaning and reference. It is a move
made in philosophy to assure the analyticity of meaning; reference is necessarily non-analytic—it
engages, somehow, with the world. Within the tradition in which Quine works, denotation and
designation are part and parcel of the same function: reference. The former is performed by “general”
terms—common nouns, adjectives, intransitive verbs—and the latter by a singular term or proper names
(Quiddities 180). However, “whereas a singular term purports to name an entity, abstract or concrete,
a general term does not; but a general term is true of an entity, or of each of many, or of none” (Two
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Dogmas 27). Thus, naming (picking out a particular) and denotation (picking out a class of particulars)
are accomplished by separate but analogous means. A name, or a singular noun with a definite article,
designates its object in a more direct fashion than a general term, in that the latter denotes a relation
among or within particulars, rather than particulars themselves, creating a sort of second order
reference, a class. Both kinds of reference, Quine claims, are subject to confused treatment, because
they are conflated with meaning. It is a confusion, he says (almost echoing Auden), that dates back to
Aristotle, where things themselves were thought to have essences, which were taken to be meaningful
properties. For Quine, however, “Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object
of reference and wedded to the word” (Two Dogmas 26). Quine’s critique is aimed at the notion of
analytic truth itself. Meaning and reference are to be kept quite separate, as terms that seem to
designate or denote the same things can differ in meaning. Consider Quine’s example of general terms
which can be imagined to pick out the same class of things: “creature with a heart” and “creature with
kidneys.” While each of these terms might be used to denote the same thing, say, a rabbit, no one
would want to say that just because both terms can be used to pick out a rabbit that the terms mean
the same thing. Such terms are called co-extensive in that the objects terms refer to in the world are
called extensions. The same confusion can arise over names: Quine reminds us of Russell’s comparison
of “Scott” to “the author of Waverley”: same extension, different meaning.

The distinction between designation and denotation is clarified by the substitution I proposed earlier in
O’Hara’s poem “Radio.” “Honegger” and “Grieg” are designations, picking out particulars, rather
directly hooked up to their objects. The general term “late romantic composers” denotes a class, a
relation within or among particulars, cut off from things in themselves. Thus one can, with Bruns,
recognize the orphic technique of naming as an attempt to directly engage the world, to reify it, to
evoke extensions as completely as possible. For orphic poetry, a name will always be stronger than a
general term, even though the latter can also be concrete. Ashbery mocks the possibility and intent of
such poetry in Some Trees’ “Meditations of a Parrot,” where a creature of empty talk rattles off a list
of particulars sacred to him:
Oh the rocks and the thimble
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The oasis and the bed
Oh the jacket and the roses. (73)
By placing these words in a parrot’s mouth, Ashbery strips them of any significance, mythical or
otherwise; they become a sort of orphic shell, a null lyric discourse. He uses the juxtapositions not as
an end in itself, but rather to show that the “possible world” in which a parrot’s talk is meaningful is
identical to our own—all words fall equally short of their objects and significances. There is no
possibility of their having “meaningful properties.”

“Two Dogmas,” can shed further light on the jacket, roses, and thimble. One finds analyticity, the idea
that a statement may remain true in all possible worlds, placed there not within reference, but within
meaning: “a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact”
(26). Quine distinguishes two types of analytic statements:
(a)
(b)

No unmarried man is married
No bachelor is married

Sentence (a) is analytic because its “truth value” is not dependent on the adjective “married.” When
Quine says “true” in his definition of analyticity, what he means is “logically true”—the truth of the
logician, not the epistemologist—where every declarative sentence can be assigned the ethically
neutral value T or F. The syntax of sentence (a) is such that the adjective “married” is the only term
that has referential meaning. Should that meaning be different in some other “possible world” the
truth value of sentence (a) remains the same: T. Such sentences are unproblematic for the formal
semantics Quine is assuming. Sentence (b), however, is troublesome because it contains the noun
“bachelor” which cannot be substituted for by just any other term and still remain logically true. While
one can substitute the synonym “unmarried man” for “bachelor” and convert the sentence into a
logically true one, one can find no satisfying way of proving such sentences analytic directly.

Two facets of Quine’s argument need concern one here. First, Quine argues that the reason that one
can even make substitutions of the above kind within statements is simply because “any two predicates
which agree extensionally (that is, are true of the same objects) are interchangeable” in the above
fashion. For Quine, one cannot be sure that such exchanges can be made on the basis of meaning,
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rather than “matters of fact”: extension. That is, any appeal to analyticity in such cases is unfounded,
for one has no way of knowing if the substitution is allowed because the statement is “analytic” (the
term Quine is trying to make sense of) or because agreement in extensionality, in “accidental matters
of fact,” allows their use in the same context (Two Dogmas 31). This holds even in “counter-factual”
instances involving terms such as “unicorn” in that such terms have their extension in the conditions of
some possible world. Secondly, if one tries to appeal to the notion of definition by saying that
“bachelor” is “defined” as “an unmarried man” purely in terms of meanings, one is simply
recapitulating principles of use—for any conception of definition rests on pre-existing conditions of
use—describing the way words are used rather than affixing meaning to them.

As noted earlier, Some Trees includes two poems entitled “Sonnet” (a practice perhaps derived from
O’Hara’s multiple poems titled “Poem”); in the first one finds statements of the form X is Y, the very
sort of identity statement used by philosophers in the analyticity debate: “The servant’s frown is the
reader’s patience”; “His pain is the servant’s alive” and “Traffic is the reader’s pictured face” are all
statements for which it would be impossible to either confirm or disconfirm analyticity. Reading them
through analyticity, they serve to show that it is in use that words acquire identity, and that it is
possible neither to fully entangle nor disentangle that use from the world. This poem, too, has a sort of
narrative, in which one moves from “each servant” to “the servant,” one whose properties, such as
“patience,” are detachable, much as in language, where one may speak of it as an entity itself,
perhaps as having virtues of its own. It is no accident that the poem contains a library, soon to collapse
under the alliterative weight of nature: “baskets, birds, beetles, spools.” Is it “the reader” in the
poem, or of the poem, who is addressed?:
Dear, be the tree your sleep awaits;
Worms be your words, you not safe from ours. (49)
“Our” words here recalls schizophrenic discourse as a stand-in for queer speech as discussed in the
previous chapter. If “our” words make a series of substitutions: “frown” becomes “patience”; “pain”
becomes an “alive”; “traffic” becomes one’s imagined visage, then here, straights are not “safe” from
such representations. It is again no accident that “Sonnet” directly follows “The Mythological Poet.” It
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contains the reverse of the warning we were given in “The Mythological Poet”: if you trust a language
with too close ties to the earth (“worms”), you’ll not be safe from being represented “with a look.”

Interestingly, almost all of the poems in Some Trees contain only complete sentences. One can trace
the path of a sentence through multiple lines only to find no “sense” waiting there, but the path,
nonetheless is present. Analytic philosophy also takes the sentence as its primitive: “statements” are
the only units which may be true or false. It is from here that Quine wages his attack on analyticity.
Quine’s investigation serves, in effect, to blur the lines between orphic and hermetic poetry; for if one
cannot be sure whether it is the world or logical, morpho-syntactic truth which is driving language,
then poetry, too, must both come out of the world and be of it. There is a sense in which the actual
sentences of Ashbery’s poems seem to be saying much the same thing. What sort of “total science”
(see just below) would they form in aggregate?

Quine’s revision of reductionism—the doctrine that “every meaningful statement is held to be
translatable into a statement (true or false) about immediate experience “—is that “statements about
the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but as a corporate body” (Two
Dogmas 36). This body is rather hermetic:
Total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with
experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values
have to be redistributed over some of our statements...[which sends out waves of adjustments
through other statements logically connected to the first]...But the total field is so
underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice
as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No
particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field,
except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole...I
envisage nothing more than a loose association reflecting the relative likelihood, in practice, of
our choosing one statement rather than another for revision in the event of recalcitrant
experience...[with] a natural tendency to disturb the system as little as possible. (ibid)
For Quine, statement—sentences—are nodes in a network of knowledge, to be evaluated for truth only
as a body. “Total science” or the network he is discussing, is the sum total of our theories about the
world, about experience. It is made up of language of one sort or another, although one imagines that
the “statements” referred to here are formal statements in a formalized language—be it mathematics
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or predicate calculus. This network is not completely closed off from experience; its periphery comes
into direct contact with experience, while its interior receives indirect impressions from that contact.

Thus, one can imagine orphic language as being near the periphery of this network, that which reflects
more constant impact with experience, and hermetic near the interior. Quine believes this view to
have affinities with pragmatism, in that constructs such as atomic particles or bricks “are myths on the
same footing with physical objects and gods, neither better nor worse except for differences in the
degree to which they expedite our dealings with sense experiences” (38). It is the same with the
objects in Ashbery’s poems in Some Trees. They neither confirm nor deny their presence or reality, nor
can they from within a network of sentential belief:
Still, as the loveliest feelings
Must soon find words, and these, yes
Displace them, so I am not wrong
In calling this comic version of myself
The true one. For as change is horror,
Virtue is really stubbornness
And only in the light of lost words
Can we imagine our rewards. (41)
Ashbery graduated Harvard in 1949, two years before “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” was published. I
don’t know whether he studied with Quine at Harvard, or read a version of the work at the time.
Neither Quine nor I know whether the statement “virtue is really stubbornness” is analytic. But in the
climax of the poet’s above figuring of himself in (the justly famous) “Picture of Little J.A. in a Prospect
of Flowers,” “we” find, within the Stevensian aphorisms, a representation which is both constituted
and “displace[d]” by words. Experience forms words which in turn remove traces of their origins. A
complex of sense-images, a network of sentences about one’s self: both are memory; neither is the
“true” representation of self. For Ashbery and for Quine, one proceeds with pragmatic beliefs which
can be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed.

If Quine took a series statements and built a network, Noam Chomsky took a network of data and
attempted to divine its source. The theory of generative grammar took shape in Cambridge, between
Harvard and MIT, in the early 1950’s; Syntactic Structures, published in 1957, is actually a series of
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lecture notes. There, Chomsky develops a theory of the structure of sentences, of a mechanism that
produces “all and only” the sentences of a particular language. Many of the sentences Chomsky
considers as “data” from which to infer rules of production have analogues in Ashbery’s poems. One
finds the latter’s sentences echo, or are echoed in the former’s, not just in form; both were after a
structure that makes no necessary appeals to meaning. Chomsky took computational theory and
applied it to linguistic behavior, a set of data. His approach took structural linguistics as a point of
departure, whereby synchronic data for a language were seen as regular and rule-governed (or
constrained). Chomsky, however, also, as is well-studied, took cues from then recent work in the
developing field of computer science, and placed the terms of constituent analysis within the
framework of a recursive computing engine, as first described in 1948 by Alan Turing:
A simple form of logical control would be a list of operations to be carried out in the order in
which they are given. ... We wish to be able to arrange that the sequence of orders can divide
at various points, continuing in different ways according to the outcome of the calculations to
date. We also wish to be able to arrange for the splitting up of operations into subsidiary
operations. This should be done in such a way that once we have written down how an
operation is to be done we can use it as a subsidiary to any other operation. (Turing 34)
Recursion, for computing, is defined in Turing’s last sentence above: a case in which an operation is
“used as a subsidiary” of itself. It presumes a set of instructions which are carried out in a particular
sequence: an algorithm. Any algorithm, mathematical or linguistic, must be expressed within a formal
language, a language whose terms have been stripped of all but logical force. Chomsky’s system joins
the purely “structural” primitives of grammatical analysis with the formal apparati of analytic
philosophy, and the recursive models of computing.

Expressed, then, in a completely formal language, a generative grammar is to be constructed so as to
be completely “autonomous and independent of meaning” (Chomsky 17). It has its basis solely in the
notion of “grammaticality”:
The fundamental aim of in the linguistic analysis of a language L is to separate the grammatical
sequences which are the sentences of L from the ungrammatical sequences which are not
sentences of L and to study the structure of the grammatical sequences. The grammar of L will
thus be a device which generates all of the grammatical sequences of L and none of the
ungrammatical ones. (13)
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“Grammatical” here means “observable”—observable in the sense of something that an observer could
witness the sentences in question being used by a speaker and accepted by a listener as well-formed
sentences of “language L.” The data for the construction of a grammar is thus a set of sentences that
could be “used.” Thus, the notion of grammaticality specifically makes no appeal to meaning; it asks
only: does this string form an acceptable whole? The sentence is thus motivated as the “base unit” of
grammar on the basis of grammaticality. What the above definition of grammaticality did, most
famously, was to show how a sentence may retain “grammaticality” through the effects of structure,
even if seemingly meaningless:
Colorless green ideas sleep furiously
Furiously sleep ideas green colorless

(15)

Readers are forced to recognize that despite the logically contradictory content of the first sentence,
it is easily understood as English, while the second is not. The relations among the categories of the
words, given in a particular order (that of the English sentence), allow it to be “parsed” as a possible
sentence of English. (That it contradicts the conditions of the known world are of no concern.)

Many of the poems in Some Trees seem to be asking the same question: can these words be combined
in this string? The majority of the poems seem to be an overt attempt to use formal poetic structure to
gut our assumptions about the necessity of meaning within linguistic constructions. Formalism, here, is
akin to generative apparatus—these poems are their structures. “Poem” is a sestina whose empty
sentences do not flesh out the form, do not use the constraints of form for play within conventional
meaning:
With the broken sky of peace
Peace means it to the sky
Let down your hair
Through peaceful air the top
Of ruins because what are lamps
When night is waiting. (36)
What is interesting is that the result is always a syntactic “whole”—grammatical relations are always
discernable, if uninterpretable. One might correctly place a period at the end of the stanza. The lack
of punctuation, however, allows the boundaries of possible sentences to blur from line to line and
stanza to stanza. Structured only by the end of the text line, whereby the last words of each line
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chosen in the first stanza are then proscribed for the rest of the poem, one can wander among the
phrasal units at will, constructing “full” sentences out of numerous different bits.

Here, form is not used to enhance and elevate some intended meaning. Instead, one becomes aware
only of how the structure is supporting an instance of what Bruns has called negative discourse: “a
form of speech which attempts to isolate the act of signification from its results, that is, from the
formation of a signified.” Thus,
to isolate the word in the void between things and meanings is to establish it as a transcendent
reality; but it is at the same time to situate in the realm where beauty can be discovered. …
[L]anguage is [here] understood to be corporeal in character, a substantial medium that is not
to be effaced by the formation of meaning. And to the extent that the poet amplifies the
corporeality of his language, he actively pursues the dissociation of words and things: he
constructs a negative discourse, in which language itself moves to become the subject or
purpose of the act of speech. (Bruns 194-7)
Ashbery’s negative discourse nearly always works to underscore the empty syntax that underlies all
sentences. Further, in doing so, he severs the relationships of the words in those sentences from their
extensions; “he actively pursues the dissociation of words and things” not for the sake of pushing the
limits of the surrealist image, but for showing that those limits themselves are a fiction when words
have no necessary connections to things.

“The Young Son” takes a differing tack to a similar end, delivering a determinate Proustian barrage of
qualifications, all of which point in the same direction, but lead only to “no subject apparently intent
on its heart’s own demon”:
Yet now a wonder would shoot up, all one color, and virtues would jostle each other to get a
view of nothing -- the crowded house, two faces glued fast to the mirror, corners and the
bustling forest ever preparing, ever menacing its own shape with a shadow of the evil defenses
gotten up and in fact already exhausted in some void of darkness, some kingdom he knew the
earth could not even bother to avoid if the minutes arranged and the divine lettermen with
smiling cries were to come in the evening of administration and night which no cure, no bird
ever more compulsory, no subject apparently intent on its heart’s own demon would forestall
even if the truths she told of were now being seriously lit, one by one, in the hushed and fast
darkening room. (53)
This, the poem’s fifth and concluding sentence, contains one hundred thirty-seven words. It contains
many stock figures from Some Trees; it and other poems are littered with birds, mirrors, forests,
shadows, nights. Thus, while this and other sentences are not completely empty, neither are they
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“surreal” in the modernist sense. As one progresses through the many above clauses, it becomes clear
that the mere extension of reference to some other possible world, surrealism’s heft, is not the point.
The words in the above sentence are placeholders that allow the poem’s syntax to function, virtually
on its own. However, its automatic-ness is deeply human; the stock phrases are like partial
condensations from a bad gothic novel. The sentence affirms that is not simply “empty” sentences
which are automatic—much of human discourse operates in the same manner.

Before Chomsky, there had been some attempts at articulating of the idea that a seemingly infinite
diversity of syntactic structures can in fact be derived from a finite set of grammatical rules, such as
that of Von Humboldt, but the necessary computational tools were not yet in place (Robins). The
uncanny surrealist likeness intentionally parodied by Ashbery in “The Young Son” is reduced to a set of
syntactic primitives by Chomsky. Any “meaningful” element in a sentence may, and must, be expressed
by a “meaningless” categorical element in order to be modeled. The new framework pushed
constituent analysis to now model production, the actual creation of sentences, rather than simply the
end result. If the structural primitives of Syntactic Structures have meaning only via the sorts of
combinations which are permitted among them, recursive rules simply and straightforwardly provide
the means for producing an infinite number of unique sentences—as well showing how a grammar might
construct one unboundedly long sentence—using a finite set of primitives and relations. Linguistics thus
moved from looking at language as a set of effects, behaviors, and expressions to seeing it as an
algorithmic engine, closed but capable of infinite productivity. The symbols used by the engine of a
generative grammar fall under several categories, or “levels of representation.” One of the goals of
Syntactic Structures is to independently motivate several discrete structural levels, to not simply take
their existence for granted.

One such level, one which involves recursion, is the level of “phrase structure.” The simplest example
is a phrase structure rule for generating a prepositional phrase:
PP -> P NP (PP)
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In prose, this rule says “Rewrite a structural marker PP (prepositional phrase) as a sequence of a
preposition, a noun phrase, and as many more additional prepositional phrases as you need.” Thus, one
could “use” this rule to produce either “in the garden” or “in the garden of roses” or “in the garden of
roses on that day”—the second and third phrases take advantage of the recursive aspect of the rule
(parenthesis being the notational equivalent of “optional”). The motivation for accepting the phrase
structure level of representation was, at the time, that it provided the simplest way expressing the
infinite generatability of human language. It did so not with appeals to meaning and the
inexhaustibility of ideas, but to the infinite number of combinations possible among finite elements
strung together in linear fashion. By removing much of their content, forms such as the sestina allow
Ashbery to express the same sort of generative-ness of pure structure. “Poem” and other formalist
poems in Some Trees allow their structures to be discovered by the reader. Other poems, like
“Pantoum,” are named for their forms, drawing further attention to their constructed nature:
That is why a watchdog is shy,
Why the court, trapped in a silver storm, is dying.
These days are short, brittle; there is only one night
And that soon gotten over.
Why, the court, trapped in a silver storm, is dying!
Some blunt pretense to safety we have
And that soon gotten over
For they must have motion. (42-3)
A pantoum is a closed generative circle, endlessly recycling its own phrases into novel contexts.
Ashbery revives it here to explore pure grammatical relations as offset by re-contextualization. With a
finite set of elements, the poem plays clause against clause, drawing out the various grammatical
senses of each phrase while imparting a fully realized meaning to none. “Why, the court, trapped in a
silver storm, is dying” is first explanation, then exclamation. While this may result “from the poet’s
having no intended meaning in mind as he investigates what meaning might be created automatically”
(Keller 241), the reverse might also be true: the poet is intending to see what relations are alwayspresent when conventionally referential meaning is stripped away.

An insistence on the sentence as primitive of the grammar, beyond lay conceptions of the sentence,
led to the development of Chomsky’s particular brand of generative grammar: transformational
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grammar. It is the transformational component of the grammar that was created to effectively handle
cases of “constructional homonymity” at the sentence level, such as “Why, the court, trapped in a
silver storm, is dying.” Consider the following examples:
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)

John ate an apple
did John eat an apple
what did John eat
who ate an apple

(i)
(ii)
(iii)

the shooting of the hunters
the growling of the lions
the raising of flowers

(Chomsky 71)

In transformational theory, each of the sentences in (I-IV) can be derived by applying transformational
rules to a “terminal string” from the phrase structure level of representation. (i) is ambiguous between
the interpretations exemplified in (ii) and (iii) -- it is not clear if the hunters are shooting or being
shot. The surface structure “looks” the same for either interpretation; their transformational
representations, however, will differ. By contrast the sentences in (I-IV) all look different, but are all
derived from a single “kernel” sentence. The sentences in sets (I) and (i) were taken as justification for
the transformational level of representation—ambiguity at one level of representation is justification
for claiming the existence of another. The autonomy of a linguistic level of transformations provides a
straightforward account of such cases of “constructional homonymity.” The pantoum, then, is a poetic
structure that plays upon this very distinction. “Empty” formalism, or what one might call “generative”
formalism, marks Some Trees throughout.

At the same time that Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics, Claude Levi-Strauss, drawing on the
then-forgotten Ferdinand de Saussure, was doing the same with anthropology. Structuralism
transformed a variety of fields, and arguably created the discourse now known as “theory.” “Myth
Today,” the theoretical section of Barthes’ 1957 collection Mythologies, may be the first piece of
theory. It makes Levi-Strauss literary. And the orphic-hermetic distinction is in play for it.

For Barthes, “myth is a type of speech” in that it always bases itself on a system of signification, verbal
or iconic. Because myth is not dependent on anything except signification, “the semiologist is entitled
to treat in the same way writing and pictures: what he retains from them is the fact that they are both
signs” (Barthes 115). What myth does, then, is to co-opt and suppress the Saussurian sign and comport
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it toward its own ends. In myth, “That which is a sign (namely the associative total of a concept and an
image) in the first system, becomes a mere signifier in the second.” Myth thus creates a second-order
system of signification, in which complete first-order signs are “reduced to a pure signifying function”
(114). The function of myth is to strip a meaningful sign of its significance, forcing it to merely “stand
for” something else. When taken as the first term of the second order system (myth), the sign is called
by Barthes form:
When it becomes form, the meaning leaves its contingency behind; it empties itself, it
becomes impoverished, history evaporates, only the letter remains...but the form does not
suppress the meaning...it puts it at a distance, it holds it at one’s disposal. One believes the
meaning is going to die...the meaning loses its value, but [it] keeps its life, from which the
form of the myth will draw its nourishment...like an instantaneous reserve of history. (117-8)
Debates in the 1990s about the future of the National Endowment for the Arts, for example, center
around myth. For many so-called conservatives, the NEA was a signifier for “failed democratic public
policy,” the epitome of the sort of thing that government should not spend money on. The first order
sign is “already complete, it postulates a kind of knowledge, a past, a memory, a comparative order of
facts, ideas, decisions” because it was originally enmeshed within a particular (liberal) discourse. Thus,
the original purpose and intent of the NEA, itself suppressed and distorted by liberal myth, is
suppressed, distorted, but left intact in order to be incorporated into a new system, the myth of
privatization.

There are two ways of reading John Ashbery’s poem “The Instruction Manual” in terms of myth of
Barthes’ sort. One may assume that in constructing this vision of “Guadalajara! City of rose-colored
flowers!” that the poet is well aware of the reductive nature of his imaginings, and is consciously
playing with the white anglo “myth” of Mexico. Or, one may assume that he is merely unconsciously
working within a neo-colonial discourse of the exotic other. In that, Ashbery is drawing on “the world
in which North American writers of the first half of the twentieth century were created. The world of
the closed-off U.S. citizen and the mythology of the exterior world; which includes the fantasy of
Mexico as more alive, but also illegal, sexual, and dangerous, that is, ‘more human’” (Yépez,
Neomemory). Drawing on one part of the myth, within which many people actually lived (of the closed-
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off US citizen), along with the other part (the fantasy of Mexico), signifies ambiguously in the poem: it
is unclear how consciously or unconsciously Ashbery is engaging them.

The poem is unlike any of the others in Some Trees, in that its autobiographical content is concrete
and accessible (unlike in “Picture of Little J.A....”), and thus the voice of the writer and the poet feel
like a single voice. It’s almost orphic. It is also, perhaps, a self-conscious adaptation of the style of
O’Hara, down to the mention of the score’s composer, Rimsky-Korsakov. It is possible to vacillate
among all of the above readings, a comment upon the insidious and vague nature of myth itself. For
Barthes, myth is also a way of reading, a particular sort of condensation of knowledge and intent: one
may “unmask” a myth, or experience it (128).

If the signifier of myth is form, its signified, or second term, Barthes calls concept. Taken together,
they form a myth’s signification. However, “the knowledge contained in a mythical concept is
confused, made of yielding, shapeless associations. One must stress this open character of the concept;
it is not an abstract, purified existence; it is a formless, unstable, nebulous condensation, whose unity
and coherence are above all due to its function” (119). Such associations are ephemeral: “mythical
concepts… can come into being, alter, disintegrate, disappear completely” (120). “The Instruction
Manual” depends upon some of the same associations that would be distilled in the next year in Jack
Kerouac’s On the Road: Mexico as far, warm, inviting, quaint, peopled with “dark-skinned” beauty,
exotic-yet-domestic, available. These were not ephemeral associations for the US literary-type in the
1950’s; this was a dominant US myth of Mexico:
And nearby is the little white booth where women in
green serve you green and yellow fruit.
The couples are parading; everyone is in a holiday mood.
First, leading the parade, is a dapper fellow
Clothed in deep blue. On his head sits a white hat
And he wears a mustache, which has been trimmed for
the occasion.
His dear one, his wife, is young and pretty; her shawl is
rose, pink, and white. (26-7)
The “you” here is the white US tourist, wryly remarking that the women match the fruit they are
offering. Leaning out of an US window affords a privileged view of Mexican society, where every day
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brings a parade of carefully groomed, yet “natural” beauty. Everyone is swooning in love, so that only
the poet, with his longingly detached eye, might “notice the mustachioed man’s wife” (27) for the
tourist-reader. The entire poem is constructed around the contrast of these organic others to the dull
reality of modern US life; the Mexicans who work in banks cannot be directly represented in the
poem’s controlling mythos. This scene also reads, to me, like a white homosexual poet’s displacement
of (rightful) rage against compulsory heterosexual life onto the exotic other: this is a myth of a life the
poet will never been able to live, easy and carefree in its societal acceptability, like the mythic
heteronormative US nuclear family of the 1950s. There are other examples of that rage later in
Ashbery’s oeuvre.

In Barthes’ conception of “contemporary” poetic language, the poetic and the mythic work against
each other. Poetic language
tries to transform the sign back into meaning: its ideal, ultimately, would be to reach not the
meaning of words, but the meaning of things themselves. This is why it clouds the language,
increases as much as it can the abstractness of the concept and the arbitrariness of the sign
and stretches to the limit the link between signifier and signified. (Barthes 133)
Interestingly, Ashbery fails to use his customary idiom in “The Instruction Manual.” He instead relies on
O’Hara-style talky orphic prose, if a less colloquial version of it. The poem is thus not poetic language
in Barthes’ sense, but rather mythic language, through which “We have heard the music, tasted the
drinks, and looked at colored houses” (Some Trees 30). Reading this way, “we” experience the myth of
Mexico. It seems, however, that the poet is winking at us as we do so: “How limited, but how complete
withal, has been our experience of Guadalajara!” (29). It is therefore possible to read “The Instruction
Manual” as a play on the very discourse it seems to be embracing: that the poet is well-aware that this
“dream” of Mexico is a false representation. The poet exposes the myth by making it clear that while
the Guadalajara “we” have visited is not the “real” Guadalajara, for “our” purposes, it might as well
be. His deadpan speech may intentionally to mock the false naturalness his very discourse allows. (As
Roffman notes, however, the poem came out of Ashbery’s actual trip to Mexico.)
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If the orphic speech of “The Instruction Manual” is unnatural for the poet of Some Trees, re-examining
Ashbery’s chosen mode of formal “negative discourse” clarifies why this is so. Barthes, in a footnote,
has this to say about classical poetic formalism:
Classical poetry [is] a strongly mythical system, since it imposes on the meaning one extra
signified, which is regularity. The alexandrine, for instance, has value both as meaning of a
discourse and as signifier, of a new whole, which is its poetic signification. Success, when it
occurs, comes from the degree of apparent fusion between the two systems....with an elegant
absorption of one form into another. (Barthes 133)
Ashbery’s poems, then, both work within classical poetics, and consciously mock it as a discourse by
refusing to let the signification “fuse” fully (or even partially) with the form. It is most clearly evident
in Ashbery’s appropriations of the pastoral: “A Pastoral” is yet another playful sestina, somewhere
between elegy and idyll, perhaps celebrating the Mississippian south, but never quite resolving into
anything the form is supposed to support. “Eclogue” is one of several father/son dialogue poems (“A
Boy” is another), one which become tinged with a desire to reach the mother through the father:
Cuddie:

I tell you good will imitate this.
Now we must dip in raw water
These few thoughts and fleshy members.
So that evil may refresh our days.

Colin:

She has descended part way!
Now father cut me down with tears.
Plant me far in my mother’s image
To do cold work of books and stones. (24-5)

The poet uses matter-of-fact body parts to defuse fetish, oedipal over-determination. The son’s wish to
have the father “plant” him within his “mother’s image” could not be read as other than charged by
the post-war psychoanalysis boom, the “cold work of books and stones” being perhaps the poet’s
veiled, displaced compensation. The tongue-in-cheek character of the lines, put in mouths that are
supposed to be speaking the archaic discourse of shepherds, disallows any psychoanalytic reading other
than an “unmasking” of psychoanalysis. Ashbery thus plays upon the content of the pastoral discourse
to his own mythic ends.

Why do some dislike poems of the real, of the world? Is it a distrust of reference, and therefore distrust
the truth of those sorts of poems, of their ability to either represent or transcend their objects? In
Some Trees, the reader is always cut off from solid ground; wires are literally stretched across many of
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its landscapes: “The girls, protected by gold wire from the gaze” (“And You Know” 67); “When they
first drew the wires/ across the field” (“Chaos” 50); “What, if not its commercial and etiolated visage,
could break through the meadow wires?” (“Grand Abacus” 44). These images seem directly lifted from
Auden’s early poems, such as “Control of the Passes…” (“They ignored his wires”) and “Who stands,
the crux left of the watershed” (“Snatches of tramline running to the wood”). They reflect the
condition of both poet and reader, each residing simultaneously in a world of inconceivable objects and
the objects of one’s conception. Contradictions are good: they illustrate the gap between meanings
and extension. Pure structure holds together meanings which would otherwise fly apart. Some Trees
represents an attempt to reconcile hermetic art to the “particular,” the orphic; neither is found to be
“the true one,” as in Quine’s attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. Perhaps the poem “Some
Trees” itself is emblematic of the poet and the readers’ place within the above space. Here, as in a
grove of trees, each word joins “a neighbor, as though speech were a still performance”; a contiguous
linear structure emerges and freezes; the lines of the poem unwind each clause, “Arranging by
chance,” along with Cage, the elements to be come upon. Through language, “you and I” are always
“As far, this morning, from the world as agreeing with it”; “we” can only listen and reflect within
ourselves what the world inspires within “us,” a sort of reverse objective correlative. “You and I” are
suddenly taken into a world where “merely being there means something,” where the poetry emerges
from being part of the structure of the event, a “silence already filled with noises.” Roffman shows the
poem recounts an early adulthood rendezvous. If speech be stilled in the face of such beauty, “these
accents seem their own defense.”
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Chapter 8: Before Conceptualism: Disgust and Overdetermination in White-dominated Experimental Poetry in
New York, 1999-2003
Dan Farrell’s ape, published in 1988, is a serial work consisting of 20 unpaginated pages divided, Heads
of the Town Up to the Aether-fashion, into blocks of verse-like near-lists on the pages’ uppers, and
commentary-like prose on the lowers. The book begins, and ends, with a different form: a page
containing a straight, single-line, list-like construction. The opening page reads:

intense. blinding drawing vicious nagging numb grueling nauseating feigning

Discussing and reassessing ape in the “Disgust and Overdetermination” issue of Open Letter in 1998,
Farrell noted that the poem is composed of “…words used to help people describe the pain they were
in to their physicians. Annoying to Wretched, not in that order. The original diagnostic tool presented
lists of words in twenty categories, divorced from any definition or context except type and intensity”
(Later). The poem then takes off from there:

thumb salt flickering stamp indolence joins
quivering enough true all neo-colonial niching
drop throw head noun pulsing percentage
juice shrewd still storm some throbbing
niggling round beating to the present day
pennyless lob pounding clean bidden reek

Gliding I noticed a slight problem presto. Also my anthem
is already in the world to the lawn-kept-pressing. One
of us really ran right out of our loafers. Been usurp.
Shooting now for fairness on the parcel to a degree.
Arranging is affirmed. (Farrell, ape)
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There are multiple voices here. At the top are words from the diagnostic tool, and, presumably, from
those who responded it with their own words. The presence of “neo-colonial” activates both the term’s
Marxist history as part of the pan-African Organization for African Unity movement (Nkrumah) and the
“indolence” that precedes it in the poem: Farrell was writing from within the Kootenay School of
Writing in Vancouver38, a poetic collective founded in 1984 with the explicit intent of activating
relations between local workers movements and writers (Burnham). There have been numerous studies
of the origins and aims of the KSW (including Wiens), and its poetic self-understanding is reasonablyreflected in its capstone anthology (Klobucar and Barnholden). My point here is that Farrell’s ape was
composed, and meant to be read, within the context of an “indolent” 1980s populace battered into
submission by global Reagan-Thatcherite revanchism, or “neo-colonial niching” that, through Canada’s
Progressive Conservative Party, targeted specific social benefits won in previous years. The presence of
“niggling” raises race in a most direct manner. What could this charged and ugly word possibly be doing
here? It gains immense resonance in proximity to “neo-colonial niching”: Farrell seems to be
highlighting the casual way in which racism penetrates to the unthinking core, and how it is at the
same time directly related to policy. The fact that it is followed, just beneath, by “pennyless lob,” a
neo-mondegreen for “pennyless yob,” or a stereotypically white working-class person who might, at
the time, have used the N-word unthinkingly.

All of this is then taken up by the book’s own authorial voice in the lower paragraph: “Gliding I noticed
a slight problem presto.” The “slight problem” here is not slight, as the ironic “presto” aims to
indicate: the “problem” is the complications race introduces into class-based historical narratives of
the sort the KSW were carefully working through at the time, and after. “My” anthem here is cis whiteworking class self-understanding, culminating in home-ownership, “the world to the lawn-keptpressing”; “One of us ran right out of our loafers” to “usurp” the “parcel” via settler-colonialism, and
is now, in an ironic remark on liberalism, “Shooting… for fairness on the parcel to a degree.“ It’s the
“to a degree” that’s telling (to say nothing of “shooting”): while the perspective given voice advances
along these lines within the country, and its limit-cased is “lawn-kept” home-ownership. The fix is still
in, and obliquely acknowledged: “Arranging is affirmed.”
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While this subtle work operates on multiple levels by sifting oppressive linguistic infrastructure, Farrell
finds, however, in his reconsideration, that ape reflects a “mistake” about language’s function. He
further remarks on ape’s lists: “I was struck (struck? sharply? hardly?) at the time by how these words
are, were, also often used in situations other than reporting pain, that is, everywhere else. Their
‘private’ use, pointing to something had only by one, paralleled a ‘public’ one” (Farrell, Later). The
private language argument terminology here is wholly intentional: Farrell’s epigraph in the Open Letter
piece—“This? What!?”—is attributed to Wittgenstein. The argument against a private language,
famously, hinges on reports of pain, and the fact that they cannot find a referent in the ‘outside’
world. The Philosophical Investigations interrogate the idea of pain as a paradigmatically ‘inner’
phenomenon, one given its reference, and meaning, only by one’s own experience of it, which then
directly result in the pieces of language of the kind Farrell realigns. Thus, Farrell’s use of a kind of
coterie code to talk about complex macro issues gets overdetermined by conventional meanings when
taken out of its context, the same way that the inner process by which one’s own experience ‘gives
meaning’ to an expression is found by Wittgenstein to be finally illusory in the private language
argument, “to participate in what is latently nonsensical with a view to allowing its nonsensicality to
become patent” (Mulhall 83). Expressions of pain, far from being paradigmatically private, turn out to
work the same way as the rest of language: through desire to communicate, prior acquisition of shared
code, reasonable guess as to intention. Meaning must always be, then, in a sense, relational:
constituted in real time and dependent on social drive. It’s here that Farrell locates ape’s error:
my mistake then was to believe that this vocabulary was referring to experiential objects,
pointing to the pain; and could also be used to describe events in the shared world. Today I am
more inclined to consider language, even in its descriptive use, to be an activity uncompelled
by any object. So that when I tell you my finger is Numb, or September is Flickering, it is less a
description of reality than an appeal for a particular kind of attention or response. When I say
appeal I also mean demand, wish, plea; clearing my throat etc. (Farrell, Later)
While the private language argument had been well-covered Anglophone territory even by 1988,
Farrell’s is a wry, knowing re-appropriation, not least because he codes the text with asides about the
poetic struggle for self-definition in the face of older definers (for the KSW, the Black Mountain poets
and Language Poets, as Wiens details) whose hands may have seemed to be stretching directly toward
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one’s linguistic pockets, the late rich stealing from rentiers: “Lost generation, wax figure, going about
it the wrong way. Not what’s in my wallet. A hunch a chrome marble. Distend this observation. Rents
frequently attempt” (ape).

As its founders acknowledge, conceptualism is a label for tendencies and experiments under the sign of
poetry that had already happened under the sign of visual art (Goldsmith and Dworkin, Against
Expression). Other texts did significant shoring up work for conceptualism as a specifically a
pedagogical brand: the 2005 edition of Open Letter (Cole and Emerson), a KSW journal; Notes on
Conceptualisms from 2009 (Fitterman and Place); the Against Expression anthology; and Goldsmith’s
workshop text (Uncreative Writing: Managing Language in the Digital Age). While I don’t want to linger
on conceptualism’s self-conception, I do want to try to recover a kind of poetic lost generation,
tendencies from the micro-period just before conceptualism that use similar formal techniques, but
with resistant social aims more in line with the original conceptualism of visual art.

In the period just after Farrell’s reassessment of ape, he published two very different collections
reexamining and redressing ape’s demands: Last Instance (1999) and The Inkblot Record (2000). A focal
point of Last Instance, a collection of prose pieces, is “Avail,” which takes, permutes and distorts
seeming multiple choice answers to a sort of health questionnaire, revealing the first-person sutures
where corporate State enters subject as host. Staged from deep within the logic of the medicalindustrial complex, the piece performs a brilliant reduction of the system’s terms to “anger” and
“physical health,” whereby the seething indignation that lack of self-determination germinates is reassigned back to the subject in an infinite recursive loop:
I feel like my physical health is something that I myself am in charge of. I feel angry about
myself a good deal of the time. Things are not more irritating to me now than usual…. I’m very
direct with people when it comes to my own physical health needs. When I become sick or ill, I
am the person to blame. Sometimes I am so angry that I feel like hurting others, but I would
not really do it. (Last Instance 24-25)
The “I” here is simply a pivot point for contradiction, a negation of any category by which one might be
assessed. The banalization of health, anger and violence, emptied of anything other than their
significance as claims on resources and their inability to be reconciled, is an integral part of the
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system’s self-representation, as if a built-in resistance to articulation, let alone resolution, were a
normal part of its proper functioning.

The book’s five shorter pieces (“Stillstand”, “Fuming”, “Invigorator”, “Geal”, “Jumb”) track
“particle[s] of a universal waning of a class” (19) with “no redreaming qualities” (20), and the
algorithms that hold it in place: “Let’s say: ‘X’. Now that is going too far.” (20) Yet there are
movements in some pieces toward escape. Following on the verse alterations of 1994’s Thimking of
You, which quietly unseated the word (“F/ ear is my master” as the poem “Countenance” memorably
puts it), Last Instance’s prose sentences hold the axis of combination steady while radically
compounding that of selection, and thus demonstrating the possibility of movement even within
normative convention. Its quick parodies of cliché—“Stop melee I’m robot to burst” (33) or “Out of the
radish into the pan” (46) (which has neither frying nor fire, yet both are there)—are followed up by
straightforward descriptions, which direct our heightened attention to incredibly finely resolved
grammar-pictures that can then seem to point beyond their ostensive objects: “Pig iron on the anvil
cooled misshapen, steaming coffee on the burner burned.” (21) Or :
The cat communicates by doing nothing. The feathers are warmest. Even the climate is huffy.
Let’s dip in to light the candles. The coin is in the bucket and the earnings are battered ready
to drop. (39)
Every expression of stasis is also a wry demand for attention to the possibilities, however
compromised, that remain. That combination of stasis, rigorous attention, and black humor, as others
have noted, is deeply Beckettian, but there’s something transformative and unmistakable about
Farrell’s work.

In Last Instance, transformation comes through most clearly in “My Recognizance,” the longest poem in
the book. “Recognizance,” may seem at first like a neologism, but my dictionary lists the following
definitions:
re cog' ni zance, n. [OF. reconoissance, later recognoissance, deriv. of L. recognoscere, fr. re+ cognoscere to know.] 1. Law. An obligation of record entered into before some court or
magistrate, making the performance of some act the condition of nonforfeiture. Also, the sum
liable to forfeiture upon such an obligation. 2. Archaic. A token; symbol; pledge; badge.
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The poem is thus a reckoning, recording, and promise, in which the poet both recognizes and
reconnoiters his childhood, adolescence and early adulthood with acceptance, as if fulfilling an
obligation not to harm them, without intending to linger nostalgically, “Away, a moment”:
While outside in crowded cards of skilled hockey players I saw my own reeling life clasped and
slipped to clipping spokes. Sinking under shuttered glands, chafing beneath my dolled tonsils,
with no effort I wafted upon my mother’s brownie effs. I cannot see the jaguar for its spots,
tottering there above the fizzling bones, the tiny gristle, the flickering marrow. Pups of twisted
balloons yipped by. Was lemon, salmon, or yellow, membrane fixed, as a bicyclist to her
pedals, to the corollal lambskin skin. Swaying, seen in the breeze of winterly floss a quantum
of batting was puffed away. A melt the hot toy plastic descended, in droplet to me. I could not
force these primary emotions, like a lunch, sandwiched between definition and extension, on
me. In decrements imconpetent, nodding off during inattention spells, disguising the shallow
branch tracks with slight foot-marks. What is a modificationist today may be a hoofer
tomorrow. (33)
There’s a pun on spokes in the first sentence, where biking and speaking, both become, sort of,
jokingly, castrating (“clipping”)—a kind of capture, “shuttered,” as one is by maternal photography
(“my mother’s brownie effs”), which unfailingly affix an image of the child’s endearing awkward stage,
glandularly produced. The toy images of living things one interacts with in youth are not analogues—
they are life, those pups really yip. The “lambskin,” is a jacket—or a condom, a false flowery crown
(“corollal”) that gets “fixed” to us, sex, since we’re not fixed. Intellectualizations (“definition”) and
things themselves (philosophical “extension”) often add up to the same distasteful coercions, some of
which we force on ourselves. Distinguishing these things is disgusting, and like death (there is
“excrement” and “cremate ” in “decrement,” an obvious “con” in “imconpetent,” and a retch in
“force”), either at the time or in remembering, and we’re not always up to it, and we cover it up,
“disguising” the tracks with “slight foot-marks” (I’ll say it: writing). What we might try to deal with at
one moment we jauntily lie about or run away from the next, but the attempt, however tongue-incheek, to construct a usable past is inevitable. We are obliged to record the past, or its specifics
simply recede into the general hot plastic—i.e. are liable to forfeiture. And we may even derive some
pleasure from it.

“My Recognizance” doesn’t end there, and the above passage for it is somewhat unfair to isolate and
try to close read or force allusions on, since it uses the most transparently autobiographical language in
the book. Farrell is able to construct such passages so that it seems unnecessary to try to attach them
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back to either a “speaker” of the poem or to the author function—rather we are able to examine such
specifics of a life as if laid out on an archaeologist’s sorting table; they are the “fizzling bones, the tiny
gristle, the flickering marrow” from which we are to project the general species. Farrell’s subjects, or
characters, do nevertheless manage small pockets of self-determination similar to the meticulous
organization of one’s oral fixation, as in Beckett’s Molloy, or the endless recontextualization of a
lexeme, as with “on” in Ill Seen Ill Said. The kind of intentional lightness that pervades is anathema to
ritual suckings and pocketings (though it would not reject them), and the non-neurotic attention that
results is a model. It’s free and it’s available, and it has other precedential takers-up: the opening of
Last Instance’s first piece, the wryly pistolized “No Future,” riffs simultaneously on late Beckett’s
relentless self-reflexivity, Silliman’s adaptation of it in the opening of Tjanting, and Wittgenstein’s
rejection of self-ostensive privacy:
The opposite up, the opposite early, fast put back, kaput. Had gone to the said beginning,
again had gone. Now what. Put back and begun. Head. Kaput. Present perfect. But had begun.
Again gone again more. Then lest then again. The snow mountained up, stopped, had it
finished. As in, up, now what. Kaput. Now what. (7)
Wittgenstein: “This?—what?!” Beckett: “It stands. What?” Silliman: “Not this. What then?” Farrell:
“Kaput. Now what.”

The single, book-length piece of The Inkblot Record partially answers that question by drawing on the
results of an instrument deeply related to the health questionnaire of “Avail”: the Rorschach test. The
book consists entirely of actual (altered?), alphabetized, unlineated, unparagraphed responses to the
(absent) Rorschach images, separated by full stops: “Birds. Birds perched, wings out, up. Black hair
strewn all over the barber’s floor. Black Sabbath.” Inkblot’s recontextualizations make the aesthetic
value of the Rorschach responses far outrun whatever normative diagnostic component might remain in
them, highlighted by Farrell’s organizing of the book’s sentences in alphabetical order. The major
impression left by the book is that, lacking an aesthetics, the Rorschach test, like the larger psychiatric
apparatus of which it is a part, could not account for the incredible charge, diversity and beauty (even
in their stretches of banality) of the responses, and thus for the people that made them. The responses
are great (“If the robe was closed, you couldn’t see the people or feet because the robe goes to the
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floor”) and the abecedarian approach perfectly highlights the scale: there are thousands of subjects
out there who produced these texts. Though it depends on the breadth of subject selection, there is a
way in which a more democratic art cannot be imagined, a point which only underscores the subjects’
systemic co-optation. Each of responses was produced within highly alienating circumstances, which we
also experience in reading them one after another, if with a kind of historical displacement: the
Rorschach’s lo-tech lack of invasiveness now reads like relative humanity.

The test’s own history goes something like this, as told in an excellent recent study by historian of
science Rebecca Lemov: in 1921, Swiss psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach published Psychodiagnostik, a
monograph containing the same blots that are still in use, which he developed to streamline the
process of assessing personality traits and diagnosing psychosis. Having a standard set of cards,
questions, and evaluative parameters, it was thought, allowed psychiatrists to learn a single process
and simply repeat it, rather than relying on impressionistic and un-replicable methods, and to develop
a control group of normal responses. Rorschach died the following year, but the method was eventually
adapted by US state and corporate entities for weeding out the bearers of potential problem
personality traits, or for confirming suspicions of the possession of such traits (Lemov 20-24).

Farrell was undoubtedly aware of this history, and presenting “problem” traits as art is an oblique
challenge to state-based evaluation. The structure and content of the book’s responses, like cries of
pain (which in many ways they are), continue to claim agency in spite of the structure that “produced”
or elicited them, since there will always be one system or another that produces us. So while there is
surely a critique of the Rorschach process’s dehumanizing aspects implicit in Farrell’s stacking up of its
detritus, there are also intimations of interlocutor, of the possibilities of real exchange. The back
cover of the book lists “trigger” questions, some simple (“What do you see?”), some follow up (“What
in the card gave you the impression of mice?”) and others more complex, and allowing, in classic style,
for a direct importation of (and, goal-wise, reconnection with) personal history (“What might that
reflect in your life?”). There are also extra-linguistic responses that are included in the body of the
text as a kind of wry duty, parenthetical scene-setters attributable to the original data collector:
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(inverts card)
(imitates sitting)
(traces outline with finger)
(demonstrates the sun’s rays using her body)
(pantomimes stomping)
(laughs)
(runs finger around blot)
Phatic openings play a huge organizing role here—many, many responses begin with “Well…” “Oh…”
“Um….”—which is certainly comic, but also points to real people involved in real speech events, talking
to others.

All of this is data which, by the 50s and 60s, actually would’ve been taken into account by someone
administering the test, as evaluation moved away from just the contentful construal of imagery (Lemov
25-27). By silently moving these aspects of the data to the fore, as the result of a further abecedarian
procedure, Farrell simultaneously makes us register the protocols of a system that attempted to record
and evaluate even the smallest indirect response—a system of coercion and control—as well as the
possibilities of a modest recuperation, of a provisional re-interpretation. Beyond the classificatory grid
that presupposed a set of typologies for quick mid-century “scoring” by prospective employers or
wardens, reading Farrell’s book, one can imagine a therapeutic component to taking the test.
Rorschach began his career as an advocate for the then fledgling psychoanalysis (Lemov). Some of the
therapeutic aspects ascribed to dream interpretation or word association were intentionally
incorporated into its design, at least initially—and that further exchanges that were supposed to
“happen” during Rorschach tests along the lines of Freudian psychiatry, analogous to catharses that are
supposed to occur when conceptual connections are spontaneously generated during an analytic session
(ibid).

A similar thing happens to the poet in classical accounts of composing poetry: the composed text is the
trace of the poet’s platonic ecstasy, which simultaneously produces and is produced by connections,
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which readers follow and try to reproduce via the work (Stanco). Some forms of reception put sourcetext-based work in a different, less ecstatic category. PET scans might reveal that there are no
differences in the brains of those re-arranging pre-existing orthographic symbols vs. those generating
them nearly ex nihilo, though preliminary research suggests otherwise (Cressey). We will have to wait
for the final data, but Inkblot allows the thought that the generation of the Rorschach responses—
which are ex nihio, unlike Farrell’s bricolative practice—might have changed the subjects’ psyches
directly, that actual therapeutic “work” got done, even if it wasn’t usually considered the main point
of the test. And Inkblot, in separating the material of the test from its supporting superstructure,
shows that its own banal organization scheme clearly does psychic work. Any found work makes a
similar statement, but Inkblot’s material, if read as therapeutic, works to heighten the contradictions.

If The Inkblot Record records through a kind of one-way mirror, then Last Instance tracks the
meditative streams that lay behind the design and construction of the glass, and the modes and means
of contact through it:
For years call to pretend calling, each other a stake in spontaneity. And what of it? How can I
be but thankful for the boring contact. It would only be unhelpful to remind them this is
actually a late returned call, not of their own accord. I ignore the slight. It would be selfish of
me not to pretend.
These lines are from “K,” which permutes the possibility of contact with the eponymous character,
throwing off a profusion of nuanced local reflections about the nature of supposed intimacy. In so doing
it illustrates how we, callers and callees all (“I am the caller I have always been”), are forced to
project ourselves onto nothing, rats who press the buttons when the empty light of desire goes on.
Talking to a machine (and later imagining how K’s childhood produced the class-based eschewal of
manners that may really be the key to happiness) or actually getting the roommate (remember: precell phones) are the same thing. The protocols of contact replace the contact itself.

In The Inkblot Record and Last Instance both, Farrell sets up structures for displaying sentences, and
tracking their fall in and out of discourse—either as found (Inkblot) or (mostly) composed (Last
Instance)—so that their affiliations with power, if not dissolve, become nuanced. The form of historical
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consciousness the books bring forth, pitching back and forth between multi- and univocality,
institutionality and idiosyncrasy, is the art of that process. In Inkblot, the direct target is the huge,
coercive, outdated, state-appropriated version of psychiatry which ape surveilles, and which “Avail”
attacks. The twelve diffuse, stultifying forms taken by conventionally mediated relationships in Last
Instance—familial, significant-otherial, occupational, temporal (see the calendric send-up “366, 1996”
which ends the book), etc.—are picked-off one at a time at appropriately honed scales. Both Last
Instance and The Inkblot Record find people behind the lexical curtains, and evince, at every decision
point, play, a drive toward negotiable social meaning, and an awareness of the stakes. In that they
work to reorient us within their moment, whether just ended, or still evolving. The idea is
recognizance: to reconnoiter, recognize, reckon, rethink, record and respond. A section from The
Inkblot Record was included in Against Expression, as was a section of “Avail.”

Farrell was living in New York with the poet and critic Sianne Ngai during the final composition of Last
Instance; Ngai wrote the essay “Raw Matter: A Poetics of Disgust” around the same time; it was
published in the same issue of Open Letter in which Farrell reassessed ape. The influence of Farrell’s
work and of that essay can be discerned, I believe, in the poetics Lytle Shaw subsequently developed in
New York. Farrell, Ngai, and Shaw were all were in dialogue at that point: Farrell and Ngai had
recently moved from New York to the Bay Area, and Shaw had moved from the Bay Area to New York
with artist Emilie Clark. I myself had discussions with Shaw about Farrell’s and Ngai’s work. I will shift
now to discussing two of Shaw’s books from the same period, leaning on Ngai’s essay in interpreting
one of them. I will also argue briefly that in Farrell’s, Ngai’s, and Shaw’s work from this period, much
of what became Flarf and conceptualism is present, albeit with a political orientation that was
explicitly stripped out by conceptualism’s self-representations and implicitly by Flarf’s intentional
ambiguities. The first of Shaw’s books I’ll discuss, Cable Factory 20, is “written inside” conceptual
artist Robert Smithson’s work, and it is with Smithson that I will begin.
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It’s a long way from ‘no ideas but in things’ to ‘no ideas,’ but maybe less so for Robert Smithson, a
New Jersey native and childhood patient of Dr. Williams:
Under shallow pinkish water is a network of mud cracks supporting the jig-saw puzzle that
composes the salt flats. As I looked at the site, it reverberated out to the horizons only to
suggest an immobile cyclone while flickering light made the entire landscape appear to quake.
A dormant earthquake spread into the fluttering stillness, in a spinning sensation without
movement. This site was a rotary that enclosed itself in an immense roundness. From that
gyrating space emerged the possibility of the Spiral Jetty. No ideas, no concepts, no systems,
no structures, no abstractions could hold themselves together in the actuality of that evidence.
(Smithson 145)
Despite Smithson’s claim of the lack of tenability of constructs on the salt flats, his description of first
coming upon the section of The Great Salt Lake that would serve as host for the Spiral Jetty is actually
driven by an idea: that of Site. Site, always a capital ‘S’ for Smithson, is a ‘series of points’ of ‘open
limits,’ ‘reflection’ and ‘edge.’ Similarly, here is Carl Andre, speaking at a college symposium on April
30, 1968, as recorded by Lucy Lippard:
The kind of place I mean is not to be confused with an environment. It is futile for an artist to
try to create an environment because you have an environment around you all the time. Any
living organism has an environment. A place is an area within an environment that has been
altered in such a way as the make the general environment more conspicuous. Everything is an
environment, but a place is related particularly to both the general qualities of the
environment and the particular qualities of the work that has been done. (47)
As place is for Carl Andre (who was later tried for second-degree murder following the death of his
wife, Ana Mendieta), Site for Smithson is a medium for ‘making the general environment more
conspicuous.’ His depiction of the lake as source of vast potential energy and possibility, stored within
complex forms that surface as blank flatness and heat, is not just description, but part of Site itself.
Through the concept of Site, Smithson’s essay on the Spiral Jetty participates no less in the production
of Site than the actual construction of the Jetty itself. The same is true of Smithson’s filmic
documentary showing, as equals, trucks dumping earth, and the range of materials (from dinosaur
skeletons to glacial patterning) that came to his mind in conceiving the project as a whole.

The artist that conceives, observes, describes, orders dumping and documents the entire process is a
selector among different scales of Site, costlessly sorting information as it arises, like Maxwell’s
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demon. Such an artist, for Smithson, has a physical solubility, and can seemingly expand or contract at
will:
The sound of the helicopter motor became a primal groan echoing into tenuous aerial views.
Was I but a shadow in a plastic bubble hovering in a place outside mind and body? Et in Utah
ego. I was slipping out of myself again, dissolving into a unicellular beginning, trying to locate
the nucleus at the end of the spiral. All that blood stirring makes one aware of protoplasmic
solutions, the essential matter between the formed and the unformed, masses of cells
consisting largely of water, proteins, lipoids, carbohydrates, and inorganic salts. Each drop that
splashed onto the Spiral Jetty coagulated into a crystal. Undulating waters spread millions upon
millions of crystals over the basalt. (Smithson 149)
The artist can locate the nucleus from any one of innumerable, and mappable, possible perspectives —
from cells to (as he later puts it) ‘James Joyce’s ear channel’ to the salt flats. Smithson: ‘when one
refuses to release scale from size, one is left with an object or language that appears to be certain’ —
but isn’t. Designating Site selects among scales, but only provisionally. In reading this now, however, in
the US, it’s hard to read this beyond Ken Chen’s description of “a disembodied white self: the self as
hero of individualism and technology, a cogito levitating freely above the racial mob.” Critiques of
“Land art” in the west from indigenous perspectives are beginning to appear, revealing “Land art’s
complicity with—or even its status as a distilled expression of” a settler-colonial perspective (Scott). In
my research up to this point, I have not, in looking into Smithson’s construction of Site and the Spiral
Jetty, found reference to the Goshute, Shoshone, Southern Paiute, or Ute indigenous people or
societies. Such absences are one of the ways in which conceptual art is racially marked.

For Smithson, art is any ‘Nonsite’ relation to Site. Any point or series of points, visual or verbal, can be
juxtaposed with another point or series, which relates to or reflects or contains it: Nonsite. In a note to
the first sentence of ‘The Spiral Jetty,’ Smithson details Site and Nonsite’s ‘range of convergence’:
The range of convergence between Site and Nonsite consists of a course of hazards, a double
path made up of signs, photographs, and maps that belong to both sides of the dialectic at
once. Both sides are present and absent at the same time. The land or the ground from the site
is placed in the art (Nonsite) rather than the art placed on the ground. The Nonsite is a
container within another container — the room. The plot or yard outside is yet another
container. Two-dimensional and three dimensional things trade places with each other in the
range of convergence. … A point on map expands to the size of a land mass. A land mass
contracts to a point. Is the Site the reflection of the Nonsite (mirror), or is it the other way
around? The rules of this network of signs are discovered as you go along uncertain trails both
mental and physical. (153)
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Thinking about the concept of Nonsite in relation to indigenous people and societies is chilling. It is
critical work to do so with regard to conceptual and particularly land art. I have not done it in what
follows, which is centered on explicating Lytle Shaw’s work at a particular moment, mostly within the
limits of its seeming intent. It is a gap that renders the explication incomplete at best.

Lytle Shaw’s Cable Factory 20 is a double path made up of signs, photographs, and maps that belong to
both sides of the Site/Nonsite dialectic as conceived by Smithson, and that trade places with each
other in a scalar range of convergence. Shaw takes Smithson’s life and work to be nodes in a larger
network of Site, one that takes in the built and unbuilt environment of the San Francisco Bay Area, the
microhistory of the western art and poetry of the last 200 years, Shaw’s own life and work, corporate
capital’s 20th century incarnations (at least 20 of them), and the Enlightenment project that, to one
degree or another, drove (and drives) it all on. Miles Champion has written poems within and between
poems by other writers, taking their texts as Site and intensely focusing down to the level of the
phoneme, simultaneously unraveling and preserving strands of the past, encoding a present. Similarly,
Shaw has noted that his book is ‘literally written inside’ Smithson’s Collected Writings, to the point
where Cable Factory’s cover fonts, colors and overall design nearly match the Smithson Collected’s in a
manner that cannot be accidental. And Smithson’s Spiral Jetty, the movie he made of it, the essay he
wrote about it, his other written and ‘sculpted’ works, his life, and his death in a plane crash are all
put in Site/Nonsite relation to each other, directly or indirectly, in Cable Factory.

Shaw’s use of photographs and other visual material in particular takes Smithson at his descriptive
word, constructing a ‘double path’ through Smithson/Shaw, one that involves a highly ironized sorting
demon similar to Smithson’s Site selector: “Who’s the filter feeder?/ Down at the bottom of the tank,”
notes a scene-setting couplet at the book’s beginning (Shaw 13). In the process, Cable Factory 20
shows, in an economically-cognizant manner alien to advertising (which uses similar techniques), how
photography can be made to say a great deal more than Walter Benjamin’s (tactically reductive) ‘what
a beautiful world!’:
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But now follow the path of photography further. What do you see? It becomes ever more
nuancé, ever more modern, and the result is that it can no longer depict a tenement block or a
refuse heap without transfiguring it. It goes without saying that photography is unable to say
anything about a power station or a cable factory other than this: what a beautiful world!
(Benjamin 86)
When coupled with text, iteration, massive changes of scale and embeddedness in larger “network of
signs.” Smithson’s “Network of signs” recalls Baudelaire’s forêts de symboles from Fleurs du Mal’s
“Correspondences”: forests that are located just to the side of the “living pillars” of the temple of
Nature, and watch man pass avec des regards familiers (Baudelaire). It’s an allusion that echoes
through a key passage of Cable Factory 20. The poem ‘#4’ invokes, but is not quite narrated by, a
transcendentalist flâneur figure who resembles Goethe (via Wilhelm Meister) or Linnaeus in passion for
perambulation and classification. A park and its history are surveyed, but something cannot quite be
accounted for:
What’s lacking in this picture —
Allowances,
The Sentiment of Abrasion?
Eyes catch and toast is casual but
a weakness in the eyes kept him
from books, and he formed the habit
of rambling about the countryside by himself:
in a mausoleum
windowed trees and light
are figures
for the permeability of shells,
Ready contents in the new language
of extreme joints
and partial correspondence. (Shaw 29)
Cable Factory 20’s project is the articulation of this language, dimly apprehended in the walker’s
surroundings, jammed together between the living pillars of built environment, ideation, violence, and
affect — the current forest of symbols. It’s a language that has basic parameters, sets of allowances,
and handlings of sentiments.

One of Cable Factory 20’s main strategies for articulating a language of “extreme joints and partial
correspondence” is maximizing ambiguity among phrasal units, particularly the simple declarative.
In Quine’s indeterminacy of translation argument, one can never decide absolutely on a one-to-one
correspondence between a phrase in one language and a phrase in another, since their components
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connect down to entirely different associative semantic webs (Word and Object). Shaw uses the
ambiguity of simple declaratives to draw out simultaneous, multiple meanings from the differing
contexts and histories the book brings together. The book’s first sentence operates this manner:
“Everyone loves Cable” (11). At least five determinate meanings come immediately to mind:
1. Everyone likes the experience of lots of channels and clear reception.
2. No one thinks the technology or content of cable pernicious.
3. Since everyone loves cable, you, reader, will like this book.
4. I’m joking when I imply that no one has objections to cable.
5. I’m joking when I recommend myself and my book to you.
Competing contexts — the technology of cable, its use in the book, the manner in which the book’s
speaker is comported towards that history and its use — all make claims on attention, claims that are
ultimately irreconcilable and undecidable, but reflect one another to some degree: partial
correspondence.

Having made the promise of a multi-stranded experience in the ‘zero’ poem that serves as a preface to
the 20 pieces of the book proper, the book continues to work in the overdetermined declarative mode.
Situated on the first page of ‘#1’ with finger-sized photo of the young Smithson and the self-admonition
“At first admit the fan” as the line preceding it, the two word complete sentence “Likeness
dominates” (16) gets saturated with competing and equal claims on sense from multiple directions:
1. The similarity of my physical appearance with Smithson’s strikes me most of all.
2. Our physical affinity dominates this work as a whole.
3. Affinity of artistic vision strikes me most of all.
4. I really like Smithson.
5. Its similarities to Smithson’s book dominate mine.
6. The idea of likeness dominates my thinking, and this book.
7. There is something inherent in the relation of likeness that privileges it.
8. Likeness dominates, but doesn’t overcome, unlikeness.
Shaw’s use of this mode, and that two-word sentence in particular, points back to Smithson’s own
complicated negotiations of likeness, as well as to previous poetic appropriations of them.

Observation, of likeness or anything else, is quite often, for many people, primarily visual, while
thought, which can be iconic, is paradigmatically verbal, at least in terms of reason and
communication; the two modes are intertwined but, like stranded cable, locked in a kind of dis-
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imposition, not fully contiguous, though visual likeness dominates. Like the non-split between
Smithson’s writing and sculpture, Cable Factory 20 dramatizes the verbal/visual (symbolic/imaginary)
distinction, showing it to be analogous to, or perhaps even a version of, the Site/Nonsite distinction—
and just as ambiguously delineated. Before the age of digital reproduction, referential language was
the ultimate medium for the Site/Non-site distinction, since it was able, and is able (at varying degrees
of success), to remove things from their situations, and to make them re-appear within an infinite
number of new contexts — infinite in the grammatical sense of an infinite set of sentences producible
by a finite set of grammatical rules.

The whiffs of Tel Quel that rise from invocations of generative grammar are entirely apropos. On the
one hand, language for Smithson could simply be heaped up as materialist humus. On the other, his
writings provide crucial context for, and form part of, work like Spiral Jetty, and of Land and
conceptual art. What is Site/Nonsite if not a this-and -that innovation on the this-or -that
signifier/signified distinction? Cable Factory 20, thirty years later, among many other modes of
recognition, embraces intellectual kitsch with equal portions of feeling and teasing, and also registers
its own moment’s shifts. By the late 1990s, when Shaw was working on the book, language’s ability to
call the signified into being was being eclipsed by visually recombinative technologies like Photoshop.
And space’s implication of a future that is not ironic had become ironic. Time and space, for Shaw,
become word and image, and they leak. Cable Factory 20 takes a lot of its structure from linguistic
accidentals, but it in terms of pure page space, there is more ‘iconic’ material than orthographic — and
orthography itself is highlighted as a spatial phenomenon. In an interview with poet Gary Sullivan
around the time of the book’s publication, Shaw describes two basic types of intentionally visuallybased material in the book: ‘backdrops’ and ‘icons.’ Via the icons, Shaw notes in the interview,
“images take on the role they traditionally do in most books: exemplifying or literalizing the text.” The
‘icons,’ like the boyhood image of Smithson, may be smaller than originals, but they leave the original
image intact. A compass repeatedly appears, “divided into 20 sections — with a blown-up salt crystal
inside,” as Shaw notes in the interview, for orientation effects. A one-into-two coaxial line splitter
from the WDM company (15, 20), and a “VX500 Low Profile 1 x N Switch” (25) grounds several pages.
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‘Backdrops’ surround and provide spatial foils for the text-as-text (recognizable verse). They come
from the photos and reproductions that had played a role in the writing (or construction) of the poem,
and are enlarged or reduced into unrecognizability via repeated xeroxing.

Conceiving of language as a system that can be visually breached, or enhanced, has precedents for
Shaw in the work of Robert Grenier and Henri Michaux, where hand-drawn material complements or
replaces or becomes the orthographic — and in comics, perhaps the poetry comics of Jacques Debrot in
particular. Shaw engaged comics (and scale) in an earlier chapbook (Low Level Bureaucratic
Structures: A Novel); in Cable Factory 20, the visual-to-verbal leaks are mechanized, rather than
empaneled, and they are often funny: the young Smithson standing in front of a dinosaur and smiling
for the camera (43); something that looks like a powerful, doorless microwave oven (first appearance
on 16); impedance shifters (61); two serious looking men in ties bent over a ‘project’ (36)— all acquire
a kind of exhausting familiarity, seemingly reappearing through invisible productive algorithms. The
blandness and ubiquity of the icons perfectly concretize the numbing sameness (WDM = ‘World
Domination Modus’?) Shaw’s narrator finds at his chosen Site, the suburbo-industrial sections of the Bay
Area. And they alter the language. Take away the surrounding facing-page glacier, and lines like
“Uplift creases along edge words” (39) change. And where the drawings of Grenier and Michaux have
expressivist elements, Shaw’s visual material seems to parody a kind of linguistic economism, the
reduction of communication to words, by zeroing in on visual and syntactic normativity, and showing
how their absolutes are impossible, at any scale. (Comics do this, too.)

The effect is heightened by the diction that Shaw employs for the written elements, a kind of neodidactic 50s science film narrator who has taken some sodium pentothal and is proceeding to
demythologize progress in the flattest of affects:
A garage opens to slanted paving.
Slats line and into dirt:
controlled by window seat, lake
lines evaporate, bake as
capitals unglue — and you,
making this work
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of neighborhood gates mistake
pleasantness for tryst.
Note boats in park lakes
raw sewage bubbles over
embankments and a handy man
must be summoned. (58)
These lines are set within an enlarged map of the Bay Area, with an icon of what looks like a prison
watchtower. The straight face with which the ‘lake/ evaporate/ bake/ gates/ mistake’ ‘unglue/ you’
and ‘Note/ boats’ rhymes are delivered may make their chimings into a kind of low comedy. Close
looks at the book’s many (fragmentary) maps reveal the locations of many of the sites, but in the
interview, names that don’t show up in the text of the poem get brought out: Oakland, Berkeley,
Emeryville. The fact that these lines literally sit on the map of the place they are describing pushes the
joke, which I take to be the Bay Area itself, completely over the embankments. At the same time, the
watchtower, and the admonishment that passing by gates is not actual contact, lend a sense of the
stakes of saying so. Shaw’s focus, he notes in the interview, tends toward environmental “givens that
structure what one is forced to internalize and be transformed by”: the things that we see, hear, and
grok when walking around.

Shaw, as he notes to Sullivan, found most of the 20 Sites of the poem in Emeryville (where he was
living at the time): a “semi-public, multi-use, vaguely-dilapidated zone... residual and often
transitional... not living up to presentation drawings... not failing wildly, just droning along... park-oid,
or spatial leftovers behaving as parks.” Writing for Landscape Architecture magazine in 1968, Robert
Smithson wrote of developing such patches:
Boring, if seen as a discrete step in the development of an entire site, has an esthetic value. It
is an invisible hole. It could be defined by Carl Andre’s motto — ‘A thing is a hole in a thing it is
not.’ (Smithson 95)
In addition to explicitly invoking Andre Smithson’s use of ‘boring’ as means for entering a space —
undecidable between physically hollowing out or being hollowed out mentally — echoes Warholian
boredom as formulated in POPism: “The more you look at the exact same thing, the more the meaning
goes away, and the better and emptier you feel” (Warhol and Hackett 50). As Shaw’s narrator walks
through Emeryville, “the exact same thing” imposes itself repeatedly. He is forced to internalize and
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be transformed by it. The meaning goes away for the narrator, but not for the reader. The narrator, or
narrators, since the perspective seems to vary from poem to poem, uncover in Emeryville a
Site/Nonsite dialectic within the built environment that is almost infinitely extensive to (as Shaw notes
in the interview with Sullivan) “historical or vertical axes that don’t connect with what’s there now,
but with what had been there”: the discursive webs that produced the area’s architecture persist only
in surface trace. So while the sentences of the poem track singly, there is disjunction in moving from
one to the next, just as there are discontinuities when seeing buildings from different eras stuck next
to each other, casting invisible roots into vanished ideologies and diffusing their toxins into the
present. The text’s disjunctiveness is thus motivated by what we might call ‘discontinuities of site’ —
impossible linkages perceived through space-time when at a particular point, and brought together,
visually and verbally, by the observer-as-artist, and book-as-factory. But it is wrong to “mistake/
pleasantness for tryst”: the encounters afforded by this landscape are not exchanges, but park-oid
structures of control.

The visual-verbal riffs extend to smaller-scaled allusions. One page features a border of xerographically
magnified neo-crosshatchings that suggest hills, paths and tree cover (23). At the same time, they
recall, and apparently use the same technique of magnification as, the cover of Clark Coolidge’s 1980
book Smithsonian Depositions, which, like Cable Factory 20, riffs on Smithson’s essay “The Spiral
Jetty,” its style and contents:
Can you see me? I’m afoot below tilting. The sun seizes, lasting on a flat of pink colloidals. And
basalt over limestone the sound circles the site. Worms rotate in a box of Pacific radio tubes.
We’ve put the cap back on it though the heats will still arise. Sag to the center of the bones, so
this rotation may be termed narration. (Coolidge 42)
While there is stylistic similarity between Coolidge’s laconic Smithsonian riffing and Shaw’s sentences,
Cable Factory draws attention to it using visual, not verbal, cues, a rotation that may be termed
narration. Even the orthography functions as a unit of visual organization, and of allusion: much of the
verse is in fact structured by an acrostic:
Recruits head out in that direction
(owners trick poodles to distraction).
Officers themselves had sat at such tables, unsure,
as they themselves remind us, if their future
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would be with Tegetal, though proud
of oaths, even
Concessions, like renaming the freeway
after traffic victims:
Klaus Fluzoig Way, from an overpass,
traffic speeding along the lagoon.
Slick rooftops after rain, first since
their return to the state,
rushing out for
the sudden heaviness in atmosphere:
clouds weighing on high-rises,
not quite repetition
in pools
which
Welcome the coincidence, crimes
appearing regularly
As newspaper reading increases,
institutionalized
below steady movement,
Teams having been washed down the street
before the hundred year parade,
Enamel on counters, drums suddenly
in blocked direction:
Recognition, they called it,
as if there were a before. (78-79)
Vertical, first-letter-of-the-line acrostics produce ROCKS and WATER — two of the four elements that
Smithson saw from 20 different perspectives within the Spiral Jetty: MUD, SALT CRYSTALS, ROCKS,
WATER. Cable Factory 20’s twenty sections clearly must correspond—at least partially—to the twenty
directions (North; North by east; Northeast by north; etc.) Smithson turned within the Jetty.

If any passages of artworld prose can be said to be legendary, Smithson’s twenty nothing-in-thatdrawer-like iterations are. Shaw’s poem is contained in the Nonsite of Smithson’s boldly empty
observations, just scaled up. Shaw doesn’t let the acrostic be too deterministic; he keeps cataloging
time-bound occurrences to get in effects like “unsure/future” and “Officers/Concessions” as
consecutive line endings. The last line reveals power, pathos and anger in the “recognition” that as
presently configured, the present’s obliteration of the past takes most people with it, and makes
comparisons for correspondence impossible, transforming them into “coincidence.”
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While working from twenty different perspectives fosters a peripatetic quality, there aren’t a lot of
people in Cable Factory 20, so it’s difficult to speak of the book’s social imagination in the way one
might of that of another frequent stroller, Frank O’Hara; the people, including O’Hara, are actually in
Shaw’s follow-up book, The Lobe. Yet Cable Factory 20’s narrator—or “ethnographer,” as Shaw
describes the definitely male protagonistic voice in the interview—describes places as if they had
intentions and personalities. They are coercive and time-bound, like people: “Anonymous treks in the
wetland, never worrying if the nine year old will drown/ Left on frontage, nouning” (44).

“Nouning” is, I think, a pretty complicated pun along those lines. One gets the sense that nouning,
which transforms a noun into a participle, is a play on John Cage-adapted Zen empty mind practice,
one that is intent on letting things come to one as themselves, literally becoming themselves within
the particular context created by the observer’s perspective. For nouning, I believe we are meant to
hear “crying,” as a cry is the ultimate non-nounal noun, a signifier of pain, which, in Wittgenstein’s
private language argument, is the referent no one can agree upon. This reading I think is borne out by
line 27, with its mention of Köningsberg, which is a synecdoche for Kant and Kant’s work. Superficially,
it was Kantian metaphysics that separated things-in-themselves, or “noumena” from things-are-weconceive-them, or “phenomena.” In the light of Kant, “nouning” can also be read as “getting at things
in themselves,” an impossibility in Kant, but why not in the poem?

A parallel visual example is the photo of a boy next to a dinosaur on page 43, which turns out (after a
little digging among internet Smithsonalia) to be Smithson himself (Estate of Robert Smithson). This is
both a Warholian, Brillo-box maneuver, substituting the real thing for our expected experience of art,
but it also adds a touch of flattened out nostalgia to the speaker-construct, as if that photo and its
relation to Smithson’s subsequent production paralleled the relation of a new author to what he
recognizes as his first major work. The simultaneous excitement and nostalgia, like the poems’
didacticism, are more found objects than affective states. The layeredness that Smithson found within
the various strata of the jetty, Shaw finds in, and grafts into, the process of textual production. There
are many more examples like this.
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The book thus seems to be after a larger scale than the “personal” perspective on buildings, or
anything else. As Shaw notes to Sullivan: “In the clamor to situate themselves in the sweep of History,
most things miss. They begin to operate as black holes, sucking up the experience of time and
reproducing it as self-interested arguments about history.” Cable Factory 20 thus takes up “geological
time as a way to complicate temporal frames of reference” produced by a faulty past exerting claims
on the present:
Asked for proof: a ‘Mediterranean’ parking
complex with an amphitheater of sponge yellow seats.
Here, we watch a foundation slab grown-over with
grass patches, trash heaps and several sealed entrances
to what must have been basements. (92)
Anticipating objections from the imagined reader, the ethnographer here foregrounds his position
within his surroundings, and within the book itself — his “apprentice work,” as Shaw calls his activities
in the interview, consists not in knowledge gathering or in the construction of history, but rather in
“effectivity” (93). Time becomes language, a rotation that may be termed narration, so that the
demand for proof and its satisfaction becomes part of the landscape. Obviously, the-walk-around-anddescribe-what-you-see-school of poetics has a pretty diverse heritage, one to which, the narrator
notes, “Everyone, theoretically, has access” (93).

The specific embeddedness of these observations in Cable Factory 20’s mock enlightenment attempts
at systematizing points to larger-scale axes of selection and combination: on the one hand, an acrostic,
and on the other, the diachronic layers of a particular area as synchronically sliced by a body moving
through them, and the demands that are made upon it. Time and space. And it’s these unveiled strata
of time and space that Cable Factory 20’s (underspecified) socio-political structure is most apparent:
in its providing a model for scalar perception. The difference here is that Levinas-like face-to-face
encounters here take place with inanimate objects, and at scales impossible other than textually.
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This is meant to send-up the dialectics of place. But Shaw is serious about the possibilities of scale.
Even if he finds the materials of this preliminary investigation lacking, he is able to make something
out of them. The textual component of the book ends with the following verse:
Now the views have been cut down.
Toner checked.
The prosthetic copy machine redescribes the
world in grain. Does grain alert us?
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All week the in-between.
So steal them.
All that’s left is to see clearly, to think, to conceive, and to begin again.
What city itself could direct us to something
even larger, but controlled? (103)
As Smithson notes (with a pun): “To be in the scale of the Spiral Jetty is to be out of it.” Shaw himself
did leave the Bay Area for another city, “even larger, but controlled.” But this sweeping question of
locale is not what ends the book: there is still one more verso-recto spread to the poem when one
turns the page, one that actually shows “the world in grain.”39 Of the poem’s last two pages, page 105,
on the right, offers a list of ‘Research Materials’ — a bibliography (one that ethically follows up on the
admonition ‘So steal them’). Page 104, however, is completely taken up by a ‘bleed’ (where a printed
image takes up an entire page without white-space borders) of a grainy xerox, along with a WDM icon.
The xeroxed image has been enlarged to the point where the shading effects have been rastered into
dark and light flecks that seem to have a three-dimensional life of their own, while also giving contours
to the dark forms, seemingly a block plan of several buildings, of the image. The altered scale of the
xerox mirrors the altered scale of the map’s version (and creation) of the territory. Such scalar shifts in
perspective are “the world in grain”—so “Does grain alert us?” It does. Just as the orthographically
giant ROCKS and WATER seem to respond to the question with blank insistence, Cable Factory 20
effects a removal from the normal experience of place via a kind of freedom of movement between
visual and verbal, spatial and temporal, or what Shaw calls in the interview “temporary expressivity” —
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an “active version of intertextuality, where there’s a kind of force and reciprocation between a place
and a text....almost as a kind of substance, a pressure bearing down on the field ethnographer doing
his ‘research’. Not just bearing down abstractly, but hooking up with what’s actually seen.”

In this way, the narrator can, near the book’s end, say “I’m not sorry I was fascinated with cameras
and binoculars; that the wars passed. And galvanizing events had to be produced by will” (98). I don’t
think the book can be fully identified with part of this position — that perspective “creates” events, a
position that wryly echoes Language Poetry’s point about putting the onus of reading on readers (or
readers on reading) rather than on texts and authors. The reader of Cable Factory 20 becomes
surrounded by the Bay Area — its topography, its history, its dead forms — and is challenged to begin
again, to try to make a piece of sculpture outside, one that might cause a change in state. One
wonders, however, if everyone really can, theoretically, make a piece of sculpture outside and expect
not to be disturbed. To be inside the cable factory is to be out of it—until “theoretically” starts to take
on negative resonances.

If part of Cable Factory 20 is a kind of scalar laboratory experiment in working with artist-asparameter, then Shaw’s follow-up, The Lobe, works with sets of artists as Sites for the poem as
possibly parasitic Nonsite, destroying the host authority structures that form like crystals on their
reputations, lives, and work, but leaving the desire for encounter intact, like a smiling ray from a
carefully engineered machine. Shaw opens “The Lobe” section of The Lobe, his follow-up to Cable
Factory 20, to which I will now turn, along with what I see as related work from the period, with a
quote from Diderot, writing to Sophie Volland:
Why shouldn’t all nature be like the polyp? When it is split into a hundred thousand fragments
the original polyp no longer exists, but all its elements continue to live. (17)
For ‘polyp’ and ‘lobe,’ substitute ‘self.’ In a review of Bernard Williams’s Truth and Truthfulness,
Richard Rorty points up a chapter that dramatizes Diderot’s idea of ‘what it is to be a truthful person’:
Rousseau thought that you could be authentic simply by laying yourself bare, but Diderot
explained why it was not that easy....Diderot’s proto-Freudian account of the agent as ‘awash
with many images, many excitements, merging fears and fantasies that dissolve into one
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another’ leaves us with the need to construct a self to be true to, rather than, as Rousseau
thought, the need to make an already extent self transparent to itself. (Rorty)
Shaw jokingly refused to attribute many of the epigraphs in Cable Factory 20 — ascribing them to,
among others, “A French Historian” (83), “A Dutch Architect” (95), “A liar living close by” (75)—sending
up the desire for an authorless text. The Lobe plays off the desire to shatter the self-in-text, treating
the desire for full fragmentation as a response to a time and place when writing was ‘forced’ to argue
against the idea of the end of history, and against the idea of the self as a fully actualizable, discrete
little world. It explains why it is no longer necessary to make those arguments, at least in the same
way.

Bruce Andrews’s I Don’t Have Any Paper So Shut Up (or, Social Romanticism) (Andrews) is, among other
things, a mirroring and spitting back of capital’s detritus and its terms for processing it, and a constant
reminder of the hard power that lays behind the soft. The book, already and rightly canonical, arrived
in some packaging: the idea of a de-selfed text. Why was that imposed on it? At the time, the discourse
of the individual, atomized, bourgeois self was valorized by corporate media as the highest unit of
organization and thinking. It did so in a crushingly totalizing way that has now mutated into ideologies,
as the poet Alan Gilbert has noted, like “an Army of one.” On a much smaller scale, a lot of bad poetry
was being written whereby the idea of the ‘self’ was what structured the poem — was what held
together its impressions and descriptions. Analytical content was scorned, often explicitly, in such
work. Charles Altieri identified the era’s “scenic mode” as a poetic whereby “an ideal state where
mimetic criteria of naturalness and an ethical standard of humility can be integrated with moments of
visionary self-transcendence sustained by careful attention to craftsmanly control” (Altieri, Self and
Sensibility). While Marvell, Browning, Eliot, etc. had based the genre of lyric around exploring the selfas-structure (its fictitiousness, its layeredness), poets were often being paid well to take the self
seriously as an essential whole. It was galling mostly for its political effects. Whereas previously, lyric
was aware that most of what gets called the ‘self’ is conjured into being by forces over which we have
little or no control, a certain post-Lowell poetry seemed to posit the non-racialized white self as
whole, sui generis, natural, and as the only legitimate vehicle of self-transcendence. It was like
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advertising. Shut Up was thus, on one level, designed to effectively mimic and disrupt the monolithic,
totalizing media, even poetic media, by turning their terms and tactics against them.

When the book, and others, arrived, some critics claimed that they got ‘beyond’ the self via those
techniques. Then, out of terminological laziness, ‘self’ and ‘author function’ collapsed in on one
another. Just as anyone who reads the internet or Ad Week or watches a lot of TV can begin to see the
signatures within the media combine, so trying to read Shut Up as without the author function cuts the
real power out from under the book — the opening up of a subject position (not the construction of a
‘self’) out of negation, a position that rejects one form of power in order to begin producing others.
Shut Up is not spitting for the sake of spitting, nor is it ‘ambient’ spitting — i.e. it doesn’t propose
‘spit’ as a category that has a metaphysical independence from the spitter. It’s directed and
embodied. Shut Up and other books are productive, as well as resistant.

An eloquent formulation of the resistant/productive dialectic is Sianne Ngai’s essay “Raw Matter: A
Poetics of Disgust.” The kind of disgust Ngai finds in Andrews and others “deliberately interferes with a
reading practice based on the principle that what is at stake in every textual encounter is a hidden
object, one that can be discovered by the reader only if he or she reads deeply enough.” It also has a
further function:
Because the force of its utterances is aimed outward rather than inward, the social attunement
between subjects disgust does achieve is paradoxically effected by a distancing. One ordinarily
thinks of the ‘face-to-face encounter’ as achieved through a process of drawing closer. But in
disgust the opposite trajectory makes this ethically important moment happen. Pulling away
from the object in revulsion, you’re suddenly in front of the other, who, unlike the others, is
attuned to you, who stands in the space you’ve prepared for him through that act of
withdrawal. Paradoxically, in the economy of disgust, it is by means of an originary exclusion
that the textual encounter is made intersubjective. (Ngai)
This is what makes Shut Up and other texts of its era so effective. Beyond whatever effects it has in
heightening the contradictions inherent in sound-bite rhetoric at as systemic level, there is a subject
position to which one attaches an act of withdrawal, even if it is not ‘present’ in the text as a ‘self.’ It
makes textual encounter intersubjective. The kinds of face-to-face encounters one gets in The Lobe
are mediated by transformations of disgust, much as the investigations of Cable Factory 20 are.

184

It is significant that Frank O’Hara (who shows up repeatedly in The Lobe) and Smithson are two white
men who were arguably killed by their art. The Lobe works within what one might call ideational lifespace, actual cullings from an artist’s work as mixed with myths and anecdotes about the life. It’s a
space that most often produces fetish objects. What Shaw’s speaker seems to be after, at one level, is
a new, non-fetishistic form of encounter, one that dusts off the 18th century “Man of Feeling”
indirectly, through the angles by which the poems reject various receptions of art and ideas, and even
take pleasure in the act. Shaw’s poet tries to think disinterestedly in the path of others, without
repeating their presence or precise movements, or those of their admirers, and in the process creates a
kind of mirror displacement: likeness dominates. But does he succeed in his walk? The book is
saturated with the detritus of self in order to show that may be possible to construct a subject position
without producing absolute presence or transcendence—but the presence that it does produce is
ambiguous. There’s no spitting, just strong orderly bowel movements that refuse to let their revulsion
hold back their acts of construction. The speaker sits pleasantly through the entire dinner...

...and, within a few pages, inserts Rush lyrics into “Wilhelm Meister” (20); makes Godard’s strike satire
Tout Va Bien into a downtown 80s office-worker noir disrupted by Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc (23); finds
public restroom chunks of Olive Garden vomit “On Jeff Wall’s Wall” (25); peeks in on Bartleby and
Uncle Fester romancing “Sara Merde” (24); visits with O’Hara and Guy Debord simultaneously in
“Having a Coke with Guy Debord” (57); and is sure, in another O’Hara nod (dated July 2000) that “Bin
Laden is coming on the right day!” (60). Though such references are set within complicating sets of
circumstances, these seem to be the only kinds of encounters that occur in The Lobe.

O’Hara, for one, hovers over the entire enterprise, his presence-in-absence culminating in a section of
sometimes homophonic “translations” that includes the Bin Laden poem, “An Extra Step in the Plaza”
(“It’s my lunch hour so I go/ for a walk along the hum-colored arc,” 60) and a “homophobic”
translation of O’Hara’s “At the Old Place”: “Earl checks out my twin-cap diesel combo./ Yeah, I got a
wrench for that. (Dude, you comin’?)/ Earl hops in” (68).
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In my opinion, Shaw’s “At the Old Place” in particular points to the stylistic invention of the poetic
movement Flarf, its ambiguous affective component. In O’Hara’s poem, 1950s white gay New York
poets congregate for clandestine dancing; in Shaw’s poem, it’s Dukes of Hazard-type guys. The poem’s
appropriations say: “Identity may not be up for grabs, and it may have some immanent component that
is not substitutable. At the same time, I believe that that immanent component is available to me
discursively as someone who gets it.” Shaw is white, cis, and straight. He’s also a Frank O’Hara scholar.
He is not intending to hurt or offend or shock anyone with the poem. He’s intending, I think, to say
something about forms of masculinity. The poem, however, exceeds that, and I think it is partially
from that same exceeding that Flarf happens. Gary Sullivan studied the work in The Lobe very
carefully, and interviewed Shaw in depth about his work. It was around the time that Shaw was
presenting the poems that became The Lobe that the Flarf collective was formed, and, later, that the
first Flarf poems began circulate outside of it (Sullivan, Glory Hole).40 This was also the time of the
brazenly stolen “election,” the ascension of the George W. Bush regime, 9/11, the run-up to the
second Iraq war, and of the Internet becoming widespread and economically essential, and then
seemingly going immediately bust.

Flarf evolved in response to all of those things, but so did a lot of other work. It was also at that same
time that experimental poets of color were beginning to be published in greater numbers by presses
such as Leroy and Krupskaya. Issues of race, and of the colonialism that was then called globalization,
were explicitly coming to the fore in their work as the same issues came to the fore in whitedominated US discourse after 9/11 and, reflectively, in the white-dominated institutions supporting
poetry in the US. Poets such as Rodrigo Toscano and Hung Q. Tu developed tremendously forceful,
almost systematic critiques that were as wicked as they were blazingly incorporative of current events
and, often, in the case of Toscano, that were compellingly calls to action. Flarf also took the discourse
of the regime and its supporters and turned it forcefully back on itself, but the poems’ intentional
ambiguities in framing and their Andrews-like outward force of utterance rely, in reception, on the
kind of mutual recognition in disgust that Ngai describes: they rely on assumptions of the poets’ own
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beliefs and intentions, and on the absurdity of ascribing the poems’ meanings to the authors. The
poems, however, in their ferocity, regularly exceed those terms, “lampoon[ing] right-wing discourse,”
for example, “with such gusto that they seem to express covert sympathy for their subject matter”
(Reed 94). That sense of sympathy is, again, produced by a pleasure in disgust that is matched with an
outward force of utterance and with ambiguities in the poems’ framing that exceed recognition in
Ngai’s sense, something the poems do intentionally.41 They do not make the textual encounter
intersubjective. Flarf, as it progressed, explicitly engaged race in ways that were intentionally "‘Not
okay.’" (Sullivan, Brief Guide), as when, to take one recently-cited example, a white Flarf poet brought
the term “ofay” into a poem (Reed 96).42 Flarf was what it was because white discourse on the Internet
after 9/11 was what it was. It leans on the same white discursive freedoms in the US of the time that
its appropriated texts unthinkingly enforce. While Flarf understands itself as sending up what Melamed
describes as “literature as an antiracist technology,” Flarf was, mostly, a reactionary movement: in its
relentless white-centering in issues of race, colonialism, gender, and violence; in the manner that its
ambiguous framing allowed its appropriated content to exceed its targets; and in the way that early,
ironized forms of “The Promise of American Poetry” feels were burned off, under the banner of
appropriation, in pleasure and disgust.

There is a concrete social sense in which that played out within the institutional rhetorical culture of
US poetry. During its initial larger reception in 2006, Flarf drew reluctant poets of color into the kind of
emotional labor—that of having to explain why, actually, it really was not OK—that Trisha Low
describes as part of the 2015 conceptualism-initiated crisis. Reed specifies the issues surrounding Flarf
as a movement and its 2006 engagements with race in detail (see pages 118-120 of Reed and the
chapter footnotes in particular), but because Flarf lacked the institutional pull that would have made it
a threat to academia or poetry nonprofits, the situation was allowed to continue—just as conceptualism
continued before Black Lives Matter. Unlike Shaw’s work, which does not have an outward force of
utterance and seems deflationary even of Smithson, Flarf’s self-referential ambiguities were as
populist as they were parodic. Rather than being deflationary (with some exceptions), Flarf rode on top
of, and used, the energy surrounding the discourses it appropriated to propel itself forward.
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Promotional events such as the multi-night Flarf Festival, held in a rented theatre in New York in April
2006 (Wired), centered mostly white poets as they enacted their pleasure in disgust, mostly at white
internet discourse, as entertainment.43 Other white-dominated experimental poetry formations from
that moment that were also working with appropriated Internet texts were paying attention: Flarf’s
intentional, inherent ambiguities in framing are a big reason it lent itself to, and was taken up as a
partner discourse by, conceptualism, and why the two movements repeatedly institutionally copromoted, as they did as late as April 17, 2009, at an event at the Whitney Museum of Art in New York
(Whitney).

Flarf’s ambiguities are not different in intent from those of Place’s Gone With The Wind project. The
movement is best understood as the poetic equivalent of whiteness studies.44 An examination of its
reception in terms of race (Yu), in terms of gender (Damon), and in terms of labor (Bernes) bears that
out. The forgotten 2006 Flarf non-crisis (that Reed can keep to a few pages of a generally positive
extended discussion) and the 2015 conceptualism crisis (that actually boiled over institutionally) played
out in exactly the same way: with poets of color having to explain what the problem was, and with
their being met with explanations of the ways that the work was new or complex or challenging. By the
time 2015 finally arrived, from the perspective of poetry institutions, it was something like first time
farce, second time tragedy. The recent release of a recuperative anthology that leaves out both the
most controversial work and its reception is yet another means of using the movement as a recentering mechanism.

If The Lobe somewhat similarly critiques old school purveyors of “emotional content” (as one poem
from the book puts it), the lack of outward force of utterance gives its critiques a different valence.
Straight-edge linguophiles from all eras get equal amounts of piss taken out of them. “The Herder,” for
example, unleashes a set of perfectly calibrated puns on the name, and ideas, of the 18th century
linguistic philosopher. After Herder ruminates on the idea of a sheep, his idea calls back to him as a
series of vocalizations, and epiphany is produced:
The sheep bleats!
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And the soul recognizes,
feels inside —
‘Yes, you are that which bleats.’

(55)

Herder goes on to imagine herding Goethe, but I also hear Robert Lowell’s car radio bleating “Love, O
careless Love.” Just as it’s impossible to write a poetry of place, it is impossible to write a poetry of
encounter, with ideas or other people — but that’s a good thing. Destroying (digesting) these inherited
terms clears the way for further encounter through a kind of disgust that is also not a turn away or a
regurgitation, but a recognition, one the book’s putative speaker can take also pleasure in:
Old School
Behind the consciousness barn raising,
instruments laid out the season’s gift drawings,
‘European Enlightenment’ the campy
organizational style of the gala. We winked
and sipped hooch from our canteens,
while umpteen members sauntered, mouthing
words in explanatory cartouches,
some with ties gone cloven at the seams.
The more we stared, wave patterns
lapped at the lowering clouds.
It was a thing of wonder, this glowing lamb leg:
I felt Ann Lee about and quivered
more than usual in the bowels.
(47)
Sipping a cocktail au dehors as one’s inherited ideational structure forms nothing more meaningful than
a lamb leg (think “golden calf”) is a fairly provocative thing to do. Pleasure in disgust, and pleasure
generally, can freak people out. Marketing departments have become amazing at tying pleasure to
consumer culture (sent up relentlessly in the book), as have their counterparts in institutional poetry.
Having your pleasure and your critique too feels dirty, something the poem’s reversed author of
Polyverse (Lee Ann Brown) might remark, and sometimes like an assertion of class privilege, as the
accoutrements of “Old School” signal. Repeated provocation of that reaction is an operative function
of The Lobe. Its satire is of encounters that reduce people and ideas, dead or otherwise, to cloaking
devices for power.

Andrews’s book remains controversial because eros doesn’t get sent up completely. Alan Davies’s
Candor, which tropes even its own appropriations and the pleasure gained therein, hasn’t yet been
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given the reading it deserves. Duchamp’s Etants Donées speaks of the impossibility of speaking any
further through the female form (luridly abject or otherwise), but is very clear that the form’s
deadness holds “The Illuminating Gas” by which one was supposed to see to proceed. The Lobe begins
with a series of “Exemplary Acts” that include “Six Bodily Graphs” that describe the deadness of the
terms by which everyday life proceeds, materially and ideationally. The pivot point for each of the
piece’s six prose paragraphs is the first person singular possessive (“my”):
Taking its horizon line from the belt of coverings affixed to the “free time” courtyard’s marble
piers, my sequence of bodily elongations and collapses attached quotation marks to the space’s
de facto protective custody effect. (9)
The first person here is a place holder. The piece anticipates its own turn against the terms that
surround that it (while also relying on a shared experience of them). It records the real-time unfolding
of an non-history, but at the same instances betrays pleasure in the ability to construct something even
out of the flimsy crap of forced internalization. Does this leave a self, or some other protective custody
effect, to be true to, or to construct alternate power grids through? It depends on partial
correspondence, of a spectral lamb leg to an abjectly thrust-out femur.
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Chapter 9: Why Not Reddit?: Poetry Communities Online
This short chapter explains why Reddit, beyond its being a commercial service, isn’t used by the global
non-exclusively anglophone poetry community even in the (inadequate) way that Twitter is. A failed
attempt to use Reddit as a platform for explicating a particular poem excerpt is used to help clarify
why it has not been adopted by poetry’s rhetorical cultures. Along the way, I present more detail on
Thomas Farrell’s conception of a rhetorical culture, and link it, just for the sake of looking into
critical-historical congruences, to Stanley Fish’s idea of an interpretive community.

The passage is from Will Alexander’s “Towards the Primeval Lightning Field”:
The body is now weighed on a broken axial cart, its blood conjoined as it rises within a nuclear
darkness of ravens. So as Piscean chronology now shatters, dawn becomes an unclaimed
resurrection, a tumultuous eikon of skin no longer formed around its old dendritic artifacts.
The calendar of draconian enfeeblement with its integers of the past 20 centuries, erased, its
linear Babels darkened by the extreme necessity for a new perpendicular burst, transmuting in
demeanour, with history consumed in a roll of flaming aural dice, with its wizardry of tools
subsumed in arcane vibration, turned into a power of splendiferous scorpions. The psychic
wounds of the past eclipsed in this new millenium by the power of smelted dragon’s blood.
(Alexander)
In this poem fragment, complexity is a kind of meta-encoding: the fact of it, and the attention it
requires, signals an authorial intention to communicate without drawing on (or, rather, by actively
blocking) conventional, low-effort associations that act as forms of cognitive oppression. That intention
is underscored (for US readers) by the British and other unconventional spellings, which heighten the
strangeness of the content that is actually encoded. Take the phrase “the extreme necessity for a new
perpendicular burst, transmuting in demeanour, with history consumed in a roll of flaming aural dice.”
There are myriad associations that habitual readers of poetry will bring to this passage, not least of
which being the endlessly deferred title-assertion of Mallarmé’s poem Jamais un Coup de Dés n’abolira
le Hazard (“Never will a throw of dice abolish chance”) and its devastatingly aphoristic end line,
“Toute Pensée émet un Coup de Dés”: Every Thought issues a Throw of Dice. Alexander’s poem
reintroduces colonial realities of the era (meaning dice thrown would never abolish the fact of being a
colonial subject in France or elsewhere) into Mallarmé’s seemingly liberating poem (i.e. its reputation
as formally liberating within literary history). That is the fire in Alexander’s dice.
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One can put a sentence like “The history, and specifically the colonial history, tied up in Mallarmé’s
seemingly liberating poem, contributes to the fire in Alexander’s dice” into a critical study, and one
can even unpack it to the point that the resonances it seeks to draw out feel verified rather than just
asserted (as I haven’t). One version of historicism would be to look among authorial artefacts for
evidence that Alexander actually had Mallarmé’s dice in mind as a referent for the dice when
composing the poem. Another would be to look at different uses of dice in Mallarmé’s and Alexander’s
differing historical moments as used to invoke historical time. The process of assertion in criticism
(stating a critical insight in a manner that will alter the cognitive environment and result in an
impression) and the process of verification (i.e. making a critical argument drawing on elements that
seem to bolster the case) are largely conjoined.

Teasing out meanings from poems is difficult, and, like many other kinds of work, it happens more
successfully in collaboration. Because the audience for poetry, in the US, is seemingly relatively small
and is perceived as being largely professionalized, it takes place within specialized journals published
behind paywalls, where the monetization of this labor is part of what contributes to the work’s
legitimation, which allows the degree of professionalization to be easily tracked. Professionalization is
also what keeps published critical activity mostly within academia and not a more open pursuit, as it
was, in, say, 19th century England. Blogs, Facebook, and Twitter have changed that to some degree,
with threads of, if not always explication, then appreciation. Probably more poetry discussions are
happening outside academia than within it, but they are not happening on Reddit, where it would
make a lot of sense for them to appear. In order to find out why not, I tried it.

Reddit is the fourth largest site on the internet in terms of daily traffic (Marantz). On reddit, users selforganize into “communities” that center on particular topics, or subreddits, but Reddit is a not a
“walled garden” like Facebook (Guardian).45 Its landing page is simple: it shows the most popular
discussions on the site at any given moment, according to proprietary metrics. The parameters can be
adjusted to display results via various related criteria: by region, and by whether something is “hot,”

192

“new,” “rising,” “controversial,” “top,” or “gilded.” The posts themselves (consisting generally of
“stories, links, and images“) are given titles by the posters, and appear under the poster’s “handle.”
Each post must also be posted under a “subreddit,” or the discussion community formed around
particular topic, concept, or shared interest. Subreddits are always part of any search result for a post.
For example, it looking for current “hot” posts (those with the most traffic), a post titled “Australian
positivity!” with 8263 upvotes, from the subreddit “r/wholesomememes,” is listed toward the center.
Illustration 9.1: Reddit. “Hot” posts.
Subreddits themselves can be searched via various metrics, including popularity. A search for “poetry”
on March 3rd, 2018, yielded the three results seen in the illustration below,
Illustration 9.2 Reddit. “Poetry” search result.
The subreddits listed are “r/Poetry,” a subreddit with more than 125K “subscribers” at the time of this
writing, “r/poetryreading,” at 1K+, and “r/poetry_critics,” at almost 7K.

These reddit “communities” were founded and are moderated by particular people; each has its own
rules of etiquette for what constitutes a relevant post or a relevant comment on a post. “r/Poetry”
consists of links to various poems by published canonical and non-canonical poets, in English and in
translation. Its “What We’re About” section says the following: “This is a forum to talk about the
world of poetry. Seek advice on submitting your poetry for publication. Offer a lesson on
enjambment. Spread the news of a new poet laureate. Etc.” Its moderators “reserve the right to
remove posts as best serves the community.”
Reddit is free as in free beer, but closed in terms of source code access and modification. Its sourcing
of content is cosmopolitanist: anyone whose internet providers allow them to reach the site can post,
but it’s a US-based site, processing memes and controlling populations in a manner no different, in
some ways, than the Poetry Foundation processes poems. The death of the dream of frictionless
transnationalism via the web—aka the borderless internet (Goldsmith and Wu)—has been hastened via
China’s and Russia’s (and Bhutan’s and Iran’s and many other countries’) internet censorship.
Relatedly, as the run-up to 2016 US presidential election and its aftermath shows, trolling and shit-
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posting are phenomena that know no borders. That makes trolling, the bane of contributor-based
websites, at once a transnational and state-mirroring pressure.

Illustration 9.3: Mowrey. “A group of white men is called a subreddit”
The “r/Poetry” subreddit is largest Reddit community based around the discussion of English-language
poetry (r/Poetry). It works to eliminate the greatest source of noise—people posting their own poems—
with a sibling subreddit dedicated to that purpose: at “r/OCPoetry”—i.e. “Original Content Poetry”—
“redditors” can submit and get feedback on their own work, and moderators (“mods”) do try to
enforce the distinction. One thus imagines that “r/Poetry” might be a possible platform for presenting
assertions such as “The dice from Mallarmé’s Jamais un Coup de Dés n’abolira le Hazard seem present
in Will Alexander’s ‘aural dice’ in his poem ‘Towards the Primeval Lightning Field.’” One could post the
link to the poem, which is legally hosted (i.e. without copyright violation) at the Poetry Foundation
site. So I did.

Illustratiion 9.4: Submitting a new post to r/poetry
Like most users, I invented a screen name for myself that does not track to my real name
(hans_seraphim). As I posted the link, a textbox warned, in bold, that “POSTING YOUR OWN POETRY
IN THIS SUBREDDIT IS A DECLARATION OF WAR.” Reddit is not a walled garden: one can view it
without an account, though one needs a login to post. Nine hours after submitting my comment on
“r/Poetry” there were still no comments on my comment, and no other comments at all. The total
number of page views was 10. The same was true six weeks later, though the number of page views
was up to 46. By any metric, for a worldwide internet discussion on poetry, this is a poor showing
indeed. The problem on reddit, at least on “r/Poetry” does not seem to be trolls, although the
problem with trolls on the site as a whole is very well-documented (Marantz). It is, I believe, a lack of
“community”—specifically of a poetry community that might already recognize Alexander and
Mallarmé. Further, my avatar was not known to members of “r/Poetry.” Still, if there are members
who immediately recognize and appreciate Alexander’s work, one imagines there would be some
response. Community is a key word for Reddit, and, in my community, as I imagine it, Alexander is very
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well-known. That does not seem to be the case on “r/poetry.” Of the top posts of all time on
“r/Poetry,” the one that has the most upvotes, at 1009, is titled “My friend made a deep poem out of
common word fridge magnets. It got dark really fast.”
Illustration 9.5: Top poetry posts
The second most upvoted, at 681, begins: “My girlfriends Grandfather, who is a poet in his 90s, has set
up a website for his poetry.” I liked that idea, but it wasn’t what I was looking for in discussing
Alexander’s poem.

Farrell’s theory and practice of rhetorical culture are aimed at “empowering, engaging, and trying to
ameliorate civic life.” His imagined audience is “those who would educate”; he wants to engage a
history where “rhetoric was part of pedagogical philosophy”; he believes that rhetoric can be taught,
and that “any practice worthy of the name should be capable of being performed by others” (2).
Farrell is serious about the ameliorative part of the practice of rhetoric, addressing “reform-minded
individuals and groups who still hope for more responsive and participatory civic institutions” (3). As
seen in previous chapters, the current US system of writing programs is not designed to be ameliorative
in the way Farrell imagines. Their administrations might best be described in Farrell’s unintentionally
caustic terms as “pluralists by necessity, rhetoricians by design” (47); the MFA world’s nods toward
pluralism continue to be fraught (Schuessler). In defense of rhetoric, however, the other term in his
equation, Farrell finds that “Aristotle offers the first, and perhaps the only justification for what
rhetoric must be if it is to be a fully realized, historically significant human practice” (61): he believes
that “the development and sophistication of rhetoric as a practice allows advocate and audience alike
to develop important relational goods and virtues” (ibid). Rhetoric, in Farrell’s view of Aristotle, thus
“moves from being an aesthetically significant form of activity to a practice, an activity with internal
standards of excellence that, if achieved, yield conduct that is ethical” (62) and that helps create and
sustain relations. I will discuss Aristotelian ethos in the next chapter, but suffice to say that the
particular rhetorical culture I was looking for is not on reddit. Reddit’s reputation for low-end
discussion precedes it, but even if that were the case simply creating a new subreddit with firm
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guidelines and hoops to jump through will not create a community-based environment for productive
discussion.

Farrell’s rhetorical cultures have more in common with (and were perhaps influenced by) Stanley Fish’s
“interpretive communities,” and it’s worth revisiting Fish’s initial formulation of the concept of an
interpretive community with regard to social media and digital pedagogy. Such communities are now
eminently hostable. And social sites self-hosted by rhetorical communities might become a means of
legitimation that allows the bypassing of paywalled academic publishing. In his classic paper
“Interpreting the Variourum” (i.e. the Variourum Commentary on Milton’s poems), Fish finds the thendominant procedure for interpretation assumes “that there is a sense, that it is embedded or encoded
in the text, and that it can be taken in at a single glace … [by] first stepping back from the text, and
then putting together or otherwise calculating the discrete units of significance it contains” (Fish 473).
That procedure, based on the code model of communication (discussed in the next chapter), might be
enacted by, in part, “the bringing forward of another analogue, or by a more complete calculation of
statistical frequencies [for word-sense disambiguation], or by the discovery of new biographical
information, or by anything else” (468). Fish’s “quarrel with this procedure (and with the assumptions
that generate it) is that in the course of following it through the reader’s activities are at once ignored
and devalued” as “the disposable machinery of extraction” (473-474). Fish’s positive account of what
doing a reading should mean looks like this:
The reader’s activities are the center of attention, where they are regarded not as leading to
meaning, but as having meaning. The meaning they have is a consequence of their not being
empty; for they include the making and revising of assumptions, the rendering and regretting
of judgments, the coming to and abandoning of conclusions, the giving and withdrawing of
approval, the specifying of causes, the asking of questions, the supplying of answers, the
solving of puzzles. (474)
It will be obvious to the reader that what Fish is describing here is a comment stream avant la lettre.46

The result of the process Fish describes is the same one described by Aristotle, but with a second step—
one that Fish says, explicitly, is actually not a second step at all:
In a word, these activities are interpretive—rather than being preliminary to questions of value,
they are at every moment settling and resettling questions of value—and because they are
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interpretive, a description of them will also be, and without any additional step, an
interpretation, not after the fact, but of the fact (of experiencing). It will be a description of a
moving field of concerns, at once wholly present (not waiting for meaning, but constituting
meaning) and continually in the act of reconstituting itself…. Everything depends on the
temporal dimension, and as a consequence, the notion of a mistake, at least as something to
be avoided, disappears. (474)
What I want to highlight is the insistence on the temporal dimension, on process, which allows an
updated perspective on Fish’s subsequent (later in the piece) definition of “interpretive communities”
(483). For Fish, interpretive communities share strategies of interpretation and constructing authorial
intention, providing “just enough stability for the battles to go on, and just enough shift and slippage
to assure that they will never be settled” (484). For Fish, readers move fluidly in and out of
interpretive communities depending on their sets of interpretive assumptions; the communities might
in fact be described by those assumptions. It is now possible, however, to capture diachronic traces of
the real-time collaborative interpretive acts that Fish describes—in, for example, a subreddit, or a
Facebook or Twitter thread. Doing so may be closer to representing what Farrell calls a rhetorical
culture (where “silences [are] noticeable”) rather than an interpretative community that seems more
based on shared assumptions and skills than on relationships. In the concluding chapter, I will discuss a
means of determining when, pedagogically, an interpretation of this sort is adequate: Aristotelian
ethos.
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Chapter 10: Ethos in Pedagogy as a Limit on Norm Translation
How does one know when a voice or an idea has been borne across in Ghosh’s sense? This short
concluding chapter, a second theoretical corollary to the main argument that picks up from the
previous corollary, proposes a non-definitive but perhaps satisfactory answer: when a poem or voice’s
ethos is relatively clear. Ethos as a pedagogical limit may be useful in norm translation, particularly
when teaching from it. It also has implications for historicist criticism generally.

It was common, during the rise of deconstruction in the US, for critics to reduce Aristotelian concepts
of goodness and badness to simplistic universalist moralizing and to thereby reject ethos as a revealing
critical construct. A main goal of Stanley Fish’s interpretive communities, developed in the wake of
deconstruction, was the collaborative construction of authorial intention and textual meanings
(however decentered), and, alongside of them, the reconstruction of how those texts conceive of
goodness and badness in the Aristotelian sense of ethos. In order look at how that move relates to
Farrell’s rhetorical cultures, I will trace a line beginning with Aristotle’s Poetics. I will argue that Ethos
can be used, when teaching poetry, as a kind of metric, or stopping point. I will also argue that Dan
Sperber and Deirdre Wilson’s Gricean maxim of relevance can be useful in constraining that use of
ethos. The framework delineated by Foucault and elaborated by Fish remains congruent with such a set
of constraints.

Aristotle, in the Poetics, proceeds from an inventory of poetic kinds, positing mimesis as the common
element among them.47 Poetic kinds “are all in their general conception modes of imitation”
(Aristotle); mimesis, while conventionally translated as imitation, refers to something beyond mimicry.
For Aristotle, mimesis is intimately bound up with ethos, or moral character:
Since the objects of imitation are [people] in action, and [they] must be either of a higher or a
lower type (for moral character mainly answers to these divisions, goodness and badness being
the distinguishing marks of moral differences), it follows that we must represent [them] either
as better than in real life, or as worse, or as they are. (ibid)
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“Moral character” (or “character”) in the Poetics is something immanent to a person or persona, and it
is revealed, in texts, through what is said:
Character is that which reveals moral purpose, showing what kind of things [someone] chooses
or avoids. Speeches, therefore, which do not make this manifest, or in which the speaker does
not choose or avoid anything whatever, are not expressive of character. Thought, on the other
hand, is found where something is proved to be or not to be, or a general maxim is enunciated.
(ibid)
“Moral purpose,” in Aristotle’s sense, is “activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with
virtue” (Kraut). It is discernable, once defined, in a relatively transparent fashion: people’s actions, as
represented in texts, mark them as “higher or lower”; they have within them “goodness or badness”;
they are, by the necessities of art, portrayed as “better or worse” than they really are. Choices reveal
character: utterances where choices are not reflected “are not expressive of character,” but wherever
“something is proved to be or not to be, or a general maxim is enunciated” thought is expressed. Ideas
may thus be articulated, but, like passing clouds, not mark their medium.

While for Aristotle “the objects of imitation are people in action,” the speeches or actions performed
in texts, the moments evaluated by readers for ethos, take place against, and take their meanings
from, assumptions about the actions’ possible meanings within what gets shorthanded as a “culture”:
In contrast to modern notions of the person or self, ethos emphasizes the conventional rather
than the idiosyncratic, the public rather than the private. The most concrete meaning given for
the term in the Greek lexicon is “a habitual gathering place,” and I suspect that it is upon this
image of people gathering together in a public place, sharing experiences and ideas, that its
meaning as character rests. To have ethos is to manifest the virtues most valued by the culture
to and for which one speaks—in Athens: justice, courage, temperance, magnificence,
magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, wisdom. (The list is given in Rhetoric, I, 9.)
(Halloran 60)
Whatever one thinks about the contemporary US and its place in the world, the poetry being written
there provides insight into its conflicts, and discloses strands of its dominant ethos. One assumption in
proposing that poetry communities self-archive is that real-time collaboration pitched toward
negotiation will progress toward an Aristotelian state of realizing an ethos, at least when undertaken
within a Farrellian rhetorical culture.
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Despite the fact that figures such as Paul de Man were used as case studies in what happens when the
belief in the possibility of “good” and “bad” as absolutes is removed, the “ethical turn” in
deconstruction did not finally resolve the issue for criticism (Baker). Critic Reed Way Dasenbrock,
sifting the aftermath, finds J. Hillis Miller stating that “an ethical judgment is always a baseless
positing,” one that is always a form of will-to-power. And Dasenbrock finds Fredric Jameson noting that
“conceptions of ethics depend upon a shared class or group homogeneity” (229)—a culture, rhetorical
or otherwise.

Dasenbrock’s study does a very clear job of delineating the stakes of deconstruction’s ethical turn after
De Man, tracking its insistence on non-universalist bases for making judgments, finding though that it
involves some pretty fantastical pretzel logic, as when memorably tracing Lyotard’s attempt, threaded
through Lyotard’s later oeuvre, to “imagine an ethics without universals,” or “judging without
criteria.” Lyotard posits a Wittensteinian ethics based in language games. When competing games are
“incommensurate”:
Injustice in this model comes from totalization, from the imposition of the ethical obligations
of one language game on those committed to a different game, while justice comes from
staying within the limits of a given language game and not imposing obligations felt by those
within a language game on those who do not feel it. (Dasenbrock 100)
The result is “multiplicity of justices” that are “defined in relation to the rules specific to each game”
(ibid). With ‘totalization’, we are, obviously, very close to Foucault, and if we substitute ‘discourse’
for ‘language game’ we are well within the world of Les mots et les choses and what followed, despite,
at the time, some 30 years of attempted revision (Foucault, Order).

“When one says ‘Aristotle’,” writes Foucault, famously, “one employs a word that is the equivalent of
one, or a series, of definite descriptions.” From there, Foucault goes on to elaborate how that word, or
name (that of an author) differs from conventional notions of naming, self, and personhood:
It would seem that the author’s name, unlike other proper names, does not pass from the
interior of a discourse to the real and exterior individual who produced it; instead, the name
seems always to be present, marking off the edges of the text, revealing, or at least
characterizing, its mode of being. The author’s name manifests the appearance of a certain
discursive set and indicates the status of this discourse within a society and a culture. It has no
legal status, nor is it located in the fiction of the work; rather, it is located in the break that
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founds a certain discursive construct and its very particular mode of being. As a result, we
could say that in a civilization like our own there are a certain number of discourses that are
endowed with the ‘author function’, while others are deprived of it. A private letter may well
have a signer—it does not have an author; a contract may well have a guarantor—it does not
have an author. An anonymous text posted on a wall probably has a writer but not an author.
The author function is therefore characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and
functioning of certain discourses within a society. (Foucault, Author 211)
Lyric poetry is one of the discourses within our society that has been granted an author function. The
author of a lyric poem “is located in the break that founds a certain discursive construct and its very
particular mode of being”—one where close identification with, and responsibility for, what is being
said within the poem is valued, and, despite efforts to the contrary, evaluated: that identification is
fundamental to what lyric is: lyric is the form that most explicitly and deliberately explores the
relationship between the functional construction of its author and the explicit construction of
sentences. It is a kind of staging, and it is also material: sentences are built from phonological,
morphological, syntactical, semantic, and, often, orthographical, units, with one measurable extension
or another in space. Lyric’s intimacy with the mechanics of signification makes it a telling expression of
a culture’s sensibility, of its most intimate projections.

At the same time, many readers see lyric as the form closest to the human mind and body. The
following, from an interview with poet Stephanie Burt, who writes often as a critic, clearly articulates
that perspective on poetic voice:
My colleague Helen Vendler (echoing a letter of Gerard Manley Hopkins’s) has described lyric
poetry as a score for performance by the speaking voice: the poem becomes yours when you
take it into yourself, which also means taking it into your body, your voice: both the body you
have, and the body you wish or imagine that you ought to have. (Barnett)
The reader enters, bodily, into the speaker-author equation. The degree to which the poem produces a
convincing voice and an absorptive reality is often called perspective, one which the reader explicitly
identifies and takes up, on this view, when the poem is successful. Perspectivalism, as a theory of art,
generally echoes the Eliotic ‘shred of platinum’ where the actual world is transmuted in an
individualized perspective that forms the poem. On that view:
Every poem, like the individual mind from which it springs, views life from a particular point of
view. By point of view I do not mean merely the literary term that designates the grammatical
person telling the poem; I mean the essential view of life that permeates the poem and makes
it unique from all other poems—the poem’s perspective. The poet cannot camouflage [their]

201

essence, [their] ego, the sense of reality that is [their] particular point of view, [their] locus,
and [their] singular position on the rim of the world. … Faulty perspective cannot be hidden
under decoration; it is the poem’s central focus, its perspective, that determines the truth of a
poem. The “realness” of the poem is inextricably linked to the reality of the poet. The poem is
as real as he is. This fact determines the accuracy of the poem’s perspective. If the poem is
not real and true (in the moral sense too), its perspective may be said to be askew. (N. Sullivan
5)
Minus the strong individualistic perspective, I think that this is true. Even with algorithmically produced
or other constraint-based poetry specifically designed to frustrate attempts at author construction, I
am looking for this: lyric, as a mode of reception, makes me want to construct an author behind the
work, one with intent, and to evaluate the choices made and resulting perspective. And I look to do so
over time: authors have histories specific to them.

For Foucault, however, the trajectory of discourse, with regard to the author function, and in terms of
social good, was away from that sort of construction, not toward it. For Foucault, the author:
is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in
short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition,
decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. … [T]he author is therefore the ideological figure
by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning… it does not
seem necessary that the author function remain constant in form, complexity, and even in
existence. (220-222)
The famous Beckett reference that concludes the essay (“What does it matter who is speaking”) has
profound political implications: reaching that point would mean a kind of freedom that is currently
unknown. The word “chooses” (“limits,” “excludes”) leads back to Aristotle. In pedagogy, cultural
assumptions, and the interpretative choices they lead to, are part of a text’s “rhetorical situation”
within reception (Sproat, Driscoll and Brizee). The rhetorical situation, on the reception side, includes
assumptions about the way actions’ possible meanings reflect on:
1.
2.
3.
4.

the people (or characters) within texts
the implied author or narrator within the text
the actual author or authors
the reader(ship) reconstructing and evaluating the actions

In this sense, ethos takes its place in Aristotle’s rhetoric alongside logos, pathos, telos, and kairos as a
kind of argument or appeal. As such, ethos is what “we might call the argument from authority, the
argument that says in effect, Believe me because I am the sort of person whose word you can believe”
(Halloran 60). Ethos is thus:
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frequently translated as some variation of “credibility or trustworthiness,” but it originally
referred to the elements of a speech that reflected on the particular character of the speaker
or the speech’s author. Today, many people may discuss ethos qualities of a text [sic] to refer
to how well authors portray themselves. But ethos more closely refers to an author’s
perspective more generally. In this resource, ethos means “author.” (Sproat, Driscoll and
Brizee)
The slippage here, in an online resource for teaching Aristotelian rhetoric to undergraduates, between
the speaker’s and the author’s perspectives with regard to ethos is telling: ethos is not individualized.
For Foucault, reading in this way imposes a (bourgeois) limit on signification; the author function is
deeply tied to ethos, and ethos, here, is a limit, an impediment, a figure that marks—marks-off. The
ascription of meaning is a limiting act in the sense that it precludes further interpretation. The lyric, at
this moment in our “civilization” (to use Foucault’s term) ties the author function, for many poets and
critics in the US and elsewhere, very tightly to ethos: poems are read for how their meanings reflect on
projections of the author. Not to see the connection between ethos and authorship, at this moment in
the history of the US, reads as a gross dishonesty, a failure of solidarity with others who lack access to
many discursive and economic spaces in the US. And since lives are limited, and destroyed, by the
same forces that both project and limit meaning, understanding them—slowing them down, naming
them—is integral to trying to understand the forces shaping society itself, in order to change it in the
direction that Foucault advocates.

A person’s set of acquired beliefs and conceptual associations becomes the backdrop, or framework,
against which actions, Aristotelian or otherwise, take place and are evaluated. That environment is
constructed, innately, within a larger social context, in a process of human development described, if
not quite commensurately, by Piaget and Foucault (Silverman). That set of beliefs and associations
might be characterized as a person’s working theory or theories about the world, with specific
assertions serving as nodes of association within the network, what Quine called the “web of belief.”
That same network’s silent critical workings had previously been made manifest, in a literary-critical
context, in a notorious experiment in pedagogy: “Irrelevant Associations and Stock Responses”
(Richards, Practical Criticism), which demonstrates, unforgettably, how the operating theories of
undergraduates can be wildly out of phase with poems being interpreted. More recently, “[i]t has
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become almost a common-place that, in Jonathan Culler’s words, ‘one can never construct a position
outside tropology from which to view it; one’s own terms are always caught up in the process they
attempt to describe’” (Sperber and Wilson, Rhetoric and Relevance 141-142). Cognitive scientists
Sperber and Wilson thus find criticism in the unsatisfying position of being only “interpretive” rather
than “explanatory” about the how of meaning (ibid 142). They aim to solve the dilemma by locating a
flawed assumption about how language works: what H.P. Grice called the “code model of
communication.” The code model assumes meanings in the head of person a get transmuted into
symbols, which get transmitted to person b, who translates them back into a’s meanings. Linguists and
cognitive scientists don’t yet know what people are actually doing when communicating: while it is not
inconceivable for human language to work according to the code model, the facts on the ground of
language use suggest that that’s not what’s actually happening in people’s brains. For Sperber and
Wilson, the fact that “unparaphrasable effects” are still present in speech and in texts “strongly
suggests that more is communicated than is encoded” via “uncoded ‘implicatures.’” Implicatures, for
them, work on the reception side. They are “inferred by the audience” by combining whatever can be
decoded “with contextual information and general expectation of the communicator’s behavior”—
which in the case of texts, means a concept of authorship. Thus, instead of having to encode all of a
meaning each time, communication has inference hard-wired into the process “as a supplement to
encoding and decoding, designed to economize on effort” (ibid 143-144). On this model, the
transmission of meanings, and thus (and here is my point) of ethos, proceeds, at least partially, via
inference: it depends upon knowledge of the world, and ideas about how things work, that are called
up by association, and go beyond whatever is directly encoded in the text.

The inferential model, if true, thus offers a fascinating further justification for historicist criticism,
beyond historical determinism itself: one must know what has been left out of any text in order to read
it properly. Historicist criticism seeks to reconstruct the sets of assumptions that were in play—or had a
high probability of having been in play—at the time that particular poems were produced, and to
impart them to current readers (Gallagher and Greenblatt). The historicist readings in this study,
especially in the Ashbery and O’Hara chapters, seek to reconstruct context along those same lines, but
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with one eye always on the pedagogical situation for which such reconstructions are ultimately
destined. Within poetry pedagogy, I think that ethos can function in a manner analogous to relevance,
i.e. for knowing when a reading of a poem is sufficient in a pedagogical situation with regard to
meanings that may not be directly encoded. Ethos, in pedagogy, can function as a kind of metric. The
inspiration for treating ethos as a metric in this way comes out of Sperber and Wilson’s idea of fully
coded communication as the “limit” in the transfer of meaning:
Instead of viewing the fully coded communication of a well-defined paraphrasable meaning as
the norm, we treat it as a theoretical limit that is never encountered. Instead of treating a mix
of explicitness and implicitness, or paraphrasable and unparaphrasable effects, as a departure
from the norm, we regard it as normal, ordinary communication. We define communication not
as a process by which a meaning in the communicator’s head is duplicated in the addressee’s,
but as a more or less controlled modification by the communicator of the audience’s mental
landscape—or “cognitive environment” as we call it—achieved in an intentional and overt way.
(ibid 144)
For Sperber and Wilson, encoded intended meanings are an idealized, asymptotic limit, a possibility, a
never-achievable. Their expectation is that meanings will be implicit, and that inference will always be
necessary. Their model of communication, literary and otherwise, is one where someone with an
intention (the speaker) works to modify an uncharted landscape (the addressee’s space of belief). That
is achieved not with discrete units, but with systemic modification. It is the same with ethos; the
goodness or badness of an action is never an encoded absolute within the text, but rather is inferred
through a non-individualized set of beliefs. And pedagogy itself, in terms of evaluation, can make use
of ethos in the sense of being able, given a particular and accepted reconstruction of an historical
moment, to make decision about the goodness or badness of a speech or action within the poem, or the
cumulative force of a poem as a whole as an author’s intentional object.

Effects of this sort tend, according to Sperber and Wilson, to be holistic. While an isolated factoid can
alter a person’s cognitive environment, “it can equally well be modified by a diffuse increase in the
saliency, or the plausibility, of a whole range of assumption, yielding what will be subjectively be
experienced as an ‘impression’” (ibid). What Sperber and Wilson propose, in moving from meaning to
“impression,” is that a poem may not have a specific, paraphrasable meaning to the person who reads
it, but that the poem nevertheless alters the set of filters that they bring to the world, via inference:
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“Decoded meaning structures are not directly adopted by the audience as thoughts of their own; they
serve rather as very rich evidence that can be exploited by largely unconscious inferential processes to
arrive at comprehension proper” (ibid). The process of “comprehension” described by Sperber and
Wilson is analogous to the process of “implication” described by Quine in defining what he calls “the
web of belief”; it is the thing, the assertional system, that “makes our system of beliefs cohere”:
If we see that a sentence is implied by sentences that we believe true, we are obliged to
believe it true as well, or else change our minds about one or another of the sentences that
jointly implied it. If we see that the negation of some sentence is implied by sentences that we
believe true, we are obliged to disbelieve that sentence or else change our minds about one of
the others. Implication is thus the very texture of our web of belief, and logic is the theory
that traces it. (Quine and Ullian)
For Quine, writing about 12 years earlier than Sperber and Wilson, the mechanism of implication is
logic: we evaluate the truth of a sentence and compare that truth to a set of stored statements, or
beliefs, and evaluate the former in light of the latter, or reevaluate existing beliefs in the light of new
information.

Sperber and Wilson’s “inferential processes” work similarly, but do not solely or necessarily proceed
via logic; when evidence is “exploited by largely unconscious inferential processes,” comprehension is
guided by the principle of (and here again is where I have been wanting to arrive all this time)
“relevance”:
Human information processing requires some mental effort and achieves some cognitive effect.
The effort required is an effort of attention, memory, and reasoning. The effect achieved is
the alteration of the individual’s cognitive environment, by the addition of new beliefs, the
cancellation of old ones, or merely the alteration of the saliency or strength of beliefs already
held. We may characterize a comparative notion of relevance in terms of effect and effort as
follows:
(a) Everything else being equal, the greater cognitive effect achieved by the processing of a
given piece of information, the greater its relevance for the individual who possesses it.
(b) Everything else being equal, the greater effort involved in the processing of a piece of
information, the smaller its relevance for the individual who possesses it.
We claim that humans automatically aim at maximal relevance, that is, at maximum cognitive
effect for minimum processing effort. (Rhetoric and Relevance 144-145)
First, I want to argue that the principle of relevance, combined with ethos, makes a usable construct in
the pedagogy of historicist criticism—in reading poems from other eras with students. Everything that
Sperber and Wilson claim about our operating set of beliefs can also be claimed about any non-
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operational ones (that is, the representations of prior realities we hold in our heads when reading
historically). Secondly, and completely outside the realm of their intention but relevant to this study,
Sperber and Wilson have described shit-posting avant la lettre. What the internet does best is exploit
human attention and information processing: most gain for least effort (if gain be catpic-based
endorphins). This aspect of relevance becomes salient when working to define community (as I believe
Farrell has done, at least in terms of poetry). Thirdly, Sperber and Wilson principle of relevance also
applies to lyric poetry as a discourse in what is perhaps an unexpected way: in some of its current
forms, lyric engages in the explicit troping of relevance: it promises exponentially greater rewards for
greater effort, and wraps itself in sonic packets that do not have any direct one-to-one correlation with
a poem’s ostensible subject. Tap slightly along poetry’s fault-lines, and this insight reverberates across
its varied plains: one can identify poetic oeuvres that, as a facet of the poet’s practice, are
specifically, if tacitly, constructed to exploit the boundaries of relevance, and of processing load, so as
to slip past conventional processing, and, thereby, conventional conceptions of history, as in Will
Alexander’s poem.

Within the Aristotelian model, to close the circle, people come to poetry, the world, and to themselves
in life through “two causes, each of them lying deep in our nature.” The primary cause is an inner,
instinctive need to perform mimesis, which is tied to a psychological reward structure:
The instinct of imitation is implanted in people from childhood… We have evidence of this in
the facts of experience. Objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to
contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity: such as the forms of the most ignoble
animals and of dead bodies. (Aristotle)
Through the contemplation of imitative representation, people can literally transform pain into
pleasure. That ability is, for Aristotle, the first cause of, and the locus for, the transformative power
of art. And it may in fact be a human truth: there is a wealth of scientific evidence about how human
imitation functions within human development (Jones); sets of similar studies confirm the role of
mimesis in art (Sawyer). So ingrained is the human mimetic tendency for Aristotle that the Poetics
finds mimesis functioning even when the original is missing, and also finds it in highly abstracted forms.
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It is within these forms that one can discern the second human poetic drive: “the instinct for
‘harmony’ and rhythm”:
If you happen not to have seen the original, the pleasure will be due not to the imitation as
such, but to the execution, the colouring, or some such other cause… even dancing imitates
character, emotion, and action… by rhythmical movement.” (Aristotle 19-21)
It is here that the pleasures of the abstract, and of abstraction, lie. Among other implications, this
form of mimesis actually gives “dancing about architecture” (O’Toole) an ancient foundation, with
“meters being manifestly sections of rhythm” that at once reveal the characters of the architect and of
the built world. That world is produced, in history, in tandem with, and against, time as represented in
the web of belief. The common elements across different peoples’ webs of belief are what we call
culture, or context. It is the set of constraints through which people derive dignity, and, relatedly,
satisfaction. Isolating enough of one another context to make and evaluate meaning, intended and
otherwise, is the task of historicist criticism. The relations produced by poetry form a community
beyond constraints of time or locale.
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Notes
1

Here Spahr is quoting David Beech.

2

See Ellingham and Killian, 209-210.

3

I’m going to use lower case c throughout when discussing conceptual poetry, but I mean the branded
thing of Kenneth Goldsmith, Craig Dworkin, Vanessa Place, Rob Fitterman, and others, as detailed in
chapter two.

4

More positive examples, partially successful in being at once discursively inside and outside, are
utopian/dystopian works that try to imagine futures past the set of existing conditions. There are some
examples in poetry (and within science fiction and comics) of representing existing conditions while at
the same time discursively (only discursively) destroying their terms in the US. The work represents
existing conditions and tries to imagine beyond them, or create space within them. Here I think first of
Will Alexander, Renee Gladman, and Nathaniel Mackey.

5

Following Vivek Narayanan, I will prefer the term Indian Poetry in English to Indian Anglophone Poetry
or other coinages. It was Narayanan, who has written repeatedly about Missing Person, who first
introduced me to Jussawalla’s work.

6

Poets in the UK have a better chance of having heard of Jussawalla in part due to Commonwealth
Studies: numerous departments in exist in India; there’s a degree-granting school at the University of
London; similar scholarship happens in the Caribbean and in Australia; and the Commonwealth
Foundation awards annual book prizes (in British Pounds). None of this changes actual economic
relations. It is discursive cosmopolitanism. And the institutions distort the work.
7

Transpiling is associated with JavaScript frameworks, and here I mean taking something from one
framework and putting it within the terms of another.

8

“Native speaker,” for linguists, basically means complete acquisition by osmosis in childhood.

9

Vivek Narayanan alerted me to this omission.

10

Vivek Narayanan introduced me to this book.

11

Documented in a single monograph by King; in minute detail in the giant and very rich edited
collection from Chaudhuri; and more compactly in the edited collection from Agarwal.
12

I published a version of this argument in early 2010 without being aware of Fred Moten’s writing on
the term “open secret” in B Jenkins, published that same year.

13

I internalized anti-Blackness on Long Island, directly, as a child, from family members, from friends,
and from the entire structure of society in growing up white and Ashkenazi. I am not claiming any
moral authority over Kenneth Goldsmith. I say and do things that I later recognize as racist in my
writing and otherwise. When I do recognize it, I try to take responsibility for it in ways that do not
perpetuate further harm.
14

I first learned of the book from Wendy Trevino’s Twitter feed, @prolpo.

15

See Jackie Wang’s Carceral Capitalism on this tactic.

16

The bombings took place mostly at night with very few casualties, according to Time (Burrough).
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17

Lee’s piece includes the following, to which I feel sure Goldsmith’s performance was intended to be
a riposte: “A quick but important side note: [Goldsmith] avoids events rooted in racialized narratives or
communities—Martin Luther King Jr.’s and Malcolm X’s assassinations are left untouched [in Seven
American Deaths and Disasters]. This in itself begs the question if an ‘American death’ or an ‘American
disaster’ requires ‘white’ victims.”
18

Spahr and Young’s study, which takes its title from Mark McGurl’s The Program Era, notes that
McGurl makes this same move:
[McGurl] has, for instance, some disdain for Chicano/a literature, because he only notices its
appropriation by higher education and not its origins in the resistant moment that also
produced El Plan de Aztlán. This means that he unfairly presumes that Chicano/a literature is
created for “the increasingly paramount value of cultural diversity in U.S. educational
institutions” and is yet another “new way of accumulating symbolic capital in the fervently
globalizing U.S. academy, pointing scholars toward valuable bodies of expertise they might
claim as their own and offering a rationale for the inclusion of certain creative writers in an
emergent canon of world literature.” This unwillingness to trace larger histories and to see
higher education as a manipulative force is one of the failures of McGurl’s otherwise excellent
project. (Spahr and Young)
19

The MCAG site at http://gringpo.com/ has been taken down as of this writing (September 1, 2019).
Several dispatches from the group at the moment in question can be found on the Poetry Foundation
website: see “Gold Star” and “Dream Library.”
20

The poem was published with the following note on its composition: “Taken from Prissy’s famous
scene in the movie version of Gone with the Wind, Place phonetically transcribes the 'unreliable'
slave’s words, which are then set in Miltonic couplets.”

21

The individualized idea of the writer with hidden social sources, in the US, retains historical nuance
from US transcendentalism. In his 1842 address entitled “The Transcendentalist,” Emerson defines a
tendency that had already taken shape in New England:
We have had many harbingers and forerunners; but of a purely spiritual life, history has
afforded no example. I mean, we have yet no man who has leaned entirely on his character,
and eaten angels’ food; who, trusting to his sentiments, found life made of miracles; who,
working for universal aims, found himself fed, he knew not how; clothed, sheltered, and
weaponed, he knew not how, and yet it was done by his own hands... Shall we say, then, that
transcendentalism is the Saturnalia or excess of Faith; the presentiment of a faith proper to
man in his integrity, excessive only when his imperfect obedience hinders the satisfaction of
his wish. (Emerson)
Emerson’s excess of faith, with universalist aims, but strictly personal results, is what
transcendentalism ran on, and it is a thread that runs through US thought and poetry. It is the
foundation of the self-psychology detailed in the chapters on Ashbery and O’Hara. And it is embedded
in US lyric itself. In Self and Sensibility in American Poetry, Charles Altieri identifies a major thread of
later 20th century poetry in the US as “The Scenic Mode”: poems by white male poets that evince “the
concern for modest, highly crafted narrative structures producing moments of sudden illumination”
(Altieri, Self and Sensibility 5). Altieri draws examples—mostly set “in naturally conceived scenes”—
from the work of poets including William Stafford, Richard Hugo, Stanley Plumley, and Charles Wright.
For Altieri, the main goal of The Scenic Mode “is not to interpret experience but to extend language to
its limits in order to establish poignant awareness of what lies beyond words” (10-11): excess of faith
(in language), with universalist aims, but strictly personal results. It is a poetic that takes
individualized transcendence to be a form, the fullest form, of self-realization, or self-actualization;
Altieri’s “poignant awareness” is a hedge on individualized transcendence. The Scenic Mode—and what
Ron Silliman has called “Quietism,” and, in a slightly later (and more anxious) form, what Stephanie
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Burt has called “ellipticism” (The Poetry Foundation)—partake of individualized transcendence via faith
in their own use of language. The practitioners of poetry in these modes in the US are almost all white.
Saturnalia itself was a Roman solstice festival that was marked by a reversal of social roles, with slave
and master changing places. Some poetry is descriptive of conditions by reproducing them, or
mimicking their forms of attention or desire. Individualized transcendence is, in that sense, part of the
master-slave dialectic. At a time when Gordon Allport was still at Harvard, Ashbery wrote his
undergraduate thesis for F.O. Matthiessen on Wallace Stevens’s “Chocorua to Its Neighbor.” The poem,
first published in 1933, was collected in 1947’s Transport to Summer (as in army transport) and is
obliquely name-checked in The Pisan Cantos published the following year. Ashbery’s use of quotation
throughout Some Trees echoes the vatic emptiness of Chocorua’s reporting of what it heard from
within a “shadow.” Stevens’s poetry was, in contemporary reviews, denounced as something like, in
the self-description of poet John Wilkinson, “neo-baroque flummery” (Wilkinson). Frost, probably
thinking of Dorothy Parker’s 1928 poem, said that Stevens wrote poems about “bric-a-brac” (Barron).
And “Personism is to Wallace Stevens what la poésie pure was to Béranger” (O’Hara). The mainstream,
or mainstreaming process, remains the same regardless of the system to which it is hooked up.
Mayakovsky was a mainstream poet. Every era really does get the poetry it deserves, but description is
not always subscription.
22

Here it is again, with the line that follows: “The coming into being of the notion of ‘author’
constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature,
philosophy, and the sciences. Even today, when we reconstruct the history of a concept, literary genre,
or school of philosophy, such categories seem relatively weak, secondary, and superimposed scansions
in comparison with the solid and fundamental unit of the author and the work” (Foucault 205).
While “Foucault provides no evidence but his own authority” for this formulation, which links the
invention of copyright to modern authorship, but further formulation and historical work has in fact
largely borne it out--while maintaining that anonymity has a place in the market as well. (See Griffin
877-879.)
23

This literature, while aware of Foucault, tends to err in a manner exemplified by the following,
which seems to ignore or elide completely racism as a constraint on individualization: “The very high
and growing rate of incarceration in the highly individualised society of the USA is a vivid example of
the difficult relationships between individualisation and the observation of the moral and legal norms
of community life” (Genov).
24

Adrienne Rich moved from Columbia University to City College at the same time, and, in teaching
and collaborating with Lorde and Jordan, and in working toward the transformation for under-served
students, aided a self-transformation that increased the value of her work. For a useful account of
Rich’s time at CUNY and SEEK, see Savonick.
25

Chapter two originally contained a discussion of the Undercommons and some issues surrounding
SEEK. The discussion was basically an extended close reading of the opening of Harney and Moten’s
book, which was my way of coming to understand the terms of their argument. I will put it here in this
note in case it is of similar help to someone.
Harney and Moten’s definition and description of structural racism and how it works draws, in its
opening, on Hollywood depictions of colonialism inside and outside the US. Harney and Moten begin
with Michael Parenti’s “classic anti-imperialist analysis of Hollywood movies” where Parenti “points to
the ‘upside-down’ way” that Hollywood depicts the colonial process:
In films like Drums Along the Mohawk (1939) and Shaka Zulu (1987), the settler is depicted as
surrounded by ‘natives’, inverting, in Parenti’s view, the role of the aggressor so that
colonialism is made to look like self-defense. Indeed, aggression and self-defense are reversed
in these movies, but the image of a surrounded fort is not false. Instead, the false image is
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what emerges when a critique of militarized life is predicated on the forgetting of the life that
surrounds it. The fort really was surrounded, is besieged by what still surrounds it, the common
beyond and beneath—before and before—enclosure. The surround antagonises the laager in its
midst while disturbing the facts on the ground with some outlaw planning. (17)
The “forgetting” that Harvey and Moten are talking about is erasure, the erasure of the reality, and
persistence, of Black social life outside the fort and within the surround, or already-existing forms of
Black self-determinative life that exist beyond settler colonialist enclosure. The book elaborates on the
power and beauty of the surround in language that is consciously not conventionally philosophical,
theoretical, or academic. As the book’s second paragraph begins, Harney and Moten make clear how
conventional forms of colonial representation damage the structure of the surround:
Our task is the self-defense of the surround in the face of repeated, targeted dispossessions
through the settler’s armed incursion. And while acquisitive violence occasions this selfdefense, it is recourse to self-possession in the face of dispossession (recourse, in other words,
to politics) that represents the real danger. Politics is an ongoing attack on the common – the
general and generative antagonism – from within the surround. (ibid)
Harvey and Moten use the first-person plural to take up an “us” that recognizes that Black life in the
US is there, and continues, and continues to be itself, despite the fort, and beyond politics. The
common is the general, and generative, antagonism: the resource that the surround produces, through
Black social life, the thing that the settler’s incursion is trying to settle along with the land. Politics,
when taken up within the surround as a means of self-defense, becomes an attack on the common,
because politics is always directed within and toward the fort and its laws, and it also implies that
there is something that needs to be changed about Black life. Recourse to self-possession, to
individualized, representative conceptions of individual or family life, in the face of repeated, targeted
dispossessions via state or other armed incursions, becomes an attack on the common because recourse
to self- possession fails to recognize and give primacy to the common as it exists. That is part of how
politics itself becomes enclosure, something not to be taken up, since the thing one wants from politics
already exists and can be generated within Black social life.
The third paragraph begins with the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, “first theorists of the
revolution of the surround” (ibid). It took a few readings before I realized that the book is talking at
once about The Black Panther Party as an actual concrete source of inspiration, and also as a
synecdoche for talking about not just self-defense, but about the use of violence in explicitly anticapitalist self-defense:
Their twinned commitment to revolution and self-defense emerged from the recognition that
the preservation of black social life is articulated in and with the violence of innovation. This is
not a contradiction if the new thing, always calling for itself, already lives around and below
the forts, the police stations, the patrolled highways and the prison towers. The Panthers
theorized revolution without politics, which is to say revolution with neither a subject nor a
principle of decision. Against the law because they were generating law, they practiced an
ongoing planning to be possessed, hopelessly and incessantly indebted, given to unfinished,
contrapuntal study of, and in, the common wealth, poverty, and blackness of the surround.
(18)
Gloss: Black social life exists; it does not need to be created or changed from being Black. The history
of Black Panthers is a history of self-organization: the People’s Free Food, Free Medical Centers, and
Free Ambulance Service, the Intercommunal Youth Institute; Seniors Against a Fearful Environment;
the Black Student Alliance (Chiles). All of these programs were created from within, and for, the
surround, with no reference to the tower, no political maneuvering to get funds, generating the law.
Harney and Moten’s book is written to work at several levels at once: for people who are aware of this
history, and see it as a model, they are saying things that are unsayable within the academy by a Black
scholar; the Undercommons is an open secret, a concept that Moten’s book of poems B Jenkins
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engages, as does an essay that is a kind of pre-cursor to The Undercommons, “Black Op.” The new
thing as a false, political necessity exists only in accepting a false reversal, in trying to reconcile the
tower to the surround: to change in order to try to end the threat. Though they do not use
conventional terms, Harney and Moten follow the Black Panthers in rejecting electoral politics within
racial capitalism, in rejecting struggle for rights within the system’s terms and limits, because it is in
the moment of politics that the common disappears within the enclosure:
The hard materiality of the unreal convinces us that we are surrounded, that we must take
possession of ourselves, correct ourselves, remain in the emergency, on a permanent footing,
settled, determined, protecting nothing but an illusory right to what we do not have, which the
settler takes for and as the commons. But in the moment of right/s the commons is already
gone in the movement to and of the common that surrounds it and its enclosure. What’s left is
politics but even the politics of the commons, of the resistance to enclosure, can only be a
politics of ends, a rectitude aimed at the regulatory end of the common. (ibid)
For Harney and Moten “politics” requires an acceptance of a false belief that the tower’s aims are
finally democratic, when in fact democracy is only an asymptotic image offered by white supremacy as
bait. Part of the price of admission is the surrender of identity:
In the trick of politics we are insufficient, scarce, waiting in pockets of resistance, in
stairwells, in alleys, in vain. The false image and its critique threaten the common with
democracy, which is only ever to come, so that one day, which is only never to come, we will
be more than what we are. But we already are. We’re already here, moving. We’ve been
around. We’re more than politics, more than settled, more than democratic. We surround
democracy’s false image in order to unsettle it. Every time it tries to enclose us in a decision,
we’re undecided. Every time it tries to represent our will, we’re unwilling. Every time it tries
to take root, we’re gone (because we’re already here, moving). (19)
To be “more than what we are” is a false because “we already are,” and failure to see that is an
implicit rejection, an exclusionary mechanism couched in the terms of inclusion. The mechanism, the
engine, for politics as described here is the institution: “all institutions are political, and all politics is
correctional, so it seems we need correctional institutions in the common, settling it, correcting us.
But we won’t stand corrected” (20). Harney and Moten devote a stand-alone chapter to the university
as an institution of this kind. Poetry is produced and consumed in these institutions; poetry, within the
university, has a close relationship with compositional pedagogy partially due to the number of
programs where MFA instructor-poets are also teaching so-called “basic writing.” In the 1960s, towerbased institutions teaching basic writing and composition began to recognize Black social life,
sometimes recruiting from the surround, and sometimes from the tower. It was a complex process that
is still becoming clear, with demands for education coming from within the surround, changing the
tower, and the tower responding with attempted absorption.
An important early instance of this phenomenon has recently been carefully-documented, from a
pedagogical standpoint, by pedagogy scholar Danica Savonick, who looks at the faculty of City College’s
Search for Education, Elevation, and Knowledge (SEEK) program, “the nation’s first state-mandated
educational opportunity program” targeting underserved students, many of whom were Black
(Insurgent). Savonick’s study focuses on classroom practices and the effect of the program on the work
of the practitioners involved: Black writers Toni Cade Bambara, June Jordan, and Audre Lorde. In 1968,
Adrienne Rich, who was white, Jewish, and gay, took leave from Columbia University to join them at
the SEEK program at City for two years. Savonick’s study details the deep ties to social movements and
innovative pedagogies that the four writers developed, often collaboratively, at City.
Early in her narrative, however, Savonick follows Alexis Gumbs in noting that, over time, the university
system worked Jordan and Lorde “literally to death”; after they left City College, their respective
universities “repeatedly deny[ed] them the medical leaves they required as they battled cancer” (ibid
39). Savonick touches on Harney and Moten’s assessment of the situation of Black intellectuals within
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the university, but does not come down on the side of Harney and Moten’s bleak conclusions for the
impact of teaching for Black faculty.
Harney and Moten’s account of university diversity practices bear out Sara Ahmed’s analysis in every
way. Drawn from two careers’-worth of witness, Harney and Moten depict a moment, in 2014, where
archival operations on the 1960s and 70s social movements are complete (SEEK was, arguably, one of
archival power’s early moves), and where the professionalization of the field is its paramount driver.
Harney and Moten are here writing about the moment where the subversive intellectual (I read their
“subversive intellectual” as a Black subversive intellectual) realizes that any changes she tries to effect
will be deflected, and any criticisms she raises will be seen as a reputational attack. They depict the
place in which the work she wants to do might actually get done, and get recognized:
[T]he subversive intellectual came [to the university] under false pretenses, with bad
documents, out of love. Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome. The university needs what
she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. She
disappears into the underground, the downlow low-down maroon community of the university,
into the undercommons of enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets
subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong. (Harney and Moten 26)
For Harney and Moten, reformation of the university is not a goal, because it is not a true possibility:
the university is situated in the laager; its “hiring hall” within the tower. Regarding the commons, and
the irredeemability of the university, Harney and Moten’s are unequivocal: “THE ONLY POSSIBLE
RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNIVERSITY TODAY IS A CRIMINAL ONE” (ibid). For subversive scholars, the
university becomes a place where resources should be exploited in a manner commensurate with the
way that their teaching labor is exploited, and their identities are appropriated.
As Savonick notes, the move from Columbia to City and SEEK definitely “catalyzed a major shift in
Rich’s work” (Savonick, Changing) into a period that critics are beginning to find her best (Chiasson).
Rich, Savonick continues, “was part of a pedagogical movement in which words had impact, and the
literature classroom embodied the possibilities of personal transformation and the difficulties of
institutional and social change.” The classroom, here, allows the kind of access that Reginald Shepherd
describes—access even to one’s own experience of alienation. That is a very non-trivial thing.
“Difficulties,” however, are the structure, not the impediment of possibility. For Harney and Moten
institutional and social change are defined by the fact that they are “only ever to come.” If, as archival
power gained force and refined its techniques, what happened for Rich, as for Bambara, Jordan, and
Lorde, was something that finally did not translate into a sustained collectivity outside of the
classroom, then it was so by design. Their collaborations were engineered by the early forms of a
diversity that was designed to be discursive. Thus, while the transformations that happen in the
classroom are not trivial, for students or for instructors, changing education in order to change society
is not part of the program: the fort remains the fort. Institutions becoming more inclusive of the
surround is a function of archival power. It also improves people’s lives: that is what is known as
incremental change, which tends to be cyclic, taken away as the political pendulum swings back.
The point that I want to make here is that, from the perspective of many instructors coming to the
university from the surround, personal transformation is a product that practitioners offer for hire, and
it is a purposeful limit on what they do, a form of individualization. For practitioners like Rich, coming
from the tower, the reward for working toward transformation in under-served students was a selftransformation that increased the value of her work. For writers like Lorde and Jordan, it was a refuge
that ended up denying them time to seek care against impending death. For Harney and Moten, the
only possible outcome for scholars like Jordan and Lorde when reporting within university precincts
today is disappearance. The reason is a concept of professionalism that requires them to reify the
system:
[E]ven as it depends on these moles, these refugees, it will call them uncollegial, impractical,
naive, unprofessional. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when
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one can have it all, they will ask. But if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor
disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the
Undercommons—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act. And it is at the same time,
the only possible act. (ibid 27-28)
Professionalization has become a field of study in itself, with its own definitions and jargon
(“Acculturation, or as it is often called, professionalization, is the process of preparing students to fit
into the culture of the professional community” (Rockwell and Sinclair).) It is not an accident that
Harney and Moten published their critique through a non-academic publisher (minor compositions) and
have made it available (as all titles via the press are) as a free PDF. They advocate, for scholars
entering the university from the Undercommons, a subversive use of the university; in the face of a
professionalization that leads to effacement, Harney and Moten find the subversive scholar will seem
“unreliable… disloyal to the public sphere… obstructive and shiftless, dumb with insolence in the face
of the call to critical thinking. (Harney and Moten 34). There have been multiple responses to this state
of affairs in the university, including calls for “slow scholarship”—”to slow scholarship down as part of
challenging the growing inequities in higher education”—as in this statement by a feminist academic
collective:
As feminists who have commitments to antiracism and social justice, we have no nostalgia for a
university that excludes women and people of color. Our call to support slow scholarship is part
of the struggle for accessible higher education and for the decolonization of knowledge, in
which experimentation, creativity, different epistemologies, and dissidence are all valued and
encouraged. (Slow Scholarship 1254)
Their call invokes “care work” as theorized by Sara Ahmed, where carving out space for one’s own
needs within the proscriptions of capital can be radical for scholars besieged by university demands and
lack of support. Self-care, however, has actually been repurposed within the corporate US as a way to
increase productivity, and emptied of meaning to the point of banality (Bright Space Coaching). The
call for slow scholarship does not, in addition, include an account of the university’s role in the
archiving of collective action, with professionalization (and its attendant time commitments) as major
strategies toward doing so. It does acknowledge the need for a certain degree of already-attained
privilege in order for the call to be enacted. It is also a call for atomized, rather than collection action
or the kind of social refuge in Harney and Moten’s sense of the Undercommons (which allows
contradictions to reproduce themselves at the surface while finding solace in work getting done
below).
Appropriation of the concept of the Undercommons, which is already well underway in academia and
beyond, should be categorically rejected. What I hope I have established in presenting fragmentary
versions of the arguments of Harney and Moten is the fact that there is a real case for the
abandonment of many institutions as we currently know them, including the university as currently
instantiated within racial capitalism. And that professionalization is not what leads to satisfaction for
scholars or for those who want to develop an understanding of the world, as Alexander proposes. What
this project proposes for global non-exclusively anglophone poetries is a shitty substitution, but one
that does not require professionalization for admission or participation, and one that allows poetry
communities to perform their own inevitable archival operations. Self-archiving might allow for the
preservation of intent, and the maintenance of frames that do not directly funnel value back into the
state.
26

See Isobel Bess, a poet writing as a critic, for a full critique of Henry Bienen’s role at the Poetry
Foundation, part of Bess’s larger critique.
27

See Jamie Berrout, a poet writing as a critic, for a full critique of the collaborationist model, part of
Berrout’s larger critique of the Poetry Foundation.
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28

That is a fascinating but oft-told story that is beyond my scope here. Similarly, there is a lot of
contention over definitions of what “free” software, and elucidating it and taking a position on it
requires a monograph in itself.
29

Vivek Narayanan, after reading a draft of this argument, reminded me of the fact that the Poetry
Foundation’s Harriet guest blogger platform initially allowed comments, along with the popularity of
Kenneth’s Goldsmith’s comments there. Narayanan, who was living in Delhi at the time that the
Foundation allowed comments, used the site to have exchanges with US-based poets whom he didn’t
otherwise know. He also noted that the posts were a major way that Goldsmith built his early
reputation.
30
The poet Charles Bernstein, writing as a critic, has a list of more than 30 “EXPERIMENTS” for
teaching posted at his current departmental site (Bernstein, EXPERIMENTS). Many of them could be
similarly digitized.
31

Confusingly, there is an open source product on offer from Blackboard called Blackboard Open LMS –
this turns out to be what was formerly known as Moodle’s Moodlerooms product, which Blackboard now
controls (Lederman).
32

To continue a bit: “a track star for Mineola Prep” is a ludicrous invention to anyone actually from
Long Island. Mineola is a county seat that is known for its drab and industrial setting; there is no such
institution there that could disgorge a prep school track star of the kind being invoked here. That said,
O’Hara would absolutely have passed, or even stopped at, the Mineola Long Island Rail Road station on
his way to Southampton. At the same time, it’s very unlikely he got down there. If he did, he is being
mercilessly ironic here about its isolated way-station blandness.

33

Ashbery and O’Hara’s friendship is beautifully detailed by Roffman.

34

Vincent offers caveats: “While Shoptaw’s theorization is the best offered so far for homosexuality as
semiotic access to Ashbery’s poetry, it seems itself to misrepresent homosexual content in John
Ashbery” (Vincent, Looting).
35
A nice review of Stein’s lab work, in the sense of describing what actually took place there, is
available in Hoffman.
36

Ashbery’s interest in the form can also be linked to Auden’s sestinas “Have a Good Time” and
“Paysage Moralisé” (Wasley).
37

This chapter takes the opposite approach to William Kherbek’s dissertation Chinese Whispers Chinese
Rooms: The Poetry of John Ashbery and Cognitive Studies, titled for a later Ashbery collection and an
early Ned Block paper respectively (and unfortunately in all three cases), which “us[es] Ashbery’s
poetry as a means of entry into controversial areas in formal cognitive studies” and into theories of
syntax and of context. My argument in this chapter looks, from a specifically historical perspective, at
possible parallels between theories of language and mind that were in play in Cambridge, MA, when
Ashbery was an undergraduate at Harvard and afterward, on Ashbery’s Some Trees; I’m trying to make
a weakly historical argument about the 1950s. I discuss Chomsky’s generative grammar in an
introductory manner, presenting it as first developed in the 1950s, as Kherbek does on page 77-79 of
his thesis; we both also refer to the famous Colorless green ideas sleep furiously formulation of the
independence of syntactic organization (as does Weinstein, of whose work I was unaware before
reading Kherbek’s thesis). Kherbek looks most closely at The Tennis Court Oath and at current versions
of Chomskyan linguistcs. Sperber and Wilson’s work, which I discuss in chapter 10 and which Kherbek
also discusses (although we focus on different constructs) is something I’ve been aware of for a long
time: it features in my 1991 undergraduate thesis on James J. Gibson’s concept of Affordance.
Kherbek’s work is extremely insightful, and I think my work here and Kherbek’s much more extensive
work along these lines are complementary.
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38

The region where the Kootenay School of Writing was founded and remains takes its name from the
Kutenai First Nations and indigenous societies. At this point in my research I have not been able to
determine what relation, if any, the KSW, which has been white-dominated, has had to indigenous
societies or movements in the area.
39

This particular use of “in grain” with rendering dates back at least to Shakespeare, here in Twelfth
Night:
Viola: Good Madam, let me see your face.
Olivia: Have you any commission from your lord to negotiate with my face? You are now out of
your text. But we will now draw the curtain and show you the picture. [She removes
her veil.] Look you, sir, such a one I was this present. Is’t not well done?
Viola: Excellently done, if God did all.
Olivia: Tis in grain, sir; ’twill endure wind and weather.
40

It is also right at this same time that Douglas Rothschild published the precepts of the “Poetry School
of Poetry” as part of the subpoetics collective’s subpublish or perish project. The three precepts are:
1. Poems should be good.
2. A poet must have a sense of temperance.
3. A poet’s first job is to learn to edit.
Rothschild and Ngai lived in the same building in Brooklyn, on Cumberland Street. Both knew Sullivan.
Sullivan’s extended reaction to the Poetry School of Poetry, Rothschild remembers, was intense (and
negative).
41

A comment on the Flarf review piece by Shell Fischer (see the bibliography) references the work’s
outward force: “When I read some flarf I feel somewhat deflated. As if the poet is laughing at me…”
<https://www.pw.org/comment/743#comment-743>.
42
I’m not making a moral argument. I did something analogous at least once in my own writing, in the
title poem of the first version of my first chapbook, Telemachiad, in 1999. I wrote about what
happened afterward in a piece called The res poetica, which was published in the Web journal
Sustainable Aircraft in 2010. The context of the poem “Telemachiad” and of the book was
schizophrenic discourse, but the framing of both poem and book was ambiguous—it never explicitly said
anything was appropriated, or from where, or what the speaker’s relation to schizophrenia was
supposed to be. Here is the relevant passage of discussion from The res poetica:

Poetry is capable of sustaining any form of ironic communication.
Poetry can attempt to recapitulate and reiterate stereotypes
without the poem’s author function seeming to be a node
for drawing pleasure in discharge from the stereotypes themselves.
Or, in an ironic effort to drain the stereotypes of charge,
the node may draw pleasure in disgust,
as a sign of self-implication, a white flag.
Pleasure in disgust, and pleasure generally, can freak people out.
The res poetica requires constant renegotiation of forms of permission.
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Deriving pleasure from disgust and deriving pleasure from re-iterating stereotypes
can, during discontinuous communicative acts, look like the same thing.
I once published a poem that contained the [three] lines
The Asian woman sat eating Tam crackers.
I laughed.
This stuff is endless.
When I first read the poem at Halcyon in Brooklyn in 2000,
a member of the audience had a visible visceral reaction,
and the res poetica, running like a current through that moment,
was damaged and destroyed.
43
“It's all geared toward entertainment,” Rothschild said when interviewed regarding Flarf in 2009
(Fischer).
44

That includes K. Silem Mohammad’s Deer Head Nation, a book whose circumstances of composition
have never been fully articulated publicly. Damon recounts how Flarf anticipates this critique: “‘His
Whiteness Writes a Poem’ by one poet begets ‘Beyond the Complexity of My Whiteness’ by another
(who is not white); ‘Houston, We Have a Problem’ begets ‘My Problems with Flarf’ begets ‘My Problem
with Gary Sullivan’s Problems with Flarf’ begets ‘My Problems with Flarf’ Business Model’ begets ‘What
is Your Porblem’ begets ‘No Porblemo’” (140).
45

According to the site’s “about” page:
Reddit bridges communities and individuals with ideas, the latest digital trends, and breaking
news (...okay, and maybe cats). Our mission is to help people discover places where they can
be their true selves, and empower our community to flourish.
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I arrived at this insight on my own as a product of the texts I have put into play here, but it is likely
that I’m not the first person to have had this insight. I have searched things like “Stanley Fish comment
stream” but have not found anything. If I have missed something, I wish it to be known that I am a poor
researcher, not a plagiarist.
47

Aristotelian poetic kinds listed in the Poetics include epic, tragedy, comedy, Dionysian dithyrambic
poetry, and most forms of flute and lyre music.

233

